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[A  BRIEF  TEXT-BOOK 


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Moral  Philosophy, 


BY 


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REV.    CHARLES   COPPENS,   S.T., 

W 

Author  of  "A  Brief  Text-Book  of  Logic  and  Mental  Philosophy,"  "A  Prac- 
tical Introduction  to  English  Rhetoric,"  and  "  The  Art 
of  Oratoricml  Composition.''' 


The  rule  and  measure  of  human  acts  is  reason." — St.  Thomas. 


New  York  . 
SCHWAKTZ,   KIKWIN  &  FAUS^ 
43  Barclay  Street. 


?r 


%  ' — ~ 

Copyright,  1895, 

by 

CATHOUC  SCHOOL  BOOK  COMPANY. 


ALL  RIOBTS  RESERVBO. 


PREFACE 


This  "  Brief  Text-Book  of  Moral  Philosophy "  is  a  com- 
panion volume  to  the  author's  "  Brief  Text-Book  of  Logic 
and  Mental  Philosophy,"  lately  published  and  already  exten- 
sively used  in  Academies  and  other  educational  institutions. 
The  author's  aim  is  to  present  to  students  and  readers — to 
such,  especially,  as  are  unfamiliar  with  the  Latin  language — 
a  brief  yet  clear  outline  of  the  system  of  Ethics  taught  in 
Catholic  Colleges,  Seminaries  and  Universities.  This  system 
is  based  on  the  philosophy  of  Aristotle. 

Questions  of  Ethics,  which  in  former  times  were  left  to  the 
close  scientific  treatment  of  specialists,  are  at  the  present  day 
freely  discussed  among  all  classes  of  society — in  newspapers 
and  popular  magazines,  in  the  workshop  and  in  the  parlor. 

Extravagant  notions  of  individual  and  social  rights  are 
circulated,  while  the  rash  speculations  of  so-called  scientists 
are  sapping  in  many  minds  the  very  foundations  of  morality. 
Never  before  has  there  been  a  more  urgent  call  on  the  part 
of  the  people  for  the  lucid  exposition  and  the  correct  appli- 
cation of  sound  moral  principles. 

In  this  sad  confusion  of  thought,  no  small  utihty  will  be 
found  in  a  clear,  simple,  systematic  explanation  of  the  ethical 
doctrines  taught  by  the  greatest  minds  of  the  past  ages,  and 
lately  most  highly  recommended  by  our  Supreme  Pontiff,  the 
illustrious  Leo.  XIIL  Such  an  exposition  the  author  has 
endeavored  to  present  in  this  little  volume. 

The  Author. 

Creighton  University,  Omaha,  Neb. 
March  12,  1895. 

3 


Digitized  by  tine  Internet  Arcliive 

in  2007  witli  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


http://www.arcliive.org/details/brieftextbookofmOOcoppiala 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

Introduction, 7 

BOOK  I— DIRECTION  OF  HUMAN  ACTS. 

Chapter    I.  The  End  to  which  Human  Acts  are  to 

be  Directed :  .11 

Article     I.   Ends  in  General,         .         .         .         .11 
"         II.   The  Last  End  of  Man,        ...  13 
"       III.  The  Attainment  of  the  Last  End.         .  20 
Chapter   II.  The  Morality  of  Human  Acts :       .        .  27 
Article     I.   The  Essence  of  Morality,    ...  27 
"         II.   The  Determinants  of  Morality,    .         .  33 
"       III.   Accountability  for  Moral  Acts,    .         .  36 
"        IV.   Circumstances  that   Lessen   Account- 
ability,    39 

**         V.   The  Passions,     .....  42 

"       VI.  Virtues  and  Vices.       ....  45 

Chapter  III.  Law,  the  Rule  of  Human  Acts:      .        .  49 

Article     I.  The  Moral  Law,          ....  49 

"         II.   Conscience,         .....  57 

"       III.   Sanction  of  the  Moral  Law.          .         .  63 

BOOK  II.— INDIVIDUAL  RIGHTS  AND  DUTIES. 

Chapter    I,  Eights  and  Duties  in  General       .        .  69 

Chapter  II.  Our  Duties  to  God :         ....  74 

Article      I.  Adoration,           .....  75 

"         II.   Faith  in  God, 77 

"       III.   Love  of  God 84 

Chapter  III.  Our  Duties  to  Ourselves.         ...  86 

5 


6  Contents. 

FAOB 

Chapter  IV.  Onr  Duties  to  Other  Men :       .        .        .89 
Article     I.  Duty  of  Love  to  Others,      ...       89 
"         II.  Duties  Regarding  the  Minds  and  Wills 

of  Others,  .  .  .  .  •  9' 
"  III.  Duties  Regarding  the  Lives  of  Others,  95 
"  IV.  Duties  Regarding  Honor.  ...  99 
Chapter  V.  Rights  of  Ownership :  .  .102 
Article  I.  Validity  of  Titles  to  Ownership,  .  102 
"  II.  Violations  of  Ownership,  .  .  .  109 
"  III.  Various  Modes  of  Acquiring  Property,  no 
**  IV.  Transfer  of  Property  by  Contract,  .  112 
"        V.  Wages  of  Laborers 114 

BOOK  III.— SOCIAL  RIGHTS  AND  DUTIES. 

Chapter    I.  Society  in  General  .        .119 

Chapter  II.  Domestic  Society : 123 

Article     I.  Nature  and  Purpose  of  Domestic  So- 
ciety,      123 

**         II.  Unity   and    Indissolubility   of    Matri- 
mony,   .         .         .         .         .         .125 

"       III.  Parental  Authority — Education.  .     130 

Chapter  III.  Civil  Society: 139 

Article  I.  Nature  and  Origin  of  Civil  Society  :  .  139 
%  1.  The  End  of  Civil  Government,  139 
%  2.   The  Units  that  Compose  Civil 

Society,        .         .         .         .141 
$  3,   Civil  Authority,        .          .          .141 
§  4.   Means  Employed  by  Civil  Au- 
thority  145 

Article    II.  The  Functions  of  Civil  Government :     146 

§  I.   Legislation,      .         .         .         -147 

$  2.  The  Judiciary,  .         .         .     149 

$  3.   The  Executive.         .         .         -153 

Chapter  IV.  International  Law.  .        .        .        -155 


INTRODUCTION. 


1.  Moral  Philosophy  is  the  science  of  the  moral  order,  or 
of  the  right  and  wrong  of  human  acts.  It  is  called  Ethics 
from  the  Greek  word  rfir],  which,  like  the  Latin  word  mores, 
signifies  morals.  Since  its  object  is  not  merely  speculative 
knowledge,  but  the  true  direction  of  hirnian  acts,  Ethics  is 
also  styled  Practical  Philosophy. 

2.  Ethics,  we  say,  directs  human  acts.  However,  not  all 
the  acts  of  a  man  are  called  human  acts,  but  only  such  as  are 
under  the  control  of  his  free  will.  Whatever  he  does  neces- 
sarily— /.  e.,  whatever  he  cannot  help  doing — results  from  the 
physical  laws  of  nature,  and,  as  such,  is  willed  and  directed 
by  the  Author  of  nature.  For  instance,  a  man  may  fall  like 
a  stone,  or  grow  like  a  plant,  or  perceive  a  sound  Hke  a  brute 
animal,  without  any  power  on  his  part  to  prevent  himself 
from  falling  or  growing  or  hearing,  if  the  required  conditions 
are  present.  These  are  cuts  of  the  man,  but  they  are  not 
acts  of  what  is  distinctively  human — namely,  his  intellect  and 
his  will.  The  term  human  act  is  restricted  in  Philosophy  to 
those  acts  which  a  man  does  knowingly  and  willingly — which 
he  has  the  power  either  to  do  or  not  to  do. 

3.  To  be  qualified  for  the  direction  of  human  acts.  Phi- 
losophy must  derive  its  conclusions  by  reasoning  from  first 
principles;  it  must  take  into  account  the  nature  of  man,  and 
the  natures  of  all  the  causes  that  influence  human  action. 


8  Introduction. 


Much  of  this  we  have  considered  in  Metaphysics,  or  Mental 
Philosophy.  Ethicg  is  thus  founded  on  Metaphysics :  Moral 
Philosophy  assumes  as  its  principles  the  conclusions  estab- 
lished in  Mental  Philosophy. 

4.  To  explain  the  object  of  Moral  Philosophy,  which  we 
have  declared  to  be  the  true  direction  of  human  acts,  we  shall 
treat  in  Book  I.  of  the  direction  of  human  acts  in  general;  in 
Book  II.,  of  the  special  duties  and  rights  of  men  viewed  as 
individuals;  and,  in  Book  III.,  of  the  rights  and  duties  of  men 
viewed  as  members  of  society. 


BOOK    I 


THE  DIRECTION  OF  HUMAN  ACTS 
IN  GENERAL. 


5.  In  order  to  treat  of  the  true  direction  of  human  acts, 
we  shall  examine  in  Chapter  I.  the  end  or  term  to  which 
such  acts  are  to  be  directed;  in  Chapter  II.,  the  morality  of 
human  acts;  and,  in  Chapter  III.,  the  rule  by  which  they  are 
to  be  directed  to  their  end. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE   END   TO    WHICH    HUMAN    ACTS   ARE 
TO    BE    DIRECTED. 

In  the  present  chapter  we  shall  consider  :  i .  Ends  in  gen- 
eral.    2.   Our  last  end.     3.    The  attainment  of  our  last  end. 

Article  I.     Ends  in  General, 

6.  We  mean  here  by  end  the  purpose  for  which  a  thing 
exists ;  the  end  of  an  act  is  the  purpose  for  which  that  act  is 
done.  For  instance,  some  may  read  a  certain  book  for 
pleasure ;  others  for  instruction,  others  again  to  practise  obe- 
dience :  the  act  is  the  same,  the  ends  are  various. 

7.  Every  human  act  is  done  for  an  end.  For  a  human 
act  is  an  act  of  the  will,  and  the  will  cannot  act  unless  the 
intellect  proposes  to  it  something  to  which  it  may  tend, 
i.  e.,  something  good.  The  will  is  only  another  name  for 
the  ratiotial  appetite — that  is,  the  power  of  tending  to  a  good 
which  the  intellect  proposes  to  it.  The  good  intended  is  the 
end  of  the  act.  Hence,  every  act  is  done  for  an  end.  You 
may  object  that  you  have  no  special  intention,  e.  g.,  in  read- 
ing ;  that  you  read  merely  to  kill  time,  to  be  busied  with  some- 
thing, etc.;  nevertheless,  you  act  for  an  end  or  purpose,  the 
end  in  this  case  being  to  kill  time  or  to  find  occupation. 

8.  We  do  not  say  that  the  end  intended  is  always  a  true 
good,  but  only  that  it  is  always  good  after  a  manner ;  that  it  is 


12     Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 

at  least  an  apparent  good,  and  aimed  at  because  apprehended 
as  good.  It  may  be  conceived  as  good  in  itself,  worth  tend- 
ing to  for  its  own  sake,  or  as  a  means  conducive  to  some  other 
good.  No  man,  however,  intends  evil  for  the  sake  of  evil, 
but  only  because  he  sees  something  good  and  desirable  in 
what  he  wills  or  in  its  result.  A  man  may  do  evil  to  another 
for  the  sake  of  revenge,  and  thus  do  what  is  morally  bad ;  he 
may  do  evil  to  himself — he  may  even  kill  himself ;  yet  he  can- 
not do  so  except  for  a  purpose  which  he  apprehends  as  good 
in  some  respect — for  example,  to  be  freed  from  trouble.  No 
will  can  possibly  act  without  aiming  at  something  that  has 
been  apprehended  as  in  some  way  desirable. 

9.  We  must  distinguish  the  nearest  or  proximate  end,  the 
farther  or  remote  end,  and  the  last  or  ultimate  end,  beyond 
which  the  agent  does  not  look  and  in  which  his  desire  rests. 
Thus  a  student  may  exert  himself  in  order  to  win  a  prize, 
because,  by  gaining  the  prize,  he  will  please  his  parents,  and 
by  striving  to  please  his  parents  he  will  please  God.  In  this 
act  of  the  student  the  prize  is  the  nearest  end,  his  parents 
a  farther  end,  and  God  the  last  end. 

Perhaps  he  does  not  think  of  God,  but  aims  at  pleasing  his 
parents  so  as  to  receive  a  promised  sum  of  money,  with  which 
finally  he  intends  to  buy  some  sweetmeats  for  the  gratification 
of  his  palate.  In  this  act  he  makes  the  enjoyment  he  derives 
from  the  gratification  of  his  palate  the  last  end. 

10.  In  the  example  just  given,  the  sweetmeats  constitute 
the  objective  end;  the  enjoyment  of  them  is  the  student's  sub- 
jective end.  The  objective  or  material  end  is  the  object 
aimed  at ;  the  subjective  or  formal  end  is  the  attainment  of 
that  object. 

1 1 .  We  must  also  distinguish  the  end  of  the  work  from  the 
end  of  the  workman.   A  watchmaker,  e.  g.,  constructs  watches 


The  End  to  which  Human  Acts  etc.      13 

in  order  to  earn  a  living.    The  end  of  the  work,  the  watch,  is 
to  mark  the  time;  the  end  of  the  workman  is  to  earn  a  hving. 

12.  An  end  is  said  to  be  (a)  actually  intended,  if  at  the 
time  of  the  act  it  is  thought  of  and  aimed  at ;  (b)  virtually 
intended,  if  the  act  is  influenced  by  a  former  intention  to  at- 
tain an  end,  though  that  end  is  not  thought  of  at  the  time  of 
the  act;  (c)  habitually  intended,  if  a  former  intention  has 
not  been  retracted,  yet  does  not  for  the  time  being  affect  the 
act;  (d)  interpretatively  intended,  if  the  act  was  not  really 
intended,  but  would  have  been  so  intended,  if  the  case  in 
hand  had  been  foreseen.  Let  us  take  an  example.  A  boy  is 
sent  by  his  father  to  assist  a  distressed  family.  He  sets  out 
with  the  actual  intention  of  fulfilling  this  commission.  While 
walking  along,  he  is  occupied  with  other  thoughts  and  is  un- 
mindful of  his  message,  yet  he  directs  his  steps  aright  in  vir- 
tue of  his  former  intention — that  is,  with  a  virtual  intention. 
He  may  delay  for  hours  at  a  friend's  house,  totally  uninflu- 
enced by  the  purpose  for  which  he  started  out ;  nevertheless, 
as  that  purpose  has  not  been  given  up,  it  remains  as  a  habit ; 
it  is  habitual.  At  last  he  reaches  the  distressed  family,  and 
finds  them  in  such  want  that  he  feels  confident  that  his  father, 
if  he  knew  the  circumstances,  would  wish  him  to  give  a  larger 
alms  than  the  sum  appointed.  Accordingly  he  gives  this 
larger  alms,  acting  on  his  father's  intention  as  he  interprets  it. 
This  is  the  father's  interpretative  intention — i.  e.,  what  he 
would  have  actually  intended  if  he  had  known  the  facts. 

Article  II.     The  Last  End. 

13.  The  last  end,  as  stated  above  (No.  9),  is  that  object 
in  which  the  agent's  desire  rests.  If  in  his  act  the  agent  ex- 
cludes all  reference  to  any  further  end,  the  end  is  positively 


14     Direction  of  Human  Acts  itt  General. 

last;  if  such  exclusion  is  not  made,  the  end  is  negpatively 
last.  By  the  absolutely  last  end  we  mean  that  object  which, 
by  its  very  nature,  requires  that  all  action  be  subordinated  to 
it,  and  that  in  it  all  desires  shall  rest. 

14.  The  first  principle  of  Moral  Philosophy  is  this: 
Thesis  L     God  is  the  absolutely  last  end  of  all  things. 
Proof.  Such  an  end  we  have  defined  to  be  an  object  which, 

by  its  very  nature,  requires  that  all  action  be  subordinated  to  it, 
and  that  in  it  all  desires  shall  rest.  Now  God  alone  can  be 
that  object.  For  all  things  except  God  are  contingent  or  im- 
necessary,  /.  e.,  they  have  not  in  themselves  the  principle  of 
their  own  existence  (Ment.  Phil.  No.  104),  but  they  exist  only 
because  and  in  so  far  as  God  gives  them  being  (Ment.  Phil.  No. 
220),  and  preserves  them  by  His  will  and  power  (No.  263). 
Hence  God  possesses  entire  and  perfect  dominion  over  all 
things,  and  in  the  creature  there  is  nothing  that  is  not  de- 
pendent on  God.  He  has  therefore  the  right  to  make  all 
things  tend  to  Himself  and  to  rest  in  Him  as  in  their  last  end. 
Moreover,  He  is  bound  to  do  so  by  His  own  perfections. 
For,  since  He  is  infinitely  wise  (Ment.  Phil.  No.  253),  He  must 
direct  all  things  to  an  end  worthy  of  Himself.  Now,  God 
alone  is  worthy  of  God.  Consequently,  God  must  require 
that  all  things  tend  ultimately  towards  Himself,  and  that  in 
Himself  all  desires  shall  rest.  Therefore  God  is  the  last  end 
of  all  things. 

1 5.  But  how  do  all  things  tend  ultimately  to  God  ?  We 
affirm  that  they  must  tend  towards  Him  with  their  whole 
being ;  because  God  has  made  their  whole  being,  the  essence 
and  the  attributes  of  each,  and  all  their  powers.  Now  what- 
soever He  makes,  He  must  direct  ultimately  to  Himself  as 
being  the  only  end  worthy  of  His  action.  Therefore  all 
things  must  tend  towards  God  with  their  whole  being. 


The  End  to  which  Hu7nan  Acts  etc.      15 

16.  The  direction  which  God  gives  to  things  is  not  a  mo- 
mentary extrinsic  impulse,  such,  e.  ^.,  as  a  musket-ball  gets 
from  the  exploding  powder;  nor  simply  a  continued  extrinsic 
management,  such  as  the  leading  of  a  horse  by  the  bridle ; 
but  it  is  an  impulse  intrinsic  to  every  creature,  which  is  not 
distinct  in  reality  from  its  very  essence  or  nattire  and  its  pe- 
culiar tendencies.  Hence,  every  action  that  the  creature 
performs  in  accordance  with  its  nature  is  towards  that  end 
for  which  it  was  created,  namely,  towards  God  Himself. 

17.  Of  course,  we  do  not  say  that  every  being  tends  imme- 
diately towards  God.  This  can  be  said  of  intelligent  beings 
only;   yet  all  other  beings  tend  mediately  towards  Him. 

There  is  a  broad  truth  in  the  saying,  "  Order  is  Heaven's 
first  law."  God's  direction,  which  cannot  fail  to  be  wise,  is 
ever  appropriate  to  the  nature  of  the  thing  directed.  Hence, 
everything  is  so  constituted  as  to  tend  towards  that  which  is 
suited  to  its  nature  and  is  for  its  good ;  plants  perform  just 
those  actions  which  are  good  for  them,  and  this  their  own 
nature  makes  them  do.  By  so  acting  they  elaborate  from  the 
inert  clod  food  for  the  animal  kingdom.  Animals  perceive 
by  their  senses  what  is  good  for  them,  and  are  led  by  their 
appetites  to  appropriate  that  good.  Man,  finally,  whom  all 
material  things  subserve,  tends  by  the  faculties  peculiar  to 
himself,  his  intellect  and  will,  to  the  knowledge  and  love  of 
God,  and  is  fitted  and  prompted  by  his  rational  nature  to 
direct  the  material  creation  to  the  glory  and  service  of  his 
sovereign  Lord. 

18.  As  the  inert  clod  supports  vegetable  life,  as  the  vege- 
table is  for  the  animal,  and  as  the  brute  animal,  together  with 
all  inferior  things,  is  for  man ;  so  in  man  himself  the  lower 
powers  are  to  subserve  the  higher  powers,  which  are  his  intellect 
and  will.  Though  each  faculty  has  its  own  specific  tendency  to 


1 6    Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 

its  own  specific  good,  still  man  is  not  a  bundle  of  independent 
faculties ;  but  he  is  a  person,  essentially  one,  fitted  by  nature  to 
employ  his  faculties  for  the  attainment  of  what  is  good  for 
him  in  his  specific  nature  as  man.  If,  therefore,  as  it  often 
happens,  an  inferior  faculty  craves  what  hinders  rather  than 
promotes  the  proper  action  of  a  higher  faculty,  reason  then 
requires  that  such  a  craving  be  suppressed,  in  accordance 
with  this  principle  of  order :  the  lower  faculties  are  to  be  con- 
trolled by  the  higher.  The  good  craved  in  this  case  is  not 
a  real  good  for  the  person,  but  rather  a  real  evil  (Ment.  Phil. 
No.  44).  The  intellect  and  will,  when  perfectly  controlling 
the  inferior  faculties,  are  in  a  fit  condition  to  follow  up  their 
own  specific  tendencies  toward  their  proper  objects,  which  are 
truth  and  all  good  worthy  of  man. 

19.  Good  worthy  of  man  is  called  becoming,  fit  or  proper. 
In  its  strict  meaning  it  is  moral  good— that  good,  namely, 
which  is  conformable  to  reason  regulating  free  acts;  in  a 
wider  meaning,  it  includes  natural  or  physical  good — that  is, 
whatever  perfects  the  nature  of  man,  as  health,  knowledge, 
etc.  Good  viewed  as  conducive  to  the  attainment  of  another 
good  is  styled  useful ;  viewed  as  capable  of  giving  satisfac- 
tion or  pleasure  to  an  appetite  it  is  named  pleasurable.  The 
useful  and  pleasurable,  when  they  are  embraced  by  the  will 
according  to  the  right  order  of  things  and  in  a  manner  worthy 
of  man,  share  in  the  nobility  of  moral  good.  Thus  the 
pleasure  which  a  dutiful  son  finds  in  making  his  parents  com- 
fortable and  happy  is  morally  good;  and  all  the  just  and 
indifferent  means  used  to  promote  this  end  are  in  the  right 
order  of  human  acts,  and  are  therefore  morally  good. 

20,  Since  God  is  the  last  end  of  all  things  (No.  14),  He  is, 
therefore,  the  last  end  of  oiu*  highest  powers,  the  intellect  and 
will.    But  there  is  this  difference  between  the  tendencies  of 


The  End  to  which  Human  Acts  etc.       17 

our  higher  powers  and  the  tendencies  of  other  things  :  that, 
while  the  latter  tend  to  God  only  tuediately,  our  intellect  and 
will  tend  to  Him  immediately ,  and  do  not  find  rest  iintil  they 
repose  in  Him  as  in  their  last  end.  When  a  brute  animal  has 
eaten  and  drunk  what  its  appetite  craves,  it  rests  in  the  satis- 
faction of  its  animal  desires,  and  longs  for  nothing  beyond 
this.  But  our  understanding  and  will  can  find  rest  in  nothing 
short  of  the  knowledge  and  love  of  God. 

2 1 .  Thesis  II.  By  our  intellect  a?id  will  we  must  tend  to 
God  as  our  last  end. 

Explanatio7i.  Of  course,  we  do  not  say  that  it  is  wrong 
for  man  to  love  created  things;  but  right  order  requires  that 
we  should  make  all  these  so  many  stepping-stones,  as  it  were, 
to  the  higher  plane  of  the  knowledge  and  love  of  God.  In 
this  proposition,  then,  we  maintain  that  the  last  end  of  man's 
intellect  and  will,  that,  namely,  for  which  these  faculties  were 
given  to  him,  is  to  know  and  to  love  God.  We  can  prove 
this  proposition  in  two  ways :  first,  by  considering  the  matter 
in  the  light  of  God's  nature;  and,  secondly,  by  considering 
it  from  the  standpoint  of  man's  nature.  However,  we  shall 
confine  ourselves  at  present  to  the  first  consideration,  which 
demonstrates  that  God  is  the  objective  end  of  man's  highest 
powers;  the  second  aspect  we  shall  present  further  on  in 
connection  with  man's  subjective  end  (No.  32). 

Proof.  God  is  the  absolute  ultimate  end  (Thesis  I.),  the 
Supreme  Good  to  which  man  is  bound  to  tend.  This  tend- 
ency must  be  through  faculties  or  activities  by  which  he  can 
apprehend  the  Supreme  Good.  He  cannot  do  so  by  any 
organic  faculty,  because  God  is  a  pure  spirit,  and,  conse- 
quently, not  the  object  of  organic  perception.  It  must,  there- 
fore, be  through  his  immaterial  faculties,  the  spiritual  activities 
of  his  soul,  his  intellect  and  will.     Man's   intellect,  by  its 


1 8    Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 

nature,  is  able  to  know  God,  and  his  will  is  able  to  love  what 
the  intellect  knows  and  proposes  as  worthy  of  love.  There- 
fore, by  our  intellect  and  will  we  must  tend  to  God  as  our 
last  end. 

22.  Thesis  III.  God  created  all  things  for  His  own  ex- 
trinsic glory. 

Explanation.  Honor  is  the  recognition  of  worth;  when 
expressed  in  words,  it  is  called  praise.  Glory  is  the  praise  of 
exalted  merit,  and  in  its  full  acceptance  implies  love  as  well 
as  knowledge,  together  with  the  manifestation  of  the  same  by 
many  persons  as  a  tribute  of  homage  that  is  due  to  the  person 
glorified.  The  knowledge  and  love  which  God  possesses  with 
regard  to  Himself  is  His  intrinsic  glory;  the  homage  of 
praise  and  love  that  creation  renders  to  God  is  His  extrinsic 
glory. 

Proof  I.  We  have  seen  that  God  is  the  absolute  ultimate 
end  of  all  things ;  or,  in  other  words,  that  all  things  must  tend 
to  Him  as  to  their  last  end.  Since  this  tendency  is  some- 
thing willed  by  God,  it  is  something  good.  Yet  no  good  can 
be  added  to  God  intrinsically,  because  He  is  Himself  the 
Infinite  Good:  it  can,  therefore,  be  added  to  God  only  extrin- 
sically.  God  has  no  need  of  any  extrinsic  good ;  yet,  if  He 
creates  at  all,  He  must  necessarily  require  that  creatures 
shall  proclaim  Him  as  their  Creator,  and  thus  render  Him 
the  glory  which  is  His  due.  Hence,  the  end  God  had  in 
creating  all  things  was  His  own  extrinsic  glory. 

Proof  2.  Man  in  particular,  we  know  from  thesis  II.,  is 
bound  to  tend  to  the  Supreme  Good,  his  last  end,  by  his  in- 
tellect and  will — that  is,  by  knowing  and  loving  God  ;  but  in 
these  very  acts  of  man  consists  the  extrinsic  glory  of  God, 
Therefore,  man  in  particular  was  created  for  the  extrinsic 
glory  of  God. 


The  End  to  which  Human  Acts  etc.      19 

Objections. 

1.  Irrational  creatures  cannot  praise  and  love  God. 
Answer.  They  cannot  love  God,  it  is  true ;  nor  can 
they  praise  Him  directly :  nevertheless,  they  praise 
Him  indirectly,  by  displaying  God's  power,  good- 
ness, wisdom,  beauty,  etc.,  to  the  intelligent  crea- 
tion, thereby  serving  to  inspire  and  increase  the  praise 
and  love  of  God  on  the  part  of  man. 

2.  God  cannot  fail  of  His  purpose,  but  He  fails  to 
receive  the  praise  and  love  of  the  wicked.  Therefore, 
He  did  not  create  them  for  that  end.  Answer. 
Though  the  wicked  refuse  God  the  homage  of  their 
love  and  voluntary  praise  in  this  life,  they  still  serve 
to  proclaim  His  praise.  For  in  the  next  life  they 
glorify  His  justice  by  their  punishment,  and  even  in 
the  present  life  they  make  manifest  His  mercy  and 
longanimity. 

3.  It  would  be  unworthy  of  God  to  promote  His  glory 
by  the  misery  of  His  creatures.  Answer.  To  create 
man  for  misery  would  be  unworthy  of  God,  yes ;  we 
are  maintaining  that  God,  on  the  contrary,  created 
all  men  for  happiness,  but  on  the  condition  that  they 
shall  render  Him  due  service.  When  the  wicked 
voluntarily  turn  away  from  their  destined  bliss  by 
refusing  to  do  their  duty,  they  must  necessarily  incur 
a  just  punishment.  The  solution  of  this  and  similar 
difficulties  will  be  better  understood  after  we  have 
treated  of  the  sanction  of  the  natural  law  (No.  107 
et  seq.). 

24.  As  we  remarked  above  (No.  10),  the  object  aimed  at 
or  intended  is  the  objective  or  fnaterial  end,  and  the  attainment 
or  enjoyment  of  the  object  is  the  subjective  or  formal  end.    So 


20    Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 

far  we  have  proved  that  God  is  the  objective  end  of  all  things, 
and  particularly  so  of  His  rational  creatures ;  we  have  ex- 
plained, also,  the  manner  in  which  all  things  tend  to  God  by 
fulfilling  the  purpose  which  He  had  in  view  when  creating 
them.  We  shall  next  consider  the  subjective  end  of  man, 
/.  <?.,  his  attainment  of  his  objective  end. 

Article  III.    The  Attainment  of  Our  Last  End. 

25.  A  man  can  labor  for  very  different  objects — now  for 
honor,  now  for  wealth,  again  for  the  pleasure  of  eating  or 
drinking,  or  for  the  performance  of  duty,  etc.  Yet  there  is 
one  thing  common  to  all  his  objects,  or  ends,  or  purposes — 
namely,  a  desire  of  well-being,  of  happiness.  All  men  desire 
happiness,  but  they  often  differ  widely  concerning  the  object 
in  which  they  expect  to  find  their  happiness. 

"  Oh,  happiness,  our  being's  end  and  aim  ! 
Good,  pleasure,  ease,  content, — whate'er  thy  name." 

26.  Not  only  do  all  men  desire  happiness,  but  they  also 
desire  perfect  happiness  or  beatitude.  Beatitude  may  be 
defined  as  that  state  in  which  man  is  made  perfect  by  the 
possession  of  all  good  things.  It  implies  endless  duration 
and  the  full  satisfaction  of  all  desires.  Is  such  a  state  attain- 
able by  every  man  ? 

27.  Thesis  IV.     Every  man  can  attain  perfect  happiness. 
Proof.     If  a  certain  good  is  found  in  all  men,  it  must  be 

part  of  man's  nature,  and  hence  it  proceeds  from  the  Author 
of  nature.  Now,  there  exists  in  us  all,  as  we  know  by  our 
consciousness,  a  desire  of  perfect  happiness;  and  this  desire 
is  good,  for  by  it  we  are  impelled  to  perfect  ourselves.  There- 
fore, this  desire  proceeds  from  the  Author  of  nature.     Biit 


The  End  to  which  Human  Acts  etc.     21 

God  could  not  have  implanted  such  a  desire  in  our  nature 
unless  he  gave  us  the  means  to  satisfy  it ;  because  to  allure  us 
by  a  desire  and  a  hope  which  He  had  destined  to  disappoint- 
ment would  be  opposed  to  God's  infinite  goodness  and  truth- 
fulness. Consequently,  God  has  given  us  the  means  whereby 
every  one  of  us  can  attain  perfect  happiness. 

28.  But  here  a  difficulty  presents  itself.  We  often  experi- 
ence contradictory  desires;  a  man,  e.  g.,  may  love  peace,  yet 
when  provoked  by  an  insult  he  feels  inclined  to  break  the 
peace.  It  is  evident  that  perfect  happiness  cannot  exist 
where  desires  are  in  conflict.  How,  then,  can  the  conflict  be 
made  to  cease  }  Clearly,  not  until  the  lower  cravings  of  our 
complex  nature  cease  to  war  against  reason.  But  as  this 
never  comes  to  pass  fully  in  this  hfe,  the  logical  inference  is 
that  beatitude  is  not  attainable  in  this  life.  Yet  we  have 
proved  it  to  be  attainable ;  it  follows,  therefore,  that  we  can 
gain  perfect  happiness  in  a  future  life. 

29.  At  this  point  another  question  arises :  Is  man  to  be 
made  supremely  happy  by  being  deprived  of  half  his  nature  ? 
Shall  the  soul  be  beatifiied  alone,  and  the  body  moulder  into 
dust  ?  You  may  reply,  there  will  be  a  resurrection  by 
which  all  things  will  be  made  right.  In  that  event,  full 
gratification  will  be  given  to  man's  desires,  among  which 
there  will  never  more  be  strife ;  for  the  faculties  of  his  lower 
nature  will  be  in  perfect  subjection  to  the  spirit.  This  is  the 
answer  of  Father  Costa- Rossetti,  S.J.  and  others,  who  main- 
tain that  in  a  purely  natural  order  of  things  the  soul  cannot 
attain  beatitude  without  the  body.  In  the  state  of  separation, 
they  say,  the  soul  would  feel  a  longing  to  be  reunited  to  the 
body,  which  nature  intended  for  it,  and  with  which  it  formed 
one  person.  Nothing  prevents  us,  they  continue,  from  sup- 
posing that  a  future  resurrection  belongs  to   the   order  of 


2  2     Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 

nature,  in  this  sense :  that,  as  God  gave  us  a  natural  desire  for 
perfect  happiness,  He  thereby  pledged  Himself  to  procure  the 
realization  of  that  desire  for  those  who  obey  the  laws  of 
nature. 

30.  Most  philosophers,  however,  consider  the  resurrection 
as  entirely  supernatural,  and  in  no  sense  due  to  our  nature, 
and  they  maintain  that  the  soul  can  be  perfectly  happy  with- 
out the  body.  To  prove  this  point,  they  reason  thus :  The 
lower  powers  of  man  exist  to  subserve  his  higher  powers  in 
this  life.  When  the  soul  possesses  in  the  next  life  the  full 
knowledge  and  love  of  God,  it  no  longer  needs  the  body  or 
the  lower  faculties,  and  consequently  it  will  have  no  desire  for 
reunion  with  its  inferior  companion. 

The  authorities  and  arguments  for  both  opinions  are  suffi- 
ciently weighty  to  warrant  the  student  freedom  to  accept 
either.  Whichever  opinion  be  adopted,  every  objection 
against  the  attainment  of  beatitude  can  be  satisfactorily 
answered. 

31.  Thesis  V.  No  created  object  can  make  man  perfectly 
happy. 

Proof.  Man  is  distinctively  man  chiefly  by  his  intellect 
and  will;  hence  no  object  can  make  him  perfectly  happy, 
unless  it  fully  satisfies  his  intellect  and  will.  This,  however, 
no  created  object  can  do.  Such  objects  are  riches,  honors, 
pleasures,  human  science  and  virtue.  But  as  none  of  these, 
nor  all  of  them  together,  can  satisfy  man's  intellect  and  will, 
it  is  clear  that  no  created  object  can  make  man  perfectly 
happy. 

I.  Not  riches,  which  are  only  a  means  of  providing 
other  good  things.  At  their  best  they  cannot  last 
beyond  the  present  hfe,  and  they  do  not  perfect  the 
intellect  and  will. 


The  End  to  which  Human  Acts  etc.      23 


2.  Not  honor.  For  honor,  whether  viewed  as  the  esteem 
which  others  have  of  us  or  as  the  outward  manifesta- 
tion of  this  esteem,  cannot  perfect  our  intellect  and 
will.  It  generally  has  uncertain  existence  when  it  is 
obtained,  and  it  cannot  be  obtained  by  all.  Besides, 
honors  are  often  bestowed  upon  the  undeserving  and 
denied  to  those  who  are  most  worthy  of  them. 

3.  Not  sensual  pleasures,  which  certainly  cannot  perfect 
oiir  higher  faculties.  On  the  contrary,  the  pursuit  of 
sensuality  degrades  man  to  the  level  of  the  brute ;  and 
surely  it  is  absurd  to  say  that  man's  perfect  happiness 
consists  in  self-degradation. 

4.  Not  the  human  sciences.  Since  human  nature  is  essen- 
tially the  same  in  all  men,  the  perfect  happiness  of  the 
human  species  must  be  the  same  in  kind  for  every 
individual,  and  hence  within  the  reach  of  all.  But 
science  is  not  within  the  reach  of  all,  because  many 
persons  have  not  sufficient  ability  to  acquire  it.  Being, 
moreover,  something  finite,  science  can  neither  satisfy 
the  intellect,  which  is  always  reaching  out  for  unhm- 
ited  knowledge,  nor  the  heart,  which  is  capable  of 
loving  and,  therefore,  desiring  the  Infinite. 

5.  Not  virtue,  which  consists  in  a  habitual  tendency  to 
perfection.  Virtue  is  consequently  not  the  ultimate 
object  of  desire,  but  only  a  means  to  attain  that 
object  (No.  72  et  seq.). 

6.    Not  all  these  united.     For  they  are  all  confined  to 
the  present  life,  and  they  cannot  satisfy  the  desires 
of  a  being  that  longs  for  everlasting  happiness. 
32.  Thesis  VI.     God  is  the  only  object  that  can  make  man 
perfectly  happy. 

jProof  I.     Every  man  can  attain  perfect  happiness  (Thesis 


24    Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 


IV.);  therefore  an  object  must  be  attainable  that  can  make 
every  man  perfectly  happy.  But  no  created  object  can  do 
this  (Thesis  V.).  Therefore  the  Creator  is  the  only  object 
that  can  make  man  perfectly  happy. 

Proof  2.  Man's  perfect  happiness  supposes  perfect  satis- 
faction for  his  highest  powers — /.  <?.,  his  intellect  and  will;  but 
no  object  can  give  such  satisfaction  to  these  two  powers  ex- 
cept perfect  truth  and  perfect  goodness.  For  his  intellect 
ever  seeks  to  know  the  causes  of  things  and  the  causes  of 
these  causes ;  nor  can  it  ever  rest  content  until  it  understands 
the  First  Cause.  As  the  First  Cause  contains  all  good,  the 
human  will  cannot  help  loving  and  desiring  it  when  it  is  once 
known.  Therefore  the  perfect  or  infinite  truth  and  goodness, 
which  is  God,  is  the  only  object  that  can  make  man  per- 
fectly happy ;  in  other  words,  the  possession  of  God  is  our 
subjective  last  end. 

33.  Man's  ultimate  beatitude,  as  Philosophy  treats  it,  view- 
ing the  subject  by  the  light  of  reason  alone,  does  not  include 
the  intuitive  knowledge  of  God,  the  beatific  vision,  which  we 
know  from  revelation  to  be  really  in  store  for  us.  The  beatific 
vision  is  not  due  naturally  to  man  or  to  any  other  creature; 
it  is  a  supernatural  gift.  A  soul  in  a  state  of  natural  beati- 
tude would  know  God  in  a  manner  proportionate  to  its 
nature ;  it  would  understand  the  perfections  of  the  Creator 
by  reasoning  from  the  knowledge  it  possesses  of  itself  and 
other  creatures.  This  knowledge  of  God,  though  abstract 
and  not  intuitive,  would  not  be  a  cold  speculation;  on  the 
contrary,  in  such  a  knowledge  of  a  Being  all  good,  all  beau- 
tiful, all  amiable,  the  soul  would  enjoy  all  perfection.  Thus 
the  primary  element  in  natural  beatitude  would  be  the  perfect 
knowledge  of  a  perfect  object.  Yet,  consequent  on  that 
knowledge  and  inseparable  from  it,  as  an  attribute  or  even  an 


The  End  to  which  Human  Acts  etc.      25 


essential  part  of  perfect  happiness,  would  be  the  love  and 
enjoyment  of  that  object  on  the  part  of  the  will. 

34.  No  one  pretends  that  perfect  happiness,  as  here  de- 
scribed, can  be  attained  in  this  life.  The  nearest  approach 
to  it  possible  on  earth  lies  in  the  right  ordering  of  our  facul- 
ties towards  the  attainment  of  our  last  end.  Indeed,  from 
the  nature  of  things  and  from  the  laws  of  harmony  which  an 
all-wise  Creator  has  established  in  the  universe,  the  happiness 
of  a  being  is  proportionate  to  that  being's  perfection.  Hence 
the  more  perfect  we  become,  the  happier  we  shall  be. 

35.  Moreover,  we  may  distinguish  three  kinds  of  perfec- 
tion; (a)  T'/yi'/ra/ perfection,  which  supposes  the  possession 
of  all  the  faculties  required  for  the  "  acts  of  the  man ;"  (b) 
Moral  perfection,  which  regards  our  human  acts  as  properly 
directed  to  our  last  end ;  (c)  Final  perfection,  which  consists 
in  otu:  attainment  of  that  end.  Possessing  then  the  physical 
perfection  of  human  nature,  we  must,  to  attain  higher  moral 
perfection,  so  order  our  faculties  by  the  practice  of  virtue, 
that : 

1.  Our  lower  powers  shall  aid  and  never  impede  the 
proper  action  of  the  intellect  and  will.  This  implies 
that  we  must  restrain  and  control  our  passions,  and 
suppress  all  inordinate  desires  for  bodily  pleasures, 
riches,  honors,  and  power.  By  so  doing  we  shall  live 
free  from  contention,  impatience,  restless  ambition; 
from  intemperance  and  lust,  with  their  attendant  deg- 
radation of  body  and  soul. 

2.  Our  higher  powers,  the  intellect  and  will,  shall  tend 
to  ennobling  objects  which  bring  us  nearer  to  God.  We 
ought  to  study  His  perfections.  We  should  endeavor 
to  appreciate  His  constant  care  for  us,  and  to  under- 
stand His  supreme  right  to  manage  the  whole  course 


26    Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 

of  our  lives.  In  this  way  we  shall  acquire  an  humble 
resignation  to  God's  sovereign  will,  and  a  loving  trust 
in  His  fatherly  providence — dispositions  which  secure 
us  in  peace  against  the  passing  ills  of  life.  Thus,  un- 
like the  Stoics  of  old,  who  vainly  strove  to  imagine 
that  there  were  no  ills  for  the  just  on  earth,  we  must 
accept,  as  men  of  sound  common  sense,  the  sufferings 
of  this  time  in  confidence  and  love,  as  purifications 
through  which  we  are  to  pass  to  the  full  possession  of 
eternal  happiness  in  God. 
3.  Of  the  goods  of  earth,  which  are  needed  for  our 
bodily  life,  we  shall  exert  ourselves  to  obtain  a  suflft- 
ciency.  Accordingly,  a  man  should  from  his  youth 
qualify  himself  for  some  respectable  pursuit,  in  order 
either  to  procure  a  decent  support  for  himself  and  those 
depending  on  him,  or,  if  he  already  has  the  gifts  of 
fortune,  to  enable  him  to  pass  successfully  through 
possible  reverses.  With  such  an  equipment,  though 
his  station  in  life  may  seem  ever  so  lowly,  a  man  can 
enjoy  deeper  peace  of  soul  and  greater  happiness  than 
those  who  abound  in  riches  and  honors  and  the 
world's  false  delights. 


CHAPTER  11. 

THE  MORALITY  OF  HUMAN  ACTS. 

36.  Having  discussed  in  the  preceding  chapter  the  end  of 
human  acts,  we  shall  next  proceed  to  study  their  nature. 
With  this  purpose  we  shall  examine:  i.  The  essential  differ- 
ence between  morally  good  and  morally  bad  acts,  or  the  essence 
of  morality ;  2.  The  determinants  of  morality  in  any  given 
actioti ;  3.  Accoicntability  for  moral  acts ;  4.  Circumstances 
that  lessen  accoicntability ;  5.  The  passions  as  influencing  ac- 
countability; 6.  If abits  as  facilitating  moral  acts. 

Article  I.     The  Essence  of  Moralit's. 

37.  Human  acts  are  those  of  which  a  man  is  master,  which 
he  has  the  power  of  doing  or  not  doing  as  he  pleases. 
(No.  2.  See  also  Ment.  Phil,  Nos.  194-199.)  True,  we  are 
physically  free  to  perform  certain  acts  or  to  omit  them — to  do 
one  thing  or  its  contrary,  to  choose  this  act  rather  than  some 
other ;  but  are  we  also  morally  free  in  regard  to  all  such  acts  ? 
Is  it  right  for  me  on  all  occasions  to  do  whatever  my  inclina- 
tion prompts  me  to  do  ?  My  reason  plainly  answers.  No :  it 
is  evident  even  to  a  child  that  some  actions  are  good  in  them- 
selves, morally  good,  and  others  bad  in  themselves,  jnorally 
bad.  The  good  acts  our  reason  commends  and  approves; 
these  we  call  right.  Evil  acts,  on  the  contrary,  our  reason 
disapproves  and  blames  ;  these  we  call  wrong.     The  ideas  of 

27 


28     Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 

right  and  wrong,  like  those  of  truth  andi  falsity,  substance  and 
accident,  cause  and  effect  are  "  primary  ideas  "  which  are  com- 
mon to  all  men  ;  hence,  they  are  trustworthy  ideas — that  is, 
the  distinction  existing  in  the  mind  between  right  and  wrong 
corresponds  to  a  distinction  existing  objectively  in  human  acts. 
(See  Logic,  Nos.  119,  120.) 

38.  But  though  all  men  distinguish  between  right  and  wrong, 
it  does  not  follow  that  all  theorizers  acknowledge  the  distinc- 
tion. It  often  stands  in  the  way  of  their  false  speculations. 
Such  writers,  for  instance  as  Huxley,  Spencer  and  the  Agnos- 
tics and  Positivists  generally,  admit  no  true  liberty  in  man, 
and  therefore  they  cannot  consistently  treat  of  human  acts  as 
such  :  there  are  no  human  acts  with  them,  for  there  are  no 
acts  which  a  man  has  the  power  to  do  or  not  to  do.  The 
same  holds  true  for  all  MateriaUsts,  who  teach  that  nothing 
exists  but  matter — acting,  of  course,  by  necessary  laws.  Pan- 
theists likewise,  admitting  no  real  distinction  between  man  and 
God,  cannot  speak  of  human  acts  as  such,  and  cannot  there- 
fore correctly  explain  the  difference  between  moral  right  and 
moral  wrong.  Nevertheless,  all  these  false  theorizers  employ 
the  terms  "  right  "  and  "  wrong  " — the  distinction  being  too 
widely  accepted  to  be  ignored.  They  are  forced,  however,  by 
the  exigencies  of  their  theories  to  misinterpret  the  meaning  of 
these  words.  Without  stopping  to  refute  their  false  and  de- 
moralizing interpretations  singly,  we  shall  briefly  explain  the 
obvious,  certain  and  common-sense  distinctions  between  moral 
right  and  moral  wrong. 

39.  The  reason  why  our  intellect  approves  certain  acts, 
calls  them  morally  good  and  pronounces  them  worthy  of  praise, 
precisely  as  free  acts,  is  because  it  perceives  that  they  are 
rightly  directed  to  their  true  end,  suitable  to  and  worthy  of  a 
rational  agent,  conformable  to  the  exigencies  of  things,  and 


The  Morality  of  Human  Acts.  29 

therefore  that  they  ought  to  be  done  by  man :  man  ought  to 
do  what  is  conformable  to  his  rational  nature  and  conducive 
to  his  perfection. 

Our  intellect  disapproves  of  other  acts,  calls  them  morally 
bad  or  evil  and  pronounces  them  to  be,  inasmuch  as  they  are 
free  acts,  deserving  of  blame,  because  it  perceives  they  are  di- 
rected away  from  their  true  end,  are  unbecoming  and  unsuit- 
able to  a  rational  agent,  at  variance  with  the  exigencies  of 
things,  and  therefore  not  to  be  done  by  man :  man  ought  not 
to  do  that  which  is  unworthy  of  a  rational  being,  and  which, 
instead  of  perfecting,  debases  him. 

40.  The  radical  notion  conveyed  by  the  term  "  good  "  is 
"  suitableness  to  an  appetite  or  desire."  Using  the  word,  then, 
in  its  radical  meaning,  we  say  something  is  good  for  a  being 
which  that  being  desires — /.  e.,  which  is  the  object  of  its  ap- 
petites. And  the  good  is  the  object  of  the  being's  appetites 
because  it  tends  in  some  manner  to  the  perfection  of  the  be- 
ing; for  the  wise  Creator  has  made  all  things  such  that  they 
tend  to  what  promotes  their  perfection.  Hence  we  call 
that  a  physical  good  which  contributes  to  perfect  a  being 
physically — as,  for  example,  food  for  the  animal  nature.  We 
call  whatever  benefits  the  intellect,  e.  g.,  truth  and  science,  an 
intellectual  good.  So,  too,  that  which  perfects  a  free  being,  as 
such,  we  call  a  moral  good. 

41.  A  free  being  perfects  itself  by  drawing  near  to  its  ulti- 
mate end,  its  supreme  good,  which  is  God.  Consequently, 
those  acts  are  morally  good  for  man  which  bring  him 
nearer  to  God,  the  ultimate  end  of  his  existence ;  and  those 
are  morally  bad  which  lead  him  away  &om  God. 

42.  Since  there  are  some  human  acts,  like  blasphemy,  that 
are  of  themselves  bad  at  all  times,  and  others,  like  reverence 
for  God,  that  are  of  themselves  always  good,  the  quahty  of 


30     Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 

goodness  or  badness  must  be  something  intrinsic  to  the  acts 
and  must  depend  upon  their  accord  with  or  disagreement  from 
the  permanent  natural  order  of  things.  It  is  clear  that  this 
order,  with  respect  to  human  acts,  corresponds  to  the  rela- 
tions which  man,  as  a  creature,  possesses  necessarily  towards 
God ;  as  a  social  entity,  towards  his  fellow-men ;  and  towards 
himself  as  a  being  endowed  with  various  faculties,  sensitive  and 
spiritual.  These  relations  in  turn  are  founded  on  the  essences 
of  things ;  hence,  the  difference  between  the  two  classes  of  acts 
is  an  essential  difference.  Now  the  essences  of  things  are 
modelled  by  the  Creator  upon  perfections  known  to  the 
Divine  Intellect  as  existing  in  the  Divine  Essence ;  therefore 
the  morality  or  immorality  of  a  human  act  is  determined 
ultimately  by  the  intellect  and  not  by  the  free  will  of  God. 
As  God  can  not  contradict  Himself,  He  can  not  make  an  in- 
trinsically moral  act  immoral,  nor  remove  the  immorality  of 
an  act  intrinsically  immoral. 

43.  Some  human  acts  are  so  disorderly  as  to  turn  a  man 
entirely  away  from  the  pursuit  of  his  true  last  end ;  for,  in 
place  of  God  as  the  ultimate  object  of  desire,  these  acts  sub- 
stitute explicitly  or  implicitly  something  altogether  incompati- 
ble with  the  love  of  God.  There  are  other  human  acts, 
which,  though  impeding  the  soul's  tendency  towards  its  true 
ultimate  end,  do  not  become  an  obstacle  to  the  attainment 
of  that  end.  In  this  difference  lies  the  distinction  between 
mortal  and  venial  sin. 

44.  Once  the  true  meaning  of  morality  is  grasped,  it  is 
easy  to  detect  the  errors  of  certain  false  theories  which  have 
been  fabricated  to  explain  the  power  residing  in  all  men  of 
distinguishing  between  good  and  evil. 

I.    Some  philosophers  attribute  this  power  to  instinct. 
But  instinct,  in  the  acciurate  meaning  of  the  word,  is 


The  Morality  of  Human  Acts.  31 

a  blind  impulse  of  nature,  which  prompts  the  animal 
to  conduct  itself  in  a  determined  manner,  and  thus 
to  perform  complex  acts,  without  understanding  their 
further  purpose,  for  the  good  of  the  individual  and 
of  the  species.  Moral  good  and  moral  evil,  on  the 
contrary,  are  apprehended  intellectually — that  is,  by  a 
cognitive  faculty  which  can  reflect  and  draw  infer- 
ences ;  hence,  in  distinguishing  between  good  and  evil, 
we  do  not  act  bHndly,  but  intelligently. 

2.  Some  speak  of  a  moral  sense.  If  by  a  moral  sense 
an  organic  faculty  or  the  action  of  an  organic  faculty 
is  meant,  the  use  of  the  term  is  erroneous  and  mislead- 
ing; because  material  organism,  which  is  required  for 
every  organic  action,  cannot  possibly  grasp  the  ab- 
stract immaterial  relations  contained  in  the  idea  of 
moral  good  or  evil.  If,  however,  the  term  is  em- 
ployed to  denote  a  certain  perfection  of  the  intellec- 
tual powers,  a  quickness  and  keenness  of  mind  in 
detecting  and  judging  the  morality  or  immorality  of 
"human  acts,  it  is  used  correctly. 

3.  Others  maintain  with  Herbert  Spencer*  that  this 
power  of  distinguishing  between  good  and  evil  rests 
upon  the  power  of  distinguishing  between  what  is 
useful  and  what  is  hurtful  to  men  generally  in  the 
present  life.  Whatever  tends  to  the  temporal  good  of 
mankind  generally  is  morally  good,  they  say,  and 
whatever  generally  does  injury  is  morally  evil.      Now, 

♦  I  believe  that  the  experiences  of  utility  organized  and  consolidated  through 
all  past  generations  of  the  human  race  have  been  producing  corresponding 
modifications,  which,  by  continued  transmission  and  accumulation,  have  be- 
come in  us  certain  faculties  of  moral  intuition,  certain  emotions  correspond- 
ing to  right  and  wrong  conduct,  which  have  no  apparent  basis  in  the  individual 
experiences  of  utility.    (Spencer's  LeUer  to  Mill.) 


32     Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 

it  is  true  that  moral  good  is  ultimately  useful  to 
mankind  even  on  earth,  and  moral  evil  is  ultimately 
injurious.  But  moral  good  is  not  good  because  it  is 
useful ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  useful  because  it  is  good, 
/.  <?.,  because  it  tends  to  make  man  more  perfect,  and 
hence  better  fitted  to  attain  his  last  end.  Moreover, 
it  is  a  part  of  the  universal  harmony  which  God  has 
estabUshed  in  His  creation,  that  the  moral  good  of  the 
individual  be  either  immediately  or  ultimately  bene- 
ficial to  the  many.  In  this  sense,  honesty  is  truly  the 
best  policy. 

4.  In  the  theories  of  Hobbes,  Paley,  Mandeville,  and 
the  older  English  Utilitarians,  regard  to  personal 
advantage  on  earth  is  the  only  motive  of  human 
action :  that  is  morally  good  which  brings  me  pleas- 
ure ;  the  "  moral  good  "  is  the  "  useful  to  me  person- 
ally." 

5.  Finally,  some  in  theory  and  very  many  in  practice 
hold  that  the  norma  or  rule  of  right  and  wrong  lies  in 
the  opinion  of  men.  That  is  right,  they  declare,  which 
the  majority  of  men  approve.  "  Voxpopuli,  vox  Dei  " — 
"  The  voice  of  the  people  is  the  voice  of  God."  But 
on  many  topics  the  opinions  of  men  are  changeful 
and  often  false.  When,  moreover,  all  men  agree  in 
calling  a  certain  act  good  or  evil,  they  do  so  because 
they  see  that  in  itself  it  is  good  or  evil ;  but  it  is  not 
good  or  evil  because  they  call  it  so, 

45.  It  may  be  asked  whether  every  human  act  is  either 
good  or  eviL     We  must  make  a  distinction. 

I.  An  act  considered  in  the  abstract,  i.  e.,  apart  from 
all  circumstances,  may  be  specifically  neither  good  nor 
evil.     For  instance,  walking,  riding,  reading,  etc.,  are 


The  Morality  of  Human  Acts.  33 


acts  that  in  themselves  do  not  imply  a  tendency  to 
cm"  last  end  or  a  departure  from  it.  All  such  are 
called  indifferent  acts :  specifically,  they  are  neither 
good  nor  bad. 
2.  But  every  moral  act  considered  individually,  i.  ^.,as 
done  in  such  and  such  circumstances  of  time,  place 
and  persons,  is  necessarily  either  good  or  bad.  For, 
since  we  distinguish  a  good  from  a  bad  act  by  its  con- 
formity with  fixed  principles  known  to  reason,  it  fol- 
lows that  when  reason  approves,  the  act  is  right; 
when  it  disapproves,  the  act  is  wrong.  Now,  in  every 
individual  human  act,  reason  approves  the  act  as  a 
fit  object  for  a  deliberate  choice,  or  disapproves  it 
as  an  unfit  object  for  such  choice;  therefore,  every 
individual  or  concrete  human  act  is  either  right  or 
wrong. 

The  truth  of  this  principle  is  made  clearer  in  the 
next  article. 

Article  II.     The  Determinants  of  Morality. 

46.  To  know  whether  an  individual  human  act  is  morally 
good,  we  must  consider  it  with  reference  to  these  three  things 
which,  because  they  determine  the  moral  character  of  acts, 
are  called  the  determinants  of  morality:  ist.  The  object  of 
the  act ;  2d.  The  end,  or  purpose ;  3d.  Its  circumstances. 
That  the  act  may  be  morally  good,  all  three  determinants 
must  be  without  a  flaw,  according  to  the  received  axiom  : 
"  Bonum  ex  integra  catisa,  malum  ex  qiwcumqiie  defectu" — "  A 
thing  to  be  good  must  be  wholly  so ;  it  is  vitiated  by  any 
defect." 

47.  I.  The  object  of  an  act  is  the  thing  done.     In  reality, 


34     Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 

it  is  not  distinct  from  the  act  itself;  for  we  cannot  act  with- 
out doing  something,  and  the  something  done  is  the  object 
of  the  act ;  say,  of  going,  eating,  praising,  etc.  The  act  or 
object  may  be  viewed  as  containing  a  further  specification — 
e.  g.,  going  to  church,  praising  God,  eating  meat.  Now, 
an  act  thus  specified  may,  when  considered  in  itself,  be  good, 
bad,  or  indifferent ;  thus,  to  praise  God  is  good  in  itself,  to 
blaspheme  is  bad  in  itself,  and  to  eat  meat  is  in  itself  an  in- 
different act.  But  that  an  individual  act  may  be  good,  its 
object,  whether  considered  in  itself  or  as  further  specified, 
must  be  free  from  all  defect;  it  must  be  good,  or  at  least 
i7idifferent. 

48,  II.  The  end,  or  ptirpose,  intended  by  the  agent  is  the 
second  determinant  of  an  act's  morality.  The  end  here 
spoken  of  is  not  the  end  of  the  work,  for  that  pertains  to  the 
object,  but  the  end  of  the  workman  or  agent  (No.  11).  No 
matter  how  good  the  object  of  an  act  may  be,  if  the  end 
intended  is  bad,  the  act  is  thereby  vitiated.  Thus,  to  praise 
God  is  good  in  itself,  but,  if  in  so  acting  the  intention  be  to 
play  the  hypocrite,  the  act  is  morally  bad.  And  this  holds 
true  whether  the  vicious  end  be  the  nearest,  remote  or  last 
end  (No.  9) ;  whether  it  be  actually  or  only  virtually  intended 
(No.  12).  On  the  other  hand,  a  good  end,  though  ever  so 
elevated,  cannot  justify  a  bad  act ;  in  other  words,  we  are 
never  allowed  to  do  evil   that  good  may  result  therefrom.* 

49.  The  circumstances  of  time,  place  and  persons  have  their 
part  in  determining  the  morality  of  an  individual  act.  The 
moral  character  of  an  act  may  be  so  affected  by  attendant 
circumstances,  that  an  act  good  in  itself  may  be  evil  when 

*  The  doctrine  that  the  end  justifies  the  means  has  been  falsely  attributed  to 
the  Catholic  Church,  and  particularly  to  the  Jesuits,  No  institutions  in  the 
world  have  more  strenuously  oppqse(J  the  pernicious  tenet  either  io  their 
theory  or  their  practice. 


The  Morality  of  Human  Acts.  35 

accompanied  with  certain  circumstances ;  for  instance,  it  is 
good  to  give  drink  to  the  thirsty,  but  if  the  thirsty  man  is 
morally  weak,  and  the  drink  is  intoxicating,  the  act  may  be 
evil. 

50.  Under  the  head  of  circumstances  certain  effects  of  an 
act  may  be  included ;  not  such  effects  as  are  directly  willed 
or  intended,  for  these  go  with  the  second  class  of  determinants 
(No.  48).  But  there  may  be  other  effects  which  the  agent 
foresees  or  can  foresee  so  related  to  the  act,  that,  though  he 
does  not  intend  them,  yet  he  consents  to  their  taking  place, 
inasmuch  as  he  wills  the  act  which,  to  his  knowledge,  is  the 
cause  or  at  least  the  occasion  of  these  effects.  Thus,  in 
ordering  a  city  to  be  bombarded,  a  general  brings  about, 
however  reluctantly,  the  death  of  many  non-combatants. 
Such  an  effect,  he  is  said  to  permit,  or  to  will  indirectly. 

51.  If  besides  the  good  effects  directly  intended  in  an  act 
evil  effects  are  foreseen  as  likely  to  result,  the  act  is  not  licit 
unless  it  fulfills  the  following  conditions :  i.  That  the  evil 
effect  be  not  directly  intended ;  2.  That  the  good  effect 
intended  be  not  produced  by  means  of  the  evil  effect,  for  we 
are  never  allowed  to  do  evil  that  good  may  come  therefrom. 
The  general  in  the  foregoing  example  does  not  kill  the  non- 
combatants  in  order  that  by  their  death  he  may  destroy  the 
combatants ;  3.  That  the  good  directly  intended  exceed  the 
evil  effects.  No  one  could  licitly  bombard  a  city  for  the  sake 
of  a  slight  advantage ;  4.  That  the  doer  of  the  act  be  not 
under  the  obligation  of  averting  the  evil  consequences  in 
question. 

52.  The  external  action  commanded  by  the  will  derives  its 
good  or  evil  character  from  the  internal,  elicited  act  of  the 
will;  hence,  outward  action  does  not  of  itself  increase  the 
right  or  wrong  of  the   act.     Indirectly,   however,   it  may 


36     Direction  of  Jfuman  Acts  in  General. 

readily  do  so ;  because  outward  action  is  apt  to  protract  or 
intensify  the  inward  disposition  of  the  will,  and  thus  increase 
the  moral  good  or  evil  of  the  act. 

Article  III.     Accountability  for  Moral  Acts. 

53.  When  I  perform  a  free  act — one  which  I  am  able  to  do 
or  not  to  do,  as  I  choose — the  act  is  evidently  impatable  to 
me :  if  the  thing  is  blameworthy,  the  blame  belongs  to  me ;  if 
it  is  praiseworthy,  I  am  entitled  to  the  praise.  Every  human 
act,  therefore,  since  it  is  a  free  act  (No.  2),  is  imputable  to 
him  who  performs  it. 

54.  But  am  I  accountable  for  my  free  acts — and  to  whom  ? 
Is  there  any  one  who  has  the  right  and  the  power  to  hold  me 
answerable  for  my  moral  conduct  ?  So  far,  we  have  not 
touched  upon  this  question.  We  have  simply  shown  that 
some  acts  are  morally  good  and  some  are  morally  bad ;  that 
some  ought  to  be  done,  and  others  ought  not  to  be  done 
(No.  39) ;  and  we  have  examined  into  the  distinction  between 
these  two  classes  of  acts,  or  the  nature  of  morality.  Proceed- 
ing further,  we  are  now  to  show  that  a  Higher  Will  binds  us 
to  observe  the  moral  law  (which  consists  in  doing  what  is 
right  and  avoiding  what  is  wrong),  and  holds  us  accountable 
for  our  moral  conduct — /.  ^.,  for  our  observance  of  the  moral 
law.  The  Higher  Will,  which  imposes  the  moral  law  upon 
us,  is  none  other  than  the  Supreme  Will  of  God. 

55.  God's  right  to  bind  ns  is  clear  from  the  fact  that  He 
is  our  Creator  and  we  are  His  creatures.  (Ment.  Phil.,  No. 
211  et  seq.)  Now  that  which  is  made  out  of  nothing,  or 
created,  belongs  entirely  to  its  Creator ;  therefore  we.  His 
creatures,  belong  entirely  to  God,  and  consequently  He 
has  a  perfect  right  to  the  homage  and  service  of  our  whole 


The  Morality  of  litwiait  Acts.  37 

being.  In  the  following  thesis  we  shall  demonstrate  the 
great  truth  that  God  recjuires  of  us  the  observance  of  the 
moral  law.  It  would  be  absurd  to  say  that  such  observance 
degrades  man.  One  might  say,  just  as  reasonably,  that  sub- 
jection to  the  laws  of  civilization  is  degrading  to  a  savage. 
Nor  is  this  comparison  farfetched,  since  the  moral  law  is  the 
central  figure  of  civilized  society. 

56.  Thesis  VII.  God's  will  imposes  the  law  of  morality 
up07i  us,  and  holds  us  accountable  for  our  observance  of  it. 

Proof  I.  The  Infinitely  wise  Creator  cannot  fail  to  employ 
the  proper  means  to  direct  all  things  to  their  appointed  ends ; 
hence,  He  directs  by  necessary  tendencies  beings  that  are 
not  endowed  with  free  will.  Over  these  tendencies  such 
beings  have  no  control :  thus  He  directs  matter  by  physical 
laws  ;  brute  animals  by  instincts.  Free  beings  He  must  also 
direct  in  the  manner  proper  to  their  nature,  /.  e.,  requir- 
ing them  to  attain  their  appointed  end  by  the  free  choice 
of  the  means  peculiarly  adapted  to  this  object.  Now,  to 
require  this  of  us,  is  to  impose  the  law  of  morality  upon 
us,  since  we  tend  towards  our  appointed  end  by  doing  what 
is  right,  and  we  fail  to  tend  towards  our  end  by  doing 
what  is  wrong.  Moreover,  if  the  imposition  of  this  law  is  to 
be  effectual,  as  in  His  Infinite  wisdom  He  is  bound  to  make 
it,  God  must  hold  us  accountable  for  our  moral  conduct. 
(See  Ment.  Phil.,  Nos.  222,  225.) 

Proof  2.  It  is  shown  in  Critical  Logic  (Nos.  156-164),  that 
the  judgments  made  by  the  common  sense  of  mankind  are 
true.  Now,  one  of  these  judgments  is  that  we  are  responsible 
for  our  moral  acts  to  a  Supreme  Ruler,  for  this  is  found  in 
the  minds  of  all  men  who  have  the  full  use  of  reason ;  nor 
can  a  man  rid  himself  of  this  conviction,  though  he  may 
eagerly  desire  to  do  so.     Therefore,  all  men  are  accountable 


38     Direction  of  J^uman  Acts  in  General. 

for  their  moral  conduct,  /.  <?.,  for  their  observance  of  the 
moral  law,  to  God,  who  is  the  Supreme  Ruler,  as  He  is  the 
Creator  of  all  things. 

57.  To  say  that  God  holds  us  accountable  for  our  free  acts, 
implies  that  He  will  punish  us  if  we  do  moral  evil.  We 
shall  show  presently  that  we  become  entitled  to  reward  by 
doing  what  is  morally  good.  A  title  to  reward,  on  account 
of  good  actions,  is  called  merit.  The  foundation  of  merit  is 
this  principle  of  reason,  that  if  a  person  freely  benefits  another, 
the  latter  ojight,  in  equity,  or  by  way  of  compensation,  to  make 
a  proportionate  return. 

58.  Merit  is  of  two  kinds.  Condign  merit  is  a  strict  title 
to  a  reward,  on  account  either  of  a  promise  freely  given  or  of  a 
benefit  received ;  it,  moreover,  imposes  an  obligation  upon  one 
person  to  make  an  adequate  return  to  another.  Congruous 
merit  is  not  a  strict  title  to  a  recompense,  but  only  a  matter  of 
propriety  or  suitableness  in  the  bestowal  of  a  reward ;  hence 
there  is  no  just  claim  on  the  one  side  and,  consequently,  no 
real  obligation  on  the  other. 

59.  Condign  merit  demands  the  fulfillment  of  two  condi- 
tions: I.  The  benefit  conferred  must  be  in  no  way  due  to 
the  recipient ;  we  can  claim  no  reward  from  another  for  pay- 
ing him  a  debt.  2.  The  person  benefited  must  accept  explic- 
itly or  implicitly  the  service  rendered,  or,  at  least,  he  ought 
to  accept  it.  If  this  condition  were  not  required,  I  should  be 
obliged  to  pay  every  tradesman  that  might  choose  to  send 
me  his  wares. 

60.  Thesis  VIII.  We  can  merit  a  reward  from  men,  atid 
from  God  also,  though  not  in  the  sa?ne  sense. 

Part  I.  Merit  with  regard  to  our  fellow-men.  Proof.  We 
often  have  the  power  either  to  confer  or  not  to  confer  a  bene- 
fit upon  our  fellow-men,  according  as  we  choose.    Now,  if  we 


The  Morality  of  Human  Acts.  39 

freely  do  good  to  others,  reason  dictates  that  they  ought  to  do 
good  to  us  in  return;  and  thus  we  have  a  title,  founded  on 
reason,  to  receive  a  reward  from  our  fellow-men.  This  title  is 
called  merit.     Hence  we  can  merit  a  reward  from  men. 

Part  II.  Merit  with  regard  to  God.  Proof.  We  are  often 
physically  free  either  to  do  a  certain  act,  whereby  we  honor 
God  and  thus  contribute  to  His  external  glory,  or  not  to  do 
the  act.  If  we  perform  the  act  in  question,  we  give  to  Him 
what  is,  in  some  manner,  a  benefit,  and  we  have  what  is,  in 
some  manner,  a  claim  to  receive  a  benefit  in  return. 

Part  III.  The  latter  is  not  merit  in  the  same  sense  as  our 
merit  with  men.  Proof.  The  good  we  do  our  fellow-men,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  not  due  to  them,  obliges  them  strictly  to  a  pro- 
portionate return;  but  we  cannot  strictly  give  anything  to 
God  which  is  not  entirely  due  to  Him,  since,  as  creatures,  we 
belong  in  every  way  to  God  our  Creator.  Consequently,  if 
He  owes  us  a  reward  at  all,  it  is  not  for  the  benefits  He 
receives  at  our  hands ;  but  only  because  He  owes  it  to  Him- 
self to  fulfill  His  promises  of  a  reward.  For,  by  implanting  in 
every  heart  an  insatiable  longing  after  perfect  happiness,  He 
has  implicitly  promised  us  a  reward — on  condition,  of  course, 
that  we  do  our  part.  Therefore,  we  can  merit  a  reward  from 
God  and  men  :  from  men,  by  reason  of  that  which  they  owe 
us;  from  God,  by  reason  of  that  which  He  owes  Himself. 

Article    IV.      Hinderances   to   Accountability. 

61.  Since  our  accountability  for  an  act  is  based  on  our 
power  to  control  the  act,  whatever  hinders  or  lessens  this 
power  must,  to  the  same  extent,  hinder  or  lessen  our  account- 
ability. There  are  mainly  four  such  hinderances :  ignorance^ 
concupiscence,  fear,  and  violence. 


40     Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 

62.  I.  Ignorance  is  the  absence  of  knowledge.  In  Ethics 
it  regards  two  classes  of  objects — Viz.,  laws  and  facts.  If  a 
man  does  not  know  that  marriage  between  third  cousins  is 
forbidden,  he  is  ignorant  of  the  law.  If  he  is  not  aware  that 
his  betrothed  is  his  third  cousin,  he  is  ignorant  of  the  fact. 
Ignorance,  whether  of  the  law  or  of  the  facts,  is  either  vin- 
cible or  invincible.  When  it  cannot  be  overcome  by  the  due 
amount  of  diligence,  it  is  invincible ;  otherwise,  it  is  vincible. 
The  latter  is  said  to  be  gross  or  supine  when  scarcely  an  effort 
has  been  made  to  remove  it ;  and  if  a  person  deliberately 
avoids  enlightenment  in  order  to  sin  more  freely,  his  igno- 
rance is  affected. 

63.  Thesis  IX.  We  are  free  fro?n  responsibility  for  acts 
performed  through  invincible  ignorance,  but  not  for  acts  done 
in  ig7iorance  that  is  vincible. 

Fart  X.  In  cases  of  invincible  ignorance,  we  are  not  respon- 
sible. Proof  We  are  responsible  for  our  acts  only  inas- 
much as  they  are  human  acts.  Now  an  act,  inasmuch  as  it 
is  done  through  invincible  ignorance,  is  not  a  human  act; 
for,  in  that  respect,  an  essential  element  of  a  human  act  is 
wanting,  namely,  knowledge.  Therefore  we  are  not  respon- 
sible for  acts  performed  through  invincible  ignorance. 

Part  II.  Vincible  ignorance  does  not  free  us  from  responsi- 
bility. Proof.  This  ignorance  could  have  been  removed  if  we 
had  so  willed ;  hence,  it  is  voluntary  As  any  deordination  in 
the  act  performed  is  caused  by  our  voluntary  ignorance,  it 
becomes  voluntary  in  its  cause.  But  what  is  voluntary  in  its 
cause  affects  the  morality  of  the  act,  as  was  explained  above 
(Nos.  50,  51),  and  we  are  responsible  for  the  morality  of  our 
acts.  Therefore,  vincible  ignorance  does  not  free  us  from 
responsibility. 

64.  Objections,    i.  Invincible  ignorance  is  rejected  when 


The  Morality  of  Human  Acts.  41 

offered  as  an  excuse  before  civil  tribunals.  Answer. 
Human  judges,  unlike  the  Divine  Judge,  cannot  see 
our  thoughts.  They  are  thus  forced  to  consider  pre- 
sumptions of  guilt,  and  it  is  presumed  that  a  law  duly 
promulgated  is  known  to  all. 
2.  In  cases  of  invincible  ignorance,  our  acts  are  free. 
Therefore  we  are  accountable  for  them.  Answer. 
Though  free  in  other  respects,  they  are  not  free  vio- 
lations of  the  law.  For  if  I  cannot  know  the  law,  I 
cannot  will  to  violate  it. 

65.  II.  Concupiscence  is  a  strong  impulse  of  the  sensible 
appetite  inclining  the  will  to  seek  sensible  good  and  to  fly 
from  sensible  evil.  When  it  arises  unbidden  by  the  will,  it  is 
termed  antecedefit;  but  when  it  arises  at  the  command,  or  con- 
tinues with  the  consent,  of  the  will,  it  is  called  consequent.  As 
soon  as  sensible  good  or  evil  is  perceived,  the  appetite  gener- 
ally acts  instinctively.  This  first  impulse  is  not  free,  and  conse- 
quently not  imputable  to  us.  In  as  far  as  concupiscence  impels 
the  will,  it  restrains  our  liberty,  and  thus  lessens  our  accounta- 
bihty.  Yet,  unless  the  impulse  be  so  violent  as  to  deprive  us 
for  the  time  being  of  the  use  of  reason,  it  does  not  dispossess 
our  will  of  the  power  to  refuse  consent ;  hence,  when  the  will 
yields,  though  its  consent  may  be  reluctant,  it  does  so  freely 
and  we  are  responsible.  Consequent  concupiscence  is  a  will- 
ful intensification  of  consent,  which  therefore  increases  our 
responsibility. 

66.  III.  Fear  arises  from  the  apprehension  of  threatening 
evil,  and  prompts  us  to  seek  safety  in  flight.  Our  will  is  thus 
dragged  along,  as  it  were,  and  so  its  freedom  is  restricted  and 
our  responsibility  is  diminished  to  the  same  extent.  Great 
fear  sometimes  exempts  a  person  from  acts  enjoined  by  posi- 
tive law. 


42     Direction  of  Hu7nan  Acts  in  General. 

67.  IV.  Violence  is  an  impulse  from  without  tending  to 
force  the  agent  to  act  against  his  choice.  It  cannot  affect 
the  will  directly — /.  <?.,  the  elicited  acts  of  the  will — for  we  can- 
not will  that  which  at  the  same  time  we  do  not  will.  But 
violence  can  sometimes  affect  our  external  acts.  In  so  far  as 
the  violence  is  irresistible,  we  are  not  responsible  for  the  ex- 
ternal act.  If,  however,  the  will  yields  a  reluctant  yet  real 
consent,  we  are  blamable,  though  in  a  lower  degree  than  if 
there  had  been  no  reluctance. 

Article   V.     The  Passions. 

68.  We  have  just  explained  how  the  passions  of  concupis- 
cence and  fear  may  affect  our  responsibility.  It  will  be  use- 
ful at  this  stage  to  consider  the  passions  in  general,  the  vari- 
ous kinds,  the  nature  of  each,  the  purpose  for  which  they 
exist,  and  the  use  we  should  make  of  them. 

Passions  are  movements  of  the  irrational  part  of  the  soul 
attended  by  a  notable  alteration  of  the  body,  on  the  appre- 
hension of  good  or  evil.  In  the  strict  meaning  of  the  word, 
passions  are  organic  affections  aroused  by  sensible  good  or 
evil.  As  such,  they  are  common  to  man  and  brute,  but  im- 
possible in  an  angel.  Nevertheless,  the  names  of  various  pas- 
sions are  often  used  analogically  to  denote  affections  of  the 
will,  that  are  entirely,  or  at  least  chiefly,  due  to  intellectual 
cognition,  as  when  we  are  said  to  love  science,  to  hate  igno- 
rance, to  desire  honor,  to  enjoy  a  joke,  etc.  To  this  latter 
class  belong  the  moral  ef?ioiions,  such  as  admiration  of  virtue, 
detestation  of  vice,  etc.  Owing,  indeed,  to  the  substantial 
union  of  our  soul  and  body,  the  one  cannot  be  strongly 
affected  without,  as  a  general  rule,  reacting  on  the  other. 
For  both  sensitive  and  intellectual  knowledge   are   accom- 


The  Morality  of  Human  Acts.  43 


panied  with  phantasms,  by  means  of  which  the  sensitive  and, 
indirectly,  the  rational  appetites  are  aroused  to  action.  Be- 
sides, in  man  there  is  really  only  one  will ;  which  is  called 
affective  to  denote  the  impulse  of  the  sense-faculty,  and  elec- 
tive to  denote  the  free  choice  of  the  rational  faculty,  and  it 
scarcely  ever  acts  powerfully  in  either  faculty  without  acting 
also  in  the  other. 

69.   Our  passions  are  of  two  kinds,  concupiscible  and  iras- 
cible. 

1.  The  concupiscible  passions  are  those  affections  of 
the  sensible  faculties  which  regard  their  object  as  sim- 
ply good  or  evil.  They  are  six  in  number :  good  or 
evil  in  general  excites  love  or  hate  respectively ;  desire 
is  roused  by  good  apprehended  as  absent,  aversion  by 
an  approaching  evil;  when  the  good  is  attained, y^_y  is 
excited,  whilst,  on  the  other  hand,  present  evil  causes 
sadness. 

2.  The  irascible  passions,  which  are  five  in  number, 
arise  when  good  or  evil  is  apprehended  as  associated 
with  difficulties  or  obstacles  to  be  overcome.  Diffi- 
culty or  even  danger  in  connection  with  a  desired 
good  is  not  always  displeasing.  If  the  attainment 
of  a  desired  good  which  is  difficult  to  acquire  is  ap- 
prehended as  within  our  power,  hope  is  aroused ;  if  it 
seems  to  be  quite  beyond  our  reach,  despondency  fol- 
lows. In  the  case  of  a  coming  evil,  we  are  animated 
by  courage  if  we  feel  that  we  can  avert  it,  but  we  ex- 
perience fear  on  perceiving  that  we  cannot  easily 
escape.  Anger  is  roused  by  the  presence  of  an  evil 
to  which  we  are  unwilling  to  submit  (St.  Thomas, 
I  ma   2  se,  q.  23).     These  eleven  may  be  called  the 


44     Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 

primary  passions.    All  others  are  modifications  or  com- 
binations of  these. 

70.  The  passions  are  intended  by  the  Creator  to  assist  us 
in  attaining  our  last  end.  Hence  in  themselves  they  are  not 
evil,  but  good.  Yet  they  must  be  subject  to  the  careful  con- 
trol of  the  will  enlightened  by  reason.  Generally  their  first 
impulses  arise  by  a  kind  of  physical  necessity  when  the  senses 
apprehend  good  or  evil.  However,  as  these  first  impulses 
are  not  free,  they  are  not  imputable  to  us.  But  as  soon  as 
the  intellect  perceives  their  presence,  the  will  can  act;  and  it 
must  assert  its  control  to  regulate  or  suppress  their  movement, 
according  as  reason  judges  it  to  be  right  or  wrong.  If  the 
will  fails  to  do  this,  we  become  accountable  for  the  conse- 
quences. The  moral  perfection  of  a  man  consists,  to  a  great 
extent,  in  his  power  to  control  his  passions  and  to  direct  their 
energies  aright.  Persevering  efforts  thus  to  regulate  the  pas- 
sions beget  good  habits,  which  are  invaluable  aids  for  attain- 
ing our  last  end. 

71.  Zeno  and  the  Stoics  totally  misconceived  the  relation 
of  the  passions  to  morality;  they  pronounced  them  to  be 
moral  disorders,  which  a  virtuous  man  was  bound  to  uproot 
from  his  heart.  He  was  not  to  allow  the  sensitive  appetite 
even  to  stir.  Now,  it  is  impossible  to  suppress  all  movement 
of  passion ;  indeed,  to  check  passion  when  it  is  conducive  to 
true  happiness,  would  be  very  unwise.  It  would  make  all  im- 
passioned eloquence  and  poetry  impossible ;  it  would  cut  off 
all  high-spirited  devotion  to  duty,  all  unselfish  spontaneity, 
and  banish  generous  pity  and  noble  enthusiasm.  The  ideal 
of  human  nature  fancied  by  the  Stoics  would  be  a  mere  cal- 
culating machine.  A  man's  father  and  mother  might  be  slain 
before  his  eyes,  whilst  he  would  be  busy  stifling  his  heart's 
natural  impulse  to  fly  to  the  rescue.    The  true  doctrine  which 


The  Morality  of  Human  Ads.  45 

we  have  here  outlined  was  formulated  by  Aristotle  and  his 
followers,  the  Peripatetics ;  but  in  its  stead  the  Stoics  at- 
tempted to  substitute  their  strange  misconceptions  of  the 
truth. 

Article  VI.     Virtues  and  Vices. 

72.  Habits  are  defined  as  more  or  less  permanent  quali- 
ties which  dispose  a  faculty  to  act  readily  and  with  ease.  A 
habit  results  naturally  from  frequent  repetition  of  the  same 
act.  Thus,  by  constantly  restraining  the  passion  of  anger,  a 
person  gains  facility  in  doing  so ;  or,  in  other  words,  he  ac- 
quires the  virtue  of  meekness.  A  habit  is  said  to  be  "a  sec- 
ond nature,"  because  though  not  constituting  nature  it  greatly 
facilitates  certain  operations  of  the  natural  faculties.  Good 
habits,  or  those  inclining  us  to  do  what  is  morally  right,  are 
called  virtues ;  bad  habits,  or  tendencies  to  what  is  wrong, 
are  called  vices.  Brute  animals  are  incapable  of  moral  acts; 
hence  they  cannot  form  moral  habits.  Their  power  of  imita- 
tion or  the  influence  of  peculiar  circumstances  may,  it  is  true, 
enable  them  to  acquire  ways  of  acting  which  are  not  ordi- 
nary, which  may  indeed  seem  unnatural ;  as,  when  a  bird  is 
made  to  pronounce  words.  The  power  to  act  thus  may  be 
termed  a  habit,  but,  of  course,  not  a  moral  habit.  Man  may 
also  acquire  habits  that  are  more  or  less  mechanical;  but, 
besides  these,  he  can  form  moral  habits  by  the  frequent  repe- 
tition of  free  acts ;  and  in  Moral  Philosophy  we  are  concerned 
with  only  the  latter  class  of  habits. 

73.  Certain  habits  may  be  supernaturally  infused  into 
the  soul,  and  in  no  other  way  can  the  supernatural  virtues  of 
Faith,  Hope  and  Charity  be  obtained;  so  that  natural  acts, 
though  ever  so  numerous,  cannot  of  themselves  produce  a 
supernatural  habit.     Even  natural  virtues  may  be  supernat- 


46     Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 

urally  infused  or  strengthened  by  Almighty  God.  Philoso- 
phy, however,  considers  only  natural  virtues  and  the  natural 
mode  of  acquiring  and  developing  them,  all  of  which  depend 
on  the  repetition  of  virtuous  acts. 

74.  Virtue  and  vice  necessarily  imply  freedom  of  action; 
no  one  is  truly  said  to  be  virtuous  for  doing  what  he  cannot 
help  doing,  nor  can  any  one  be  called  vicious  for  doing  what 
he  cannot  possibly  avoid.  Now,  freedom  is  a  power  belong- 
ing peculiarly  to  man's  will ;  therefore  all  vices  and  virtues 
must,  in  some  manner,  be  referred  to  the  will.  Besides,  the 
will  can  influence  the  intellect  considerably,  not  in  regard  to 
such  judgments  as  are  immediately  evident,  but  in  regard  to 
the  less  immediate  conclusions  of  reasoning.  In  this  way  it 
can  so  bend  the  intellect  to  consider  certain  motives  for  ac- 
tion to  the  exclusion  of  other  motives  that,  after  repeated 
acts  of  the  same  kind,  the  intellect  finds  great  ease  in  certain 
modes  of  action  rather  than  in  others. 

The  will  can  also  control  the  sensitive  appetites  or  pas- 
sions; and,  as  these  are  of  two  kinds,  the  concupiscible  and 
the  irascible,  the  relation  of  the  passions  to  the  will  gives  rise 
to  two  classes  of  virtues  and  vices.  Accordingly,  the  moral 
virtues  are  reducible  to  four  heads,  called  the  four  cardinal 
virtues:  namely,  justice^  a  habit  belonging  directly  to  the 
will;  prudence,  dwelling  in  the  intellect;  temperance,  regulat- 
ing the  concupiscible  passions,  znd  fortitude,  commanding  the 
irascible  passions. 

75.  I.  Justice  perfects  the  will,  inclining  it  to  choose  al- 
ways that  which  tends  to  our  true  good  and  the  attainment 
of  our  last  end.  As  such  it  is  a  general  virtue,  and  includes 
all  the  virtues.  In  a  more  restricted  sense,  justice  inclines  us 
to  give  to  every  one  his  due — to  God  by  the  virtue  of  religion, 
to  our  parents  hy  filial  piety,  to  our  benefactors  by  gratitude. 


The  Morality  of  Human  Acts.  47 

To  other  men  we  give  their  due  by  acts  of  what  is  commonly 
understood  zs Justice.  This,  in  turn,  is  of  two  kinds:  cotn- 
mutative  justice,  by  which  we  give  to  other  men  quid  pro  quo, 
i.e.,  an  exact  equivalent  in  return  for  what  they  give  us;  dis- 
tributive justice,  a  virtue  of  the  ruler,  by  which  he  distributes 
the  honors,  rewards,  burdens,  etc.,  of  the  community  accord- 
ing to  the  merits  and  conditions  of  his  subjects. 

76.  II.  Prudence  perfects  the  intellect,  directing  it  to  dis- 
cern on  all  occasions  what  is  best  suited  for  the  attainment  of 
our  last  end.  Thus  defined,  prudence  is  a  general  virtue, 
which  includes :  (a)  Clear-sightedtiess,  or  a  quick,  accurate 
perception  of  the  true  value  of  means  to  an  end ;  (b)  Caution, 
which  bids  us  take  time  to  notice  difficulties  and  to  provide 
against  them ;  (c)  Self-distrust,  which  disposes  us  to  examine 
matters  with  care,  and  to  accept  the  advice  of  others,  espe- 
cially if  our  own  case  is  in  question. 

77.  When  clear-sightedness  is  perverted  to  the  attaining  of 
a  morally  bad  end,  it  degenerates  into  the  vice  of  crafti?iess 
or  cunning;  when  carried  to  excess,  caution  becomes  timidity, 
self-distrust  turns  into  pusillanimity ,  and  docility  is  changed 
into  simplicity.  In  these,  as  in  other  matters,  it  is  the  part  of 
prudence  to  indicate  the  proper  mean,  or  middle  course  be- 
tween excess  and  defect — "  virtus  in  jnedio,"  "  virtue  holds 
the  middle  course  " — the  golden  mean  between  too  much 
and  too  httle.  "  Avoid  extremes  "  is  an  important  maxim  in 
moral  conduct. 

78.  III.  Temperance  governs  the  sensible  appetites  in 
the  use  of  things  that  especially  attract  them — namely,  sen- 
sible pleasures.  The  will  can  restrain  these  appetites  and 
accustom  them  to  follow  the  guidance  of  reason.  When  this 
is  brought  about,  they  are  said  to  be  well  ordered,  and  as 
such  they  contribute  to  man's  perfection.     The  virtue  of  tem- 


48     Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 

perance  does  not  consist  in  an  entire  abstinence  from  what 
the  sensible  appetites  crave,  but  rather  in  the  golden  mean  of 
moderate  use.  A  higher  degree  of  restraint  belongs  to  the 
virtue  of  mortification.  Still,  the  golden  mean  of  temperance 
cannot  be  kept  perfectly  without  constant  checks  upon  the 
cravings  of  the  passions — that  is,  without  sometimes  practising 
mortification  by  denying  ourselves  allowable  pleasures.  Con- 
cupiscence is  like  a  fiery  horse,  which  must  be  early  broken 
in  and  controlled  ever  afterwards  with  a  firm  hand. 

79.  IV.  Fortitude  is  the  virtue  by  which  the  will  com- 
mands the  irascible  passions  to  attempt  what  is  lofty,  though 
the  means  are  arduous  and  even  perilous,  and  to  bear  evils 
with  composure.  It  thus  embraces  courage  zxA  patience.  To 
attempt  what  is  lofty  is  magnanimous ;  to  contemn  difficul- 
ties in  the  way  is  brave.  Cowardice  is  the  absence  of  forti- 
tude; but  fortitude,  when  carried  to  excess, /.<?.,  beyond  the 
bounds  prescribed  by  prudence,  grows  into  rashness.  Thus, 
fortitude,  like  other  virtues,  must  adhere  to  the  golden  mean. 
In  this  or  that  person,  each  of  these  four  virtues  may  have 
different  degrees  of  strength ;  nevertheless,  no  virtue  can  be 
perfect  without  the  companionship  of  the  others. 


CHAPTER    III. 

LAW  THE  RULE  OF  HUMAN  ACTS. 

80.  We  have  already  proved  (No.  56)  that  man  is  account- 
able to  his  Creator  for  his  free  acts;  this,  moreover,  is  a 
judgment  of  the  common  sense  of  mankind.  Yet  reason  does 
not  originate  God's  supreme  control ;  it  does  not  make  the 
law.  But  it  recognizes  and  reveals,  as  decreed  by  the  sover- 
eign will,  a  rule  outside  and  independent  of  us,  according  to 
which  our  actions  ought  to  be  directed.  Now,  a  rule  direct- 
ive of  action  is  called  a  law,  the  word  being  used  m  its 
widest  sense.  Thus  the  laws  of  physical  nature  are  rules  in 
accordance  with  which  the  actions  of  material  things  are  di- 
rected. In  a  stricter  sense,  the  term  "law"  expresses  the 
direction  of  free  acts,  and,  as  such,  it  is  a  rule  directive  of 
human  acts.  In  this  last  meaning  only,  is  the  word  "law" 
employed  in  Moral  Philosophy. 

Reason  not  only  reveals  to  us  the  existence  of  certain  gen- 
eral  laws  affecting  human  conduct,  but  it  dictates  their  appli- 
cation to  individual  human  acts.  Viewed  as  a  faculty  thus 
directive  of  individual  acts,  reason  is  called  conscience. 

We  shall  consider  in  the  present  chapter:  i.  The  moral 
law  in  general ;  2.  The  applicatioji  of  the  moral  law  by  con- 
science;  3.   The  sanction  of  the  moral  law. 

Article  I.     The  Moral  Law  in  General. 

81.  A  law,  we  have  said,  is  "a  rule  directive  of  human 
acts."    Still  more  expHcitly  defined,  "  a  law  is  an  ordinance  of 

49 


50     Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General, 

reason  which  is  for  the  common  good,  and  has  been  promul- 
gated by  one  having  charge  of  the  conmiunity."  As  doubt 
may  sometimes  arise  whether  a  given  enactment  is  really  a 
law,  and  has  the  force  of  a  law,  a  careful  examination  of 
every  word  in  this  definition  is  in  order. 

(a)  A  law  is  an  ordiriaiice  of  reason  ;  it  proceeds  as  an  or- 
dinance from  the  will  of  the  law-giver,  after  it  has  originated 
in  his  intellect.  He  perceives  a  right  course  of  action  which 
is  useful  or  necessary,  and  he  wills  to  impose  an  obligation, 
on  those  who  are  subject  to  his  decrees,  to  follow  this  course 
of  action.  Law  is  distinguished  from  mere  counsel  by  the 
note  of  obligation.  Still  the  law  has  no  other  binding  force 
than  the  ruler  intended. 

(b)  For  the  common  good.  A  law  is  imposed  on  the  general 
community,  not  on  individuals,  though  it  does  not  necessarily 
affect  the  actions  of  all  individuals  composing  the  commu- 
nity, but  only  certain  classes,  e.  g.,  merchants,  lawyers,  tax- 
payers, voters,  etc.  Nevertheless,  the  effect  intended  must 
redound  to  the  common  good. 

(c)  It  is  manifest  that  a  law  cannot  be  enacted  except  by 
the  person,  physical  or  moral,  that  has  charge  of  the  whole 
community.  By  his  position,  such  a  one  is  bound  to  direct 
all  the  members  of  the  community  to  their  common  good; 
and  as  the  enactment  of  laws  is  a  necessary  means  to  this 
end,  he  has  the  right — and  he  alone — of  making  laws. 

(d)  Profuulgation  is  essential  for  the  obligation  of  a  law, 
so  that,  without  this,  even  if  the  lawgiver  should  wish  the 
immediate  observance  of  an  ordinance,  there  is  no  binding 
force.  The  reason  is  apparent.  A  law  is  directive  of  human 
acts;  but  without  promulgation  a  law  cannot  be  the  sub- 
ject of  human  acts,  because  an  essential  requisite,  the  knowl- 
edge needed  for  such  an  act,  is  wanting. 


Law  the  Rule  of  Human  Acts.  51 

82.  A  law  decreed  by  Almighty  God  is  a  divine  law  ;  one 
established  by  man  is  a  human  law.  Those  laws  for  human 
conduct  which  God,  having  once  decreed  creation,  necessa- 
rily enacts  in  accordance  with  that  decree,  constitute  the 
natural  law  ;  those  which  God  or  man  freely  enacts  are  posi- 
tive laws.  Now,  between  the  natural  law  and  positive  laws, 
there  are  these  four  points  of  difference : 

1.  The  natural  law,  unlike  positive  laws,  does  not 
depend  upon  the  free  will  of  God;  its  requirements 
flow  from  the  intrinsic  difference  between  right  and 
wrong,  which  is  determined  by  the  very  essences  of 
things  (No.  42).  Hence,  under  this  law,  certain 
acts  are  not  evil  primarily  because  they  are  forbid- 
den, but  they  are  forbidden  because  in  themselves 
they  are  evil. 

2.  Consequently,  the  natural  law  is  the  same  at  all 
times,  in  all  places,  and  for  all  persons;  but  this  is 
not  true  of  positive  laws,  which  may  be  changed  with 
changing  circumstances,  or,  if  the  law-giver  so  wills 
it,  even  without  change  of  circumstances. 

3.  The  natural  law  emanates  from  God  alone;  but 
positive  laws  may  be  enacted  by  men. 

4.  The  natural  law  is  promulgated  through  the  light 
of  reason;  positive  laws  require  for  their  promulga- 
tion a  sign  external  to  man. 

83.  As  a  consequence  of  the  foregoing,  the  natural  law 
may  be  defined  as  the  ordinance  of  Divine  Wisdom,  which 
is  made  known  to  us  by  reason,  and  which  requires  the 
observance  of  the  moral  order.  It  may  also  be  defined  to 
be,  "  The  eternal  law  as  far  as  it  is  made  known  by  human 
reason."  By  the  eternal  law  we  mean  all  that  God  necessa- 
rily decrees  from  eternity.     That  part  of  the   eternal  law. 


52     Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 

which  reason  reveals  as  directive  of  human  acts,  we  call  the 
natural  law. 

84.  A  universal  formula  which  contains  in  brief  an  ex- 
pression of  the  whole  natural  law  is  this :  "  Keep  the  moral 
order,"  or  "Observe  right  order  in  your  actions."  Some 
writers  state  it  simply  as,  "  Do  good  and  avoid  evil."  Now, 
the  right  order  of  human  acts  consists  evidently  in  their 
proper  direction  to  man's  last  end,  which  is,  subjectively,  his 
perfect  beatitude  and,  objectively,  God  Himself  (Nos.  40, 
41).  God  must  direct  His  free  creatures  to  their  last  end, 
hence  He  commands  them  to  observe  the  moral  order  and 
forbids  them  to  depart  from  it. 

85.  Consequently,  nothing  can  excuse  us  from  observing 
the  moral  law  or  any  part  of  it,  though  such  observance  be 
attended  with  the  most  distressing  difficulties,  and  demand 
from  us  the  most  heroic  sacrifices — the  sacrifice  even  of  our 
lives. 

86.  We  must  note,  however,  that  the  afltanative  precepts 
of  the  natural  law  differ,  in  respect  to  obligation,  from  the 
negative  precepts.  The  latter,  which  forbid  certain  acts, 
always  remain  in  force,  so  that  the  forbidden  acts  are  never 
allowed.  Thus  no  one  is  ever  allowed  to  dishonor  God ;  this 
negative  precept  holds  always  and  for  all  persons.  Affirmative 
precepts,  or  those  commanding  certain  acts,  oblige  only  for 
certain  times  or  occasions;  the  affirmative  precept  to  honor 
God  does  not  oblige  us  to  worship  Him  uninterruptedly. 

87.  By  saying  the  natural  law  is  immutable — i.e.,  not 
susceptible  of  change  (No.  82),  we  mean  that  an  act  morally 
bad  by  its  nature  cannot  become  morally  good.  Nor  can 
any  precept  of  the  natural  law  be  abrogated — /.  <?.,  totally 
done  away  with ;  nor  be  derogated  from,  by  partially  losing  its 
:)inding  force;  nor  admit  of  dispensation. 


Law  the  Rule  of  Human  Acts.  53 

Yet  some  acts  indifferent  in  themselves,  which  derive  their 
moral  goodness  or  badness  from  attending  circumstances, 
may  seem  to  change  their  moral  character.  For  example, 
diiring  many  ages  capital  was  considered  unproductive — /.  <?,, 
it  did  not  fructify,  it  had  no  market  value — and  hence  to 
exact  even  moderate  interest  for  money  lent  was  held  to  be 
unjust,  because,  in  accordance  with  the  economic  practices 
of  the  period,  this  was  a  demand  for  a  recompense  not 
due.  But  with  the  change  of  times,  the  methods  of  busi- 
ness and  commerce  have  changed,  so  that  now  capital  has 
a  market  value,  and  is  said  to  fructify.  Consequently,  it 
is  everywhere  considered  to  be  a  productive  article,  for  the 
use  of  which  it  is  just  and  lawful  to  require  a  fair  recom- 
pense. 

88.  Thesis  X.  The  natural  law  is  eternal  and  unchange- 
able. 

Proof.  All  men  have,  at  all  times,  the  same  essence,  or 
nature ;  hence  they  have  the  same  ultimate  end,  and  the  same 
natural  means  necessary  for  attaining  that  end.  These  means 
the  omniscient  Creator  knew  and  decreed  from  eternity,  and 
therefore,  by  an  eternal  act  of  His  will.  He  requires  for  all 
times  the  employment  of  these  means.  Now,  the  natural 
means  necessary  for  man's  attainment  of  his  last  end  consists 
in  his  observance  of  the  natural  law,  which  is  consequently 
eternal  as  a  divine  decree,  and  unchangeable  with  the  un- 
changeableness  of  man's  nature. 

89.  Objections,  i.  God  allowed  the  Israelites  when  they 
were  leavmg  Egypt  to  steal  the  silver  and  gold  of  the 
Egyptians  (Exod.  xii.),  yet  theft  is  against  the  natural 
law.  Answer.  Granting,  for  the  sake  of  argument, 
that  this  is  the  correct  interpretation  of  the  passage 
cited,  we   deny   that    such   a   permission   would   be 


54     Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 

against  the  natural  law.  Theft  is  the  appropriation 
of  what  belongs  to  another  without  or  against  the  lat- 
ter's  will.  Now  all  possessions  belong  absolutely  to 
God,  and  He  has  the  absolute  right  to  dispose  of 
them.  If,  then,  the  Israelites  received  from  God  ex- 
press permission  to  appropriate  certain  goods  belong- 
ing to  their  oppressors,  even  against  the  will  of  the 
latter,  they  did  not  commit  theft,  since  they  had  the 
full  consent  of  the  absolute  Owner. 
2.  God  commanded  Abraham  to  kill  an  innocent  per- 
son, and  miu-der  is  surely  opposed  to  the  natural  law. 
Answer.  The  killing  of  an  innocent  person  by  pri- 
vate authority  is  plainly  opposed  to  the  natural  law. 
But  God  is  the  supreme  Lord  of  life,  and  therefore 
He  can  deprive  His  creatures  of  life  when  He  sees  fit, 
and  in  the  manner  He  chooses,  whether  directly  or 
indirectly — /'.  e.,  by  the  ministry  of  angels,  of  men,  or 
of  other  creatures. 

90.  Though  the  natural  law  is  made  known  to  us  by  our 
reason,  it  does  not  follow  that  every  person  on  attaining  the 
full  use  of  reason  acquires  a  complete  knowledge  of  the  law. 
Philosophers  divide  its  precepts  into  three  classes:  i.  The 
fundamental  principles  immediately  expressed  by  the  uni- 
versal formula,  "  Keep  the  moral  order,"  or  "  Do  good 
and  avoid  evil."  2.  Obvious  consequences  drawn  directly 
from  the  fundamental  principles,  which  are  applied  to  par- 
ticular classes  of  acts;  to  these  belong  the  precepts  of  the 
Decalogue,  with  the  exception  of  the  third.  3.  More  remote 
conclusions  drawn  from  the  fundamental  principles  by  rather 
intricate  processes  of  reasoning. 

91.  Thesis  XI.  The  nattiral  law  in  its  most  general 
principles  and  their  immediate  applications^  i.  e.,  the  first  and 


Law  the  Rule  of  Human  Acts.  55 

second  classes  of  its  precepts,  caimot  be  mvincibly  unknown  by 
those  who  have  the  full  use  of  reason. 

Proof  I.  God  cannot,  in  His  goodness  and  wisdom,  leave 
a  man  without  the  means  necessary  to  attain  his  last  end ; 
but  the  knowledge  of  the  natural  law  in  its  most  general  prin- 
ciples and  their  immediate  application  is  a  necessary  means 
to  this  end  for  all  men  that  have  the  full  use  of  reason. 
Therefore,  God  cannot  leave  such  men  without  this  knowl- 
edge or  at  least  the  opportunity  to  acquire  it. 

Proof  2.  The  thesis  is  made  evident  by  investigating  the 
nature  of  the  precepts  contained  in  the  two  classes  specified. 
Those  of  the  first  class  are  first  principles  in  the  moral  order 
and,  hke  the  first  principles  of  the  speculative  order,  are  ad- 
mitted to  be  self-evident.  The  precepts  of  the  second  class 
forbid  acts  which  in  themselves  are  evil,  and  enjoin  acts 
which  in  themselves  are  good  and  directly  necessary  for  the 
attainment  of  man's  last  end.  These  latter  precepts  flow  from 
the  first  principles  of  the  moral  order  by  inference  so  easy 
that  the  rudest  minds  are  capable  of  performing  the  neces- 
sary reasoning  at  once  and  without  effort.  This  is  so  true 
that  some  writers  consider  the  precepts  of  the  second  class  to 
be  self-evident. 

Proof  3.  History  and  observation  show  that,  at  all  times 
and  in  all  regions  of  the  world,  men  have  possessed  such 
knowledge. 
92.  Objections. 

I.  Some  Indian  tribes  think  a  man  has  a  right  to  kill 
his  parents  when  they  are  old  and  infirm.  Therefore 
the  primary  principles  of  the  natural  law  are  not 
known  to  all.  Answer.  These  men  certainly  have 
given  proof  that  they  believed  it  wrong  to  slay  the 
innocent.     At  the  same  time  they  considered  that  filial 


56     Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 

piety  enjoins  relief  to  afflicted  parents.  This  relief 
they  judged  they  were  giving  by  depriving  their  aged 
parents  of  life  which  had  become  a  painful  burden  to 
the  latter.  To  discern,  in  this  confusion  of  obligation, 
the  moral  evil  of  their  act  of  homicide,  required  a 
rather  intricate  process  of  reasoning,  the  conclusion  of 
which  belongs  to  the  third  class  of  precepts  under  the 
natural  law.  Our  thesis,  however,  does  not  maintain 
that  knowledge  of  this  kind  must  be  universal. 
2.  The  Spartans  of  old  approved  in  their  children  the 
vice  of  theft.  Answer.  Here,  too,  was  a  confusion 
of  obligation.  The  Spartans  held  that  the  protection 
of  the  country  was  life's  highest  duty.  Hence,  though 
reprobating  theft  in  general,  they  approved  it  in  so  far 
as  the  act  was  intended  to  develop  military  sagacity. 
93.  Thesis  XII.  Human  laws  derive  their  binding  force 
from  the  natural  law,  and  ultimately  from  God. 

Explanation.  We  are  not  speaking  here  of  every  rule  laid 
down  by  men,  but  of  laws  in  the  strict  meaning  of  the  term. 
Laws  thus  understood  can  be  enacted  by  a  perfect  commu- 
nity only.  As  the  State  (the  supreme  society  in  the  natural 
order),  and  the  Church  (which  holds  the  same  place  in  the 
supernatural  order),  are  the  only  perfect  societies,  it  follows 
that  only  the  State  and  the  Church  can  enact  laws  in  the 
strict  meaning  of  the  term. 

I^oof  I .  The  chief  dictate  of  the  natural  law  is  that  we 
should  observe  right  order  in  our  free  acts  (No.  84).  Now, 
right  order  requires  that  the  members  of  a  perfect  community 
should  obey  all  those  rational  directions  which  are  given  by 
him  who  has  charge  over  the  community — /.  <?.,  that  they 
should  obey  all  laws.  Therefore  the  natiu^al  law  requires  the 
observance  of  human  laws.     Moreover,  the  natural  law  de- 


Law  the  Rule  of  Human  Acts.  57 


rives  its  binding  force  from  God  ;  therefore  the  obligation  to 
obey  human  laws,  which  flows  directly  from  the  natural  law, 
proceeds  ultimately  from  the  same  Divine  source. 

Proof  2.  Once  we  grant  that  human  laws  can  impose  a 
moral  obligation,  it  is  easy  to  prove  that  their  binding  power 
is  derived  from  God.  For  this  power  supposes  superiority 
over  the  consciences  of  men.  But  whence  do  men  derive 
such  superiority  ?  Not  from  themselves,  because  all  men  are 
equal  by  their  nature.  This  power,  therefore,  must  be  de- 
rived from  God,  who  alone  is  the  superior  of  all  men  and  has 
power  over  their  consciences. 

94.  Objections. 

1.  The  laws  of  men  are  sometimes  opposed  to  the  laws 
of  God;  therefore  human  laws  do  not  derive  their 
binding  force  from  God.  Answer.  Such  enactments 
are  not  laws,  and  are  falsely  so  called.  A  rule  for 
human  action  which  is  opposed  to  God's  law  cannot 
be  for  the  true  good  of  the  community. 

2.  Sometimes  the  laws  of  the  State  are  opposed  to  those 
of  the  Church.  Therefore  both  cannot  come  from 
God.  Answer.  The  laws  of  the  State  and  those  of 
the  Church  cannot  clash  if  they  are  just.  In  case  of 
dispute,  the  presumption  for  justness  must  be  in  favor 
of  the  higher  community,  the  Church  of  God. 

Article  II.     Conscience  Applying  the  Moral  Law. 

95.  Conscience  is  the  human  intellect  applying  the  general 
principles  of  morals  to  individual  acts.  The  term,  as  em- 
ployed in  Moral  Philosophy,  means  not  an  examination  into 
one's  past  deeds,  but  a  judgment  on  acts  about  to  be  per- 
formed.    In  judging  whether  an  individual  act  is  morally 


58     Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 

good  or  evil,  the  intellect  forms,  explicitly  or  implicitly,  a 
syllogism,  the  major  of  which  is  a  known  principle  of  moral- 
ity, the  minor  a  particular  fact,  and  the  conclusion  a  practi- 
cal judgment,  which  is  called  a  dictate  of  conscience.  For 
instance, — a  lie  is  never  allowed;  but  to  say  that  I  have 
never  sinned  would  be  a  He ;  therefore,  I  am  not  allowed  to 
say  that  I  have  never  sinned.  Conscience,  then,  may  be  de- 
fined as  a  practical  judgment  formed  by  reasoning  from  a 
universal  principle  to  a  particular  fact,  whereby  I  decide 
whether  a  certain  individual  act  ought  to  be  done  or  omitted, 
or  whether  it  may  be  done  or  omitted,  at  my  choice. 

96.  My  conscience,  with  regard  to  any  particular  act  may 
be  correct  or  erroneous  ;  its  judgment  may  be  certam  or  doubt- 
ful; the  doubt  may  be  concerning  a  law  or  a.  fact.  A  doubt- 
ful judgment  is  called  an  opinion  ;  the  reasons  in  favor  of  an 
opinion  constitute  its  probability.  In  matters  pertaining  to 
conscience,  we  can  seldom  have  the  strictest  certitude,  such 
namely  as  excludes  all  possibility  of  error.  However,  moral 
certitude,  which  excludes  a  prudent  doubt  (Log.  79,  etc.)  is 
Gufhcient  to  safeguard  moral  rectitude.  Hence,  a  certain  dic- 
tate of  conscience  means  a  practical  judgment  free  from  a 
prudent  doubt  in  regard  to  error.  Moreover,  it  may  happen 
that  two  honest  men  act  in  diametrically  opposite  ways  about 
the  same  matter,  and  each  may  be  morally  certain  that  he  is 
right.  If  I  make  a  mistake  through  no  fault  of  my  own, 
my  judgment  is  erroneous  though  it  may  be  morally  certain. 
In  such  a  case  I  am  said  to  be  invincibly  ignorant  of  the 
truth.  If,  however,  the  error  is  due  to  my  own  fault,  my 
ignorance  is  vincible. 

97.  Thesis  XIII.  Conscience  when  certain  must  be  obeyed, 
whether  it  be  correct  or  invincibly  erroneous. 

Proof.     We  are  bound  to  obey  the  law  rationally — /.  <?.,  as 


Lazv  the  Rule  of  Human  Acts.  59 


our  intellect  makes  known  to  us  the  application  of  the  law. 
But  when  conscience  is  certain,  our  intellect  makes  known  to 
us  the  application  of  the  law  with  certainty,  whether  our 
judgment  in  the  matter  be  correct  or  invincibly  erroneous. 
Therefore,  conscience  when  certain  must  be  obeyed,  whether 
it  be  correct  or  invincibly  erroneous. 

98.  Conscience  is  said  to  be  doubtful,  when  the  motive  for 
believing  that  a  particular  law  does  not  exist,  or  that  it  is  not 
appHcable  to  the  case  in  hand  is  based  on  an  opinion  more 
or  less  probable — /.  <?.,  more  or  less  well  founded. 

1 .  An  opinion  is  slightly  or  barely  probable  when  it  rests 
on  very  weak  motives. 

2.  It  is  probable,  or  plausible,  when  supported  by  solid 
reasons,  though  stronger  reasons  may  uphold  the  con- 
tradictory opinion. 

3.  It  is  equally  probable  With  the  contradictory  opinion 
when  both  are  supported  by  equally  plausible  reasons. 

4.  It  is  more  probable,  when  the  reasons  favoring  the 
opinion  are  stronger  than  those  opposed  to  it. 

5.  It  is  most  probable,  when  the  arguments  on  which  it 
rests  are  very  strong,  while  those  for  the  contradictory 
opinion  are  very  weak. 

99.  Doubt,  as  affecting  conscience  is  either  speculative  or 
practical.  It  is  a  practical  doubt,  if  it  regards  the  formal 
liceity  of  a  particular  act  which  is  about  to  be  performed. 
Hence,  if  I  act  with  a  practical  doubt,  I  do  not  know  whether 
or  not  I  am  doing  wrong  and  displeasing  God;  for  example: 
everything  considered,  I  am  in  doubt  whether  I  shall  do 
wrong  by  reading  a  certain  book  which,  I  have  reason  to 
think,  is  dangerous  to  Faith. 

Doubt  is  speculative  when  it  concerns  the  premises  of  a 
syllogism,  the  conclusion  of  which  is  a  dictate  of  conscience : 


6o     Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 

that  is,  if  I  doubt  either  that  a  certain  law  exists,  or,  granting 
its  existence,  that  it  is  apphcable  to  this  particular  case.  I 
doubt,  for  example,  whether  by  a  law  of  the  Church  a  certain 
Saturday  of  the  year  is  a  fast  day,  or,  knowing  that  such  a  law 
exists,  whether  to-day  is  that  particular  Saturday ;  or,  again, 
whether  I  am  excused  from  fasting  to-day  by  present  illness. 

loo.  Thesis  XIV.  //  is  never  right  to  act  with  a  practical 
doubt  of  conscience. 

Proof.  To  act  with  a  practical  doubt  of  conscience  is 
equivalent  to  saying :  "  I  may  break  God's  law,  and  so  dis- 
please Him  by  doing  this  act,  yet  I  will  do  it  any  way."  But 
this  is  never  right,  because  it  is  a  manifest  proof  of  an  evil 
disposition  to  do  the  act,  even  if  it  were  known  to  be  pro- 
hibited, and  hence  shows  contempt  for  God's  law. 

loi.  What  then  must  we  do,  in  order  to  avoid  acting  with 
a  practical  doubt  of  conscience  ?  We  may  abstain  from  act- 
ing, if  the  matter  so  permits ;  or  we  may  choose  the  safer 
side,  that,  namely,  by  which  we  fulfill  the  obligation  in  ques- 
tion; or  we  may  remove  the  practical  doubt.  This  removal 
we  can  sometimes  effect  by  a  more  careful  examination  into 
the  principles  or  facts  involved,  or  by  inquiring  from  compe- 
tent authorities  whether  such  a  law  exists,  or  whether  it  is 
applicable  to  this  particular  case.  This  would  be  to  solve 
the  speculative  doubt,  and  is  the  direct  method  of  getting  rid 
of  the  practical  doubt.  But,  if  we  are  indeed  so  circum- 
stanced that  it  is  impossible  to  make  use  of  the  direct  method, 
we  may,  nevertheless,  get  rid  of  the  practical  doubt,  and  act 
in  the  matter  with  safety,  by  applying  to  the  difficulty  the 
reflex  principle  of  moral  conduct:  "A  doubtful  law  has  no 
binding  force." 

1 02.  A  course  of  conduct  is  called  safe,  if  it  excludes  all 
danger  of  formal  wrong.     Yet  one  coiu"se  may  be  safer  than 


Law  the  Rule  of  Huma7i  Acts.  6i 

another,  for  we  can  make  assurance  doubly  sure  by  avoiding 
the  possibility  of  even  material  wrong.  The  less  safe  course, 
however,  must  so  guard  me  from  formal  wrong  that  I  cannot 
be  justly  blamed  for  adopting  it.  Still,  the  fact  that  one 
opinion  is  safer  than  another,  does  not  by  itself  make  it  the 
more  probable  of  the  two.  Thus,  if  a  neighbor  has  a  less 
probable  claim  to  a  house  in  my  possession,  the  safer  course 
for  me  to  follow,  that  I  may  avoid  all  possibility  of  doing 
him  an  injustice,  would  be  to  give  up  my  claim  in  his  favor; 
and  yet,  in  point  of  genuineness,  my  neighbor's  title  is  sup- 
posed to  be  less  probable  than  mine. 

103.  Thesis  XV.  When  a  certain  end  is  absolutely  to  be 
secured,  we  must  choose  the  safer  way  of  secwing  it. 

Explanation.  Since  the  end  in  this  case  is  absolutely  to  be 
secured,  I  ought,  if  it  were  possible,  to  use  means  which  are 
absolutely  reliable  or  certain,  for  the  means  should  be  propor- 
tionate to  the  end.  But  it  is  here  supposed  that  none  of  the 
means  available  is  absolutely  reliable,  but  that  each  is  supported 
by  probability  only,  one  of  the  means  having  a  higher  degree 
of  probability  than  any  other.  In  this  case,  we  maintain,  with 
all  moralists  of  standing,  that  the  safer  way,  that,  namely,  which 
has  the  more  probable  opinion  in  its  favor,  must  be  followed 
in  practice. 

Proof.  If  I  choose  the  less  safe  way,  I  freely  make  less 
certain  the  acquisition  of  an  absolutely  necessary  end.  But 
freely  to  lessen  the  certainty  of  attaining  an  absolutely  neces- 
sary end  is  wrong.  Therefore,  I  may  not  in  this  case  choose 
the  less  safe  way ;  on  the  contrary,  I  am  bound  to  follow  the 
safer  way. 

Thus,  on  the  principle  that  Baptism  is  absolutely  necessary 
for  salvation,  the  Church  baptizes  converts,  if  their  former 
baptism  is  doubtful.     On  this  principle,  too,  physicians  are 


62     Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 

not  allowed,  if  sure  remedies  are  at  hand,  to  experiment  with 
doubtful  medicines  upon  their  patients,  whose  health  they  are 
bound  by  their  engagements  to  secure. 

1 04.  But  when  there  is  question  of  the  mere  liceity  of  an 
act,  am  I  bound  to  adopt  the  more  probable  opinion?  In 
other  words,  when,  according  to  one  probable  opinion,  the 
law  requires  a  certain  act  of  me,  and,  according  to  another 
probable  opinion,  such  a  requirement  does  not  exist,  am  I 
bound  to  observe  the  law  which  probably  has  never  been 
enacted  ?  Or  again,  am  I  bound  to  observe  an  existing  law 
in  circumstances  to  which  the  law-giver  probably  never  in- 
tended it  to  be  applied  ? 

On  various  theories  various  answers  are  given  to  this  ques- 
tion: 

1 .  Rigorists  say :  As  long  as  any  doubt  remains  that  the 
law  does  not  exist,  the  law  must  be  obeyed,  though, 
most  probably,  the  law  does  not  exist. 

2.  Tu florists  say :  The  law  must  be  obeyed  unless  the 
opinion  favoring  an  easier  course  be  far  more  probable. 

3.  Probabiliorists  say  :  Obey  the  law  unless  the  opinion 
favoring  an  easier  course  be  more  probable. 

4.  Probabilists  allow  a  free  choice,  provided  the  easier 
course  has  solid  probability  in  its  favor,  even  though 
the  other  course  has  greater  probabihty. 

5.  Laxists  permit  liberty  of  choice  even  when  the  easier 
course  is  only  slightly  or  barely  probable.  This  last 
view,  and  that  which  requires  for  the  liceity  of  an  act 
certitude  that  it  is  not  forbidden,  have  both  been  con- 
demned by  the  Church. 

105.  Thesis  XVI.  ///  questions  of  mere  liceity,  we  may  fol- 
low the  easier  course  if  there  is  a  solidly  probable  opinion  in  its 
favor. 


Lazu  the  Rule  of  Iliimau  Acts.  6 


o 


Proof.  A  doubtful  law  has  no  binding  force.  But  that 
law  against  whose  existence  a  solidly  probable  opinion  mili- 
tates is  a  doubtful  law.  Therefore  I  am  not  bound  to  follow 
such  a  law.  The  principle,  ''  A  doubtful  law  has  no  binding 
force,"  which  is  received  as  an  axiom,  is  apparent  from  the 
fact  that  such  a  law  is  wanting  in  an  essential  feature  required 
for  binding  force,  viz.,  full  promulgation.  If  reasonable  efforts 
have  been  made  to  remove  the  doubt,  yet  without  success,  we 
may  conclude  that  the  law,  if  it  exists,  has  not  been  sufficiently 
promulgated. 

1 06.  Objections: 

1.  If  the  thesis  is  true,  I  am  allowed  to  do  wrong. 
Answer.  We  are  never  allowed  to  do  formal  wrong, 
/.  (?.,  what  we  know  to  be  wrong;  but  we  are  not 
always  forbidden  to  do  what  is  materially  wrong,  to 
do  that,  namely,  which  we  do  not  know  to  be  wrong. 

2.  But  the  law  may  be  certain  and  only  the  application 
of  it  uncertain;  I  know,  for  instance,  that  I  must 
abstain  from  meat  on  Friday,  but  I  do  not  know 
whether  this  is  Friday.  Answer.  The  same  rule 
holds  for  the  application  of  the  law  as  for  its  doubt- 
ful existence.  If,  after  trying  in  vain  to  obtain  enlight- 
enment on  the  subject,  I  have  a  sohdly  probable 
opinion  that  to-day  is  not  Friday,  I  may  reason  that 
the  law  of  abstinence  as  affecting  this  particular  case 
is  a  doubtful  one,  and  therefore,  for  this  particular  ap- 
plication, has  no  binding  force. 

Article  III.     The  Sanction  of  the  Moral  Law. 

107.  The  sanction  of  a  law  is  the  provision  of  reward  for 
the  observance  of  the  law  and  of  punishment  for  its  violation. 


64     Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 

That  sanction  is  called  perfect,  which  is  sufficient  to  make  it 
a  matter  of  every  one's  highest  interest  to  observe  the  law. 
If  the  sanction  falls  short  of  this,  it  is  said  to  be  imperfect. 

108.  Thesis  XVII.  The  sanction  appertaining  to  the 
natural  law,  though  imperfect  in  this  life,  is  perfect  in  the  life 
to  come. 

Part  I.  There  is  an  imperfect  sanction  in  this  life.  Proof. 
We  know  from  the  experience  of  mankind  that  the  observance 
of  the  natural  law  usually  brings  with  it  certain  forms  of  hap- 
piness, such  as  peace  of  mind,  friendship,  honor,  a  fair  supply 
of  earthly  possessions,  health  and  longevity;  and  that  frequent 
violation  of  the  law  entails  all  of  life's  miseries,  such  as  dis- 
quiet of  mind,  dishonor,  poverty,  disease,  and  often  an  early 
death.  Hence  it  is  evident  that  the  natural  law  has  some 
sanction  in  this  life.  Yet  this  sanction  is  very  imperfect. 
Oftentimes  the  virtuous  endure  great  misery  in  this  life,  while, 
on  the  other  hand,  evil  doers  are  often  comparatively  pros- 
perous and  apparently  triumphant  in  their  wickedness.  More- 
over, the  perfect  sanction  of  the  law  requires  that  the  rewards 
held  out  for  its  observance  should  exceed  as  recompense  all 
inconvenience  and  suffering  that  may  be  inctured  by  observ- 
ing the  law,  and  that  the  penalties  threatened  should  be  greater 
than  any  emoluments  or  advantages  that  may  be  obtained  by 
violating  the  law.  Now,  what  reward,  for  example,  can  be 
given  in  this  life  to  a  man  that  dies  for  the  truth  ?  Is  it  the 
renown  of  a  noble  deed  ?  But  death  makes  the  enjoyment  of 
renown  on  earth  an  impossibility  for  him.  Or  again,  does 
the  weak  remorse  of  the  apostate  match  the  advantage  which 
his  base  denial  of  the  Faith  has  gained  in  the  preservation  of 
his  life  ?  Therefore,  the  rewards  and  punishments  of  this  life 
do  not  form  a  perfect  sanction  of  the  natural  law. 

Part  JI.     A  perfect  sanction  in  the  next  life.     Proof.     Since 


Law  the  Rule  of  Human  Acts.  65 

God  wills  the  observance  of  the  law  which  He  has  impressed 
upon  the  hearts  of  men,  His  wisdom  requires  Him  to  use  the 
proper  means  to  secure  that  observance.  But  the  only  means 
proper  to  secure  this  end  without  destroying  human  liberty  is 
to  propose  adequate  rewards  and  punishments,  that  is,  to 
estabhsh  a  perfect  sanction  of  the  law.  Therefore  a  perfect 
sanction  of  the  law  exists.  But  since  the  sanction  in  this  life 
is  imperfect,  it  follows  that  there  must  be  a  perfect  sanction 
in  the  next  hfe. 

109.  We  know  that  all  men  can  attain  the  perfect  happi- 
ness for  which  their  nature  longs  insatiably.  (Thesis  IV.) 
It  is  clear,  also,  that  this  happiness,  our  siinimum  bonum,  or 
greatest  good,  the  possession  of  God  Himself  (Thesis  VI.),  is 
the  chief  sanction  of  the  observance  of  the  moral  law: 
it  is  the  highest,  the  most  complete,  the  most  appropriate 
reward  of  the  virtue  practised  in  this  life.  Can  any  form  of 
happiness  be  higher  or  more  complete  than  the  everlasting 
possession  of  God  ?  The  appropriateness  of  such  a  reward 
is  apparent  from  the  nature  of  virtue,  which  consists  in  the 
observance  of  the  moral  law,  and  is  the  direct  means  to  the 
attainment  of  our  last  end.  What  then  could  be  more  appro- 
priate than  that  virtue's  reward  should  be  the  perfect  pos- 
session of  that  towards  which  its  endeavors  tend  ? 

no.  Since  vice  consists  essentially  in  a  willful  turning  away 
from  our  last  end,  it  becomes  evident,  by  a  process  of  reason- 
ing similar  to  that  followed  above,  that  the  privation  of  the 
possession  of  God  is  the  natural  and  chief  punishment  of  the 
wicked.  Now,  two  ways  are  possible  by  which  the  wicked 
might  be  deprived  of  their  last  end,  and  so  be  disappointed  of 
the  only  object  that  can  satisfy  the  insatiable  craving  of  their 
nattue.  One  way  is  by  the  soul's  utter  annihilation  after  death; 
the  other  is  by  a  future  hfe  of  despair,  in  which  the  soul  must 


66     Direction  of  Human  Acts  in  General. 

evermore  be  tormented  by  vain  yearnings  for  the  Good  which 
it  despised  and  rejected  in  the  days  of  its  trial  on  earth.  We 
know  from  Revelation  that  the  wicked  who  die  impenitent 
shall  be  condemned  to  eternal  sufferings.  Natural  reason, 
however,  could  not,  of  itself,  give  us  certainty  on  this  point. 
Yet  it  belongs  to  Moral  Philosophy  to  show  that  this  doc- 
trine, far  from  being  unreasonable,  is  in  perfect  accord 
with  rational  principles.  Omitting  the  argmnents  adduced 
in  oiu"  Psychology  (Ment.  Phil.,  No.  215),  we  shall  merely  dis- 
prove the  possibility  of  the  soul's  annihilation,  the  only  other 
way  of  depriving  man  of  the  last  end  which  he  has  forfeited. 
If  annihilation  were  possible,  the  perfect  sanction  of  the  nat- 
ural law  would  be  impossible.  A  sanction  is  not  perfect  that 
does  not  make  it  every  man's  highest  interest  to  choose,  in 
the  face  of  the  greatest  temptation,  the  right  rather  than  the 
wrong.  Now,  surely,  annihilation  would  not  be,  on  many 
occasions  and  for  many  persons,  a  perfect  sanction.  Are 
there  not  many  persons  in  the  world  around  us  who  would 
choose  annihilation  after  death,  rather  than  deny  themselves 
unlawful  gratifications  ?  Besides,  what  retribution  would  then 
be  in  store  for  the  crime  of  suicide? 

III.  Some  have  pleaded  for  the  existence  of  another  state 
of  probation  after  death.  But  such  a  theory  only  shifts  the 
difficulty  without  solving  it.  For,  if  at  the  end  of  the  second 
probation  some  souls  should  persevere  in  their  wickedness, 
shall  there  be  a  third  trial, — and  a  fourth,  and  so  on,  forever  ? 
As  the  series  of  trials  cannot  go  on  without  end,  and  as  it  is 
likely  that  some  souls  would  persist  in  malice  through  multi- 
plied probations,  these  souls  must  at  last  enter  upon  a  fixed 
state  of  disappointment  and  despair.  Hence,  if  this  state 
must  be  entered  upon  finally,  there  is  no  reason  why  the  first 
trial  should  not  be  decisive.    In  the  second  place,  such  an 


Law  the  Rule  of  Human  Acts.  6y 

arrangement  would  take  from  the  punishment  sanctioning  the 
law  its  deterrent  force.  If,  despite  the  present  widespread 
belief  of  immediate  retribution  after  death,  so  many  are  hope- 
lessly wicked,  how  much  more  grievous  and  wicked  would  be 
the  violations  of  the  law  if  men  were  convinced  that,  in  the 
next  life,  they  should  have  an  opportunity  of  averting  the 
everlasting  doom  of  sin ! 

112.  Moreover,  since  the  soul  by  its  nature  is  immortal 
(Ment.  Phil.,  No.  213  ef  seq.),  it  would  be  unreasonable  to 
admit  the  possibility  of  the  soul's  annihilation. 

Should  it  be  objected  against  us,  that  eternal  punishment  is 
repugnant  to  the  infinite  mercy  of  God,  we  should  answer 
that  the  justice  of  God  is  infinite  as  well  as  His  mercy.  Be- 
sides, eternal  punishment  is  not  only  a  vindication  of  right  or- 
der, it  is  also  deterrent  and  remedial.  The  consideration  of  that 
terrific  retribution  is  calculated  to  keep  to  the  narrow  path  of 
virtue  many  who  are  sorely  tempted  to  stray  therefrom,  and 
to  call  back  those  who  have  left  it  for  the  perfidious  ways 
of  iniquity. 

A  suspicion  may  sometimes  lurk  in  the  mind  that  eternal 
punishment,  though  God  has  an  absolute  right  to  inflict  it,  is 
after  all  an  excess  of  rigor  and  therefore  unjust,  because  there 
would  be  no  proportion  between  an  eternity  of  suffering  and 
the  temporal  duration  of  man's  evil  deeds.  The  difficulty 
arises  from  oiu*  failure  to  comprehend  the  malice  of  sin.  The 
gravity  of  an  offense  is  to  be  measured  not  by  its  duration 
only,  but  especially  by  the  dignity  of  the  person  offended. 
Now  the  dignity  of  God  is  infinite ;  accordingly,  an  offense 
against  His  Sovereign  Majesty  is  objectively  infinite,  and 
demands  an  infinite  compensation.  This  a  creature  cannot 
give,  because  it  is  essentially  finite ;  the  nearest  approach  to 
an  equivalent  is  an  everlasting  retribution. 


BOOK  II. 


THE  RIGHTS  AND  DUTIES  OF  INDIVIDUALS. 


113.  Thus  far  we  have  considered  human  acts  in  their  re- 
lation to  our  final  beatitude,  and  the  natural  law  as  directing 
these  acts  to  their  appointed  end.  We  shall  next  proceed  to 
apply  this  law  to  man's  rights  and  duties.  In  the  present  book 
we  shall  treat  of  the  rights  and  duties  of  man  viewed  as  an 
individual.  In  the  last  book  we  shall  treat  of  his  social  rights 
and  duties. 


a 


CHAPTER  I. 

RIGHTS  AND  DUTIES  IN  GENERAL. 

114.  To  say  that  a  man  has  a  right  to  a  thing,  means  that 
he  has  a  certain  power  over  it.  Evidently,  however,  physical 
power  does  not  of  itself  constitute  a  right.  The  highwayman's 
power  over  the  traveler's  money  gives  him  no  right  thereto. 
A  right,  then,  belongs  to  the  moral  order.  It  is  an  inviolable 
7noral power  belonging  to  one  man,  which,  therefore,  all  other 
men  are  bound  to  respect. 

115.  In  every  right  four  things  are  to  be  taken  into  account: 
(a)  the  subject,  i.  e.,  the  person  possessing  the  right;  (b)  the 
term,  including  all  those  who  are  bound  to  respect  the  right; 
(c)  the  title,  or  reason  on  which  the  right  is  founded ;  (d)  the 
matter,  or  that  to  which  the  subject  has  a  right.  The  matter 
may  be  my  own  act  or  the  act  of  another  person ;  that  is,  I 
may  have  the  right  to  perform  a  certain  act  or  to  require  the 
performance  or  the  omission  of  an  act  on  the  part  of  another. 
Thus  in  N.'s  right  to  the  house  which  he  owns,  N.  himself  is 
the  subject,  all  other  persons  constitute  the  term,  his  payment 
of  the  purchase  money  agreed  upon  is  the  title,  and  the  owner- 
ship of  the  house  is  the  matter.  He  has  a  right  to  occupy  the 
house,  to  prevent  others  from  dwelling  in  it,  or  to  require  the 
party  who  leases  it  to  pay  the  stipulated  rent. 

1 1 6.  A  right  possessed  by  one  person  involves,  on  the  part 
of  another  or  of  others,  the  obUgation  to  respect  that  right. 
This  obligation  is  called  a  duty.  We  may  therefore  define 
duty  in  the  abstract  as  a  moral  bond  or  obligation  of  doing 

69 


7o    The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Individuals. 

or  omitting  certain  acts  in  favor  of  another  person.  The  act 
itself  that  ought  to  be  done  or  omitted  is  the  concrete  duty. 
Every  duty  then  supposes  a  corresponding  right,  and  every 
right  a  duty :  right  and  duty  are  correlative  and  inseparable. 
Hence  brute  animals  can  have  no  rights,  for  they  have  no 
duties  or  moral  obligations,  since  by  their  irrational  nature 
they  are  incapable  of  voluntary  acts.  We  are  under  obliga- 
tion to  abstain  from  cruelty  to  animals,  not  because  they 
have  rights,  but  because  such  conduct  is  unworthy  of  our 
rational  nature.  Insane  persons  and  infants  have  rights 
radically,  which  all  are  bound  to  respect;  yet  by  reason 
of  their  mental  helplessness  they  are  exempt  from  perform- 
ing duties. 

117.  Every  duty  or  obligation  supposes  that  some  one  who 
has  power  to  bind  the  consciences  of  men  has  imposed  the 
obligation.  Now,  moral  acts,  we  know  from  the  preceding 
book,  are  such  as  are  in  conformity  with  the  moral  law,  which 
has  God  for  its  author.  As  every  moral  obligation  is  neces- 
sarily associated  with  a  moral  act,  it  depends,  immediately  or 
remotely,  for  its  binding  force  upon  the  moral  law  and  the 
Divine  Author  of  the  law.  Therefore,  the  true  rights  and 
duties  of  man  come  from  God ;  and  they  cannot  be  correctly 
understood  if  considered  apart  from  their  dependence  upon 
God. 

118.  Rights  and  duties  are  inseparable;  yet  it  may  be 
asked,  which  is  prior  ?  Do  the  duties  which  rest  upon  us 
precede  in  the  order  of  nature  and  of  supposition  the  corre- 
sponding rights,  or  is  the  converse  true  ? 

I.  Absolutely,  or  in  the  formal  concept  of  right  and 
duty,  right  is  prior  to  duty.  Right  is  a  moral  power 
existing  in  one  person,  which  gives  rise  to  an  obliga- 
tion in  another.     Consequently,  the  right  is  the  cause 


Rights  and  Duties  in  General.  71 

of  the  obligation,  and  every  cause  is  prior,  in  the  order 
of  nature  and  of  supposition,  to  its  effect. 

2.  Since  God  cannot  be  bound  or  Hmited,  He  has  no 
duties  towards  His  creatures,  although  He  possesses 
sovereign  rights  over  all  creation, 

3.  Hence,  man  has  no  rights  with  regard  to  God ;  he 
has  duties  only.  These  duties,  which  God  has  im- 
posed, confer  upon  him  a  right  to  the  means  required 
to  attain  the  end  of  his  existence.  Thus  man's  depend- 
ence upon  God  is  a  duty  prior  to  all  his  rights,  and,  at 
the  same  time,  it  is  the  source  of  all  his  rights.  Once 
God  has  deigned  to  bestow  upon  us  the  right  of  exist- 
ence, He  owes  it  to  His  own  infinite  attributes  to  per- 
fect His  gift  by  endowing  us  with  all  the  rights  neces- 
sary for  our  existence  as  men. 

4.  A  man's  God-given  rights  impose  obligations  or 
duties  on  other  men  to  respect  his  rights.  Hence,  in 
the  relations  of  men  with  one  another,  right  is  prior  to 
duty. 

119.  Rights  are  variously  divided  into  connatural  and 
acquired,  alienable  and  inalienable,  perfect  and  imperfect. 

1.  Connatural  rights  are  those  which  are  inseparable 
from  the  nature  of  man  as  a  person.  Such  are  the 
rights  to  hfe  and  limb,  to  personal  integrity,  to  liberty 
of  action  within  just  limits,  to  specific  equality  as  a 
member  of  the  human  family.  Acquired  rights  come 
to  a  man  in  virtue  of  his  own  exertions,  or  of  acts  done 
by  others  in  his  favor;  for  example,  rights  to  property, 
to  franchise,  to  office,  are  acquired  rights. 

2.  Inalienable  rights  are  those  which  a  man  cannot  re- 
nounce or  transfer  to  another,  because  they  are  neces- 
sary to  the  attainment  of  his  last  end.     All  other  rights 


72    The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Individuals. 

are  called  alienable.  "  We  hold  these  truths  to  be  self- 
evident,"  says  our  Declaration  of  Independence,  "  that 
all  men  are  created  equal ;  that  they  are  endowed  by 
their  Creator  with  certain  inalienable  rights  ;  that 
among  them  are  hfe,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happi- 
ness." 
3.  Perfect  or  strict  rights  are  of  such  a  kind  that  the 
corresponding  duties  are  matters  of  commutative  jus- 
tice. Imperfect  rights  are  not  so  definite;  they  are 
founded  not  on  justice  but  on  claims  of  gratitude  or  of 
honor,  or  on  some  similar  title. 

120.  Rights  in  conflict.  Rights  cannot  strictly  be  said  to 
conflict.  We  may  meet  with  conflicting  claims  to  the  same 
thing,  or  apparent  rights  in  conflict,  but  of  these  only  one  can 
be  a  real  right.  For,  by  the  nature  of  a  right,  its  existence  in 
one  person  imposes  an  obhgation  upon  all  others  to  respect 
that  right.  Consequently,  conflicting  rights  is  a  contradiction 
in  terms,  because  "  I  am  bound  to  respect  something"  and  "I 
am  not  so  bound  "  are  evidently  contradictory  propositions. 
When  two  claims  conflict,  the  right  disputed  must  be  decided 
to  belong  to  the  claimant  that  has  the  true  title,  or  at  least 
the  better  title.  Such  a  decision  is  not  always  easy,  especially 
as  men  are  naturally  prepossessed  in  favor  of  their  own  in- 
terests, and  on  this  account  they  are  often  forced  to  make 
use  of  arbitration  and  law  coiuts. 

121.  The  following  principles  regarding  conflicting 
claims  are  obvious:  of  two  claims  otherwise  equal  that 
should  prevail — 

I.  Which  is  more  necessary  for  the  attainment  of  man's 
last  end :  thus,  the  right  to  life  takes  precedence  of 
that  to  property.  Hence,  if  a  man  who  is  suffering 
extreme  poverty  has  instant  need  of  food,  he  possesses 


Rights  and  Duties  in  General.  73 

the  right  to  supply  his  need  from  the  provisions  of 
others  who  are  not  in  equal  or  greater  need. 

2.  Which  concerns  the  good  of  the  greater  number. 
For  this  reason,  the  common  good  takes  precedence 
of  private  good,  as  when  a  citizen  has  to  expose  his 
life  in  defense  of  the  State. 

3.  Which  is  more  probably  genuine :  thus,  a  man  pos- 
sessing an  object  which  he  acquired  in  good  faith  can 
continue  to  hold  it  till  a  better  claim  be  proved. 

122.  Various  classes  of  duties  correspond  to  the  various 
classes  of  rights :  to  the  natural  rights  of  one  person  corre- 
spond the  natural dnties  of  others;  to  acquired  rights,  adven- 
titious duties;  to  imperfect  rights,  imperfect  duties.  Positive 
duties  which  are  based  on  positive  or  affirmative  precepts  of 
the  law,  oblige  us  to  perform  certain  acts;  while  negative 
duties,  which  are  based  on  negative  precepts,  oblige  us  to 
abstain  from  certain  acts.  Positive  duties  do  not  require  us 
to  act  at  every  moment,  but  only  at  certain  times ;  negative 
duties,  however,  oblige  us  to  abstain  at  all  times  from  the 
forbidden  acts. 

We  have  duties  to  God,  to  ourselves,  and  to  our  neighbor. 
These  three  classes  of  duties  we  shall  examine  severally  in 
the  three  following  chapters. 


CHAPTER  II. 

OUR  DUTIES  TO  GOD. 

1 23.  Our  duties  to  God  take  precedence  of  all  other  duties: 

(a)  Logically,  because  God  is  the  First  Cause,  upon  whom  we, 
as  contingent  beings  and  effects  of  His  creative  power,  depend 
for  the  beginning  and  continuance  of  our  existence.  Upon 
this  dependence  are  founded  all  our  rights  and  duties,  (b) 
Morally,  because  God  is  oiu"  last  end ;  and  all  morality  con- 
sists in  directing  our  acts  to  our  last  end. 

124.  Religion,  objectively  considered,  is  the  sum  total  of 
all  oiu:  duties  to  God.  It  is  not  a  thing  of  human  invention, 
but,  as  Cicero  observes :  "  It  is  to  be  found  in  every  land ; 
for  natiu-e  knows  how  to  worship  God,  and  no  man  is  igno- 
rant of  the  law  by  which  it  is  enjoined." 

Considered  subjectively,  religion  is  the  moral  virtue  by  which 
man  renders  due  homage  to  God  as  the  first  beginning  and 
last  end  of  all  things.  Hence,  to  acknowledge  our  entire 
dependence  on  Him  is  the  primary  act  of  this  virtue.  We 
acknowledge  the  dependence  of  our  entire  existence  by  adora- 
tion, of  oiu"  intellect  by  faith,  of  our  will  by  love.  These, 
accordingly,  are  the  three  fundamental  duties  of  rehgion. 
Though  God  has  no  need  of  these  acts  for  Himself,  still  He 
is  the  author  of  the  moral  order  by  which  these  acts  are 
enjoined,  and  He  owes  it  to  His  own  sanctity  to  exact  the 
observance  of  the  moral  order. 

74 


Our  Duties  to  God.  75 


Article  I.     Adoration. 

125.  Thesis  I.  All  men  are  bound  to  render  to  God  the 
wojship  of  interior  and  exterior  adoration. 

Proof.  Reason  dictates  that  a  subject  or  dependent  show 
honor  to  his  ruler,  and  that  such  honor  be  proportioned  to  the 
ruler's  dignity  and  the  subject's  dependence.  But  all  men 
depend  in  every  respect  upon  God,  their  Creator  and  Sover- 
eign Lord,  the  Ruler  of  the  Universe,  the  Master  of  hfe  and 
death.  Moreover,  God  is  worthy  of  infinite  honor.  There- 
fore man  owes  God  the  greatest  possible  honor,  such  honor  as 
is  incommunicable  to  any  created  being. 

The  honor  rendered  in  acknowledgement  of  God's  sovereign 
dominion  is  called  adoration.  This,  we  maintain,  ought  to  be 
both  interior  and  exterior. 

1.  Interior  adoration.  We  owe  God  the  reverence  and 
honor  of  our  highest  faculties,  /'.  e.,  of  our  intellect 
and  will.  But  operations  of  these  faculties  are  in- 
terior; they  are  not,  in  themselves,  perceptible  by 
the  senses.  Therefore,  we  owe  God  the  worship  of 
interior  adoration. 

2.  Exterior  adoration.  Man  owes  God  the  homage  not 
of  a  part  of  his  being,  but  of  his  whole  being.  His 
body,  as  well  as  his  soul,  is  entirely  dependent  upon 
God,  and  should,  therefore,  contribute  by  outward 
or  bodily  action  to  the  extrinsic  glory  of  God.  (No. 
22.)  Besides,  on  account  of  the  close  union  be- 
tween soul  and  body,  interior  reverence  naturally 
finds  expression  in  external  action;  and  outward  acts, 
in  their  turn,  promote  interior  reverence.  As  outward 
action  falls  under  the  senses,  our  external  reverence 


76    The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Individuals. 

helps  our  fellow-men  to  elicit  and  express  the  reverence 
and  honor  which  they,  too,  owe  to  God. 

126.  Men  are  not  isolated  individuals,  but  they  are,  as  we 
shall  prove  later  on,  naturally  social  beings.  Hence,  in  this 
connection,  we  may  insert  a  thesis  on  the  worship  which  men 
in  their  social  capacity  owe  to  God. 

Thesis  II.  Men  are  obliged  to  render  public  worship  to 
God. 

Proof  \.  Society  is  natural  to  mankind;  hence  it  comes 
from  the  Author  of  nature.  Society,  therefore,  no  less  than 
private  individuals,  is  dependent  upon  God,  and  owes  Him 
the  worship  due  to  His  infinite  Majesty.  Consequently, 
men  are  obliged,  as  members  of  society,  to  render  to  God  the 
homage  proper  to  society,  which  is  the  worship  of  public  ador- 
ation. 

Proof  2.  The  public  acknowledgment  of  God's  supreme 
dominion  over  all  created  things  is  necessary  for  the  welfare 
of  civil  society  ;  so  much  so,  that  a  notorious  infidel  has  said  : 
"  If  a  God  did  not  exist,  we  should  have  to  invent  one  for  the 
public  good,"  On  this  public  acknowledgment  are  based,  in 
great  measure,  the  sanctity  of  oaths,  the  binding  power  of 
contracts,  the  strength  of  the  marriage  bond,  the  fidelity  of 
subjects  as  well  as  the  integrity  of  rulers,  and  consequently  the 
stability  of  governments  and  civil  constitutions.  Hence,  those 
who  attack  the  worship  of  God  are  dangerous  enemies  of 
mankind,  for  they  are  endeavoring  to  sap  the  foundations  of 
society. 

127.  The  vices  directly  opposed  to  religion  are  impiety, 
idolatry,  and  superstition.  Impiety  is  the  refusal  to  give 
supreme  honor  to  God.  If  it  takes  the  positive  form  of  direct 
dishonor  to  God,  it  is  called  blasphemy.  Idolatry  consists  in 
worshiping  a  creature  with  an  adoration  due  to  God  alone. 


Our  Duties  to  God.  yj 

By  superstition  we  mean  certain  practices,  with  a  religious  in- 
tent, that  are  irrational  or  unworthy  of  their  purpose. 

1 28.  The  principal  acts  of  adoration  axt  prayer  and  sacri- 
fice, which  have  been  practised  by  all  nations  from  their  be- 
ginning. The  special  forms  that  both  should  assume  have 
not  been  determined  by  nature.  Of  course,  God  had  the 
right  to  determine  such  forms  by  a  supematiu-al  Revelation 
and  to  make  them  obligatory  upon  all  His  subjects.  No  act 
of  ours  is  sufficient  by  itself  to  regain  the  favor  of  our  Creator 
if  we  have  once  lost  it  by  sin  ;  we  could  never  know,  except 
from  a  supernatural  source,  how  to  obtain  the  Divine  pardon. 

Article  II.     Faith  in  God's  Word. 

129.  Thesis  III.  All  men  are  obliged  to  accept  Divine 
Revelation,  when  it  has  been  made  known  to  them,  and  to  be- 
lieve the  mysteries  which  it  jnay  contain. 

Explanatio7i.  We  know  indeed  that  a  supernatural  Reve- 
lation has  been  given  to  mankind.  This,  however,  it  is  the 
province,  not  of  Philosophy,  but  of  Theology  and  kindred 
sciences  to  prove  and  discuss.  Prescinding,  therefore,  from 
the  actual  state  of  things,  we  examine,  from  the  standpoint 
of  natural  reason,  what  man's  duties  are  in  regard  to  Revela- 
tion if  the  latter  should  be  made. 

Part  I .  Mafi  is  obliged  to  accept  Divine  Revelation.  Proof. 
God  is  the  Supreme  Lord  and  Master  of  all  His  creatures. 
He  has  the  right,  therefore,  to  enjoin  upon  us  the  acceptance 
of  certain  truths  which  natural  reason  by  itself  is  incapable  of 
discovering,  and  to  command  the  performance  of  certain  acts 
of  worship.  This  right  connotes,  on  our  part,  the  duty  of 
accepting  such  truths  and  of  performing  such  acts,  when 
God's  will  in  these  matters  shall  have  been  made  known  to  us. 


78    The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Individuals. 

Now  this  is  to  accept  Divine  Revelation.  Consequently,  we 
are  obliged  to  accept  Divine  Revelation  when  it  has  been 
made  known  to  us. 

Part  2.  Man  is  obliged  to  believe  in  revealed  mysteries. 
Proof.  A  mystery  is  a  truth  which  human  reason  cannot  com- 
prehend. We  may  understand  the  meaning  of  the  subject 
and  the  predicate  of  the  proposition  in  which  the  incom- 
prehensible truth  is  enunciated ;  we  may  know  that  such  a 
predicate  belongs  to  such  a  subject,  but  we  cannot  perceive 
how  or  why  they  are  thus  connected.  Even  in  the  natural 
order,  many  of  the  physical  phenomena  are  incomprehensible 
truths,  and  may,  therefore,  be  called,  in  a  certain  sense,  nat- 
ural mysteries.  Revealed  or  supernatural  mysteries  are  those 
truths  which  can  be  learned  only  by  Divine  Revelation ;  for 
example,  that  the  three  Divine  Persons  are  one  God.  Now, 
God's  infinite  knowledge  necessarily  includes  truths  which 
surpass  our  finite  understanding ;  such  truths  He  is  surely 
able  to  make  known  to  us,  and  He  has  the  right  to  demand 
our  belief  in  the  same  as  an  homage  of  our  understanding. 
Therefore,  we  are  imder  obligation  to  beheve  the  mysteries 
which  God  may  be  pleased  to  reveal. 

130.   Objections. 

1.  It  is  unworthy  of  a  man  to  believe  what  he  does  not 
understand.  Answer.  If  such  belief  were  without  a 
sufficient  reason,  yes;  but  if  it  is  supported  by  the 
best  of  reasons,  namely,  the  infalhble  authority  of 
God,  belief  is  truly  worthy  of  man,  and  the  contrary 
course  would  be  most  imreasonable. 

2.  Dogmatic  teaching  enslaves  the  intellect.  Answer. 
An  entire  reliance  upon  authority  in  every  science 
would  be  detrimental  to  intellectual  development.  But 
to  reject  the  momentous  truths  of  Revelation,  because 


Our  Duties  to  God.  79 


they  come  from  authority,  would  be  rrore  unreason- 
able than  to  refuse  belief  in  the  existence  of  the 
Roman  Empire,  because  we  must  depend  ultimately 
for  our  knowledge  of  this  historic  fact  upon  human 
testimony. 

3.  The  knowledge  of  mysteries  is  useless.  Answer. 
On  the  contrary,  it  is  most  useful ;  besides  giving  us 
an  occasion  to  honor  God  by  the  homage  of  our  intel- 
lect, it  wonderfully  and  consolingly  expands  our  knowl- 
edge of  God  and  of  our  own  destinies. 

4.  Dogmatic  teaching  begets  intolerance.  Answer. 
Truth  begets  a  theoretic  intolerance,  or  a  firmness  of 
conviction  which  is  intolerant  of  error.  But  we  deny 
that  such  a  state  of  mind,  whether  it  rests  upon  au- 
thoritative teaching,  or  upon  demonstration,  causes 
practical  intolerance,  or  an  unjust  interference  with 
civil  and  religious  liberty.  The  persecution  of  the 
Church  in  recent  times,  carried  on  in  many  lands  by 
the  opponents  of  Revelation,  shows  what  begets  in- 
tolerance. 

131.  If  God  deigns  to  bestow  a  Revelation  upon  us.  He 
must  necessarily  give  us  the  means  of  recognizing  it  as 
such.  Chief  among  these  means  are  miracles  a.n6.  prophecies. 
Miracles  are  effects  perceptible  by  the  senses,  which  tran- 
scend the  powers  and  the  order  of  all  nature.  We  have 
demonstrated  (Ment.  Phil.,  Cosmol.,  Chap.  III.)  that  miracles 
are  possible,  and  can  be  known  as  such  with  certainty. 
Prophecies  are  accurate  predictions  of  such  future  events  as 
depend  upon  free  causes,  and  cannot  be  known  in  advance 
with  certainty,  except  by  the  omniscient  God. 

132.  Thesis  IV.  Miracles  ajid  prophecies  are  infallible 
proofs  of  a  Divine  Revelation, 


8o    The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Individuals. 

Explanation.  In  this  thesis  we  maintain  that  if,  unmis- 
takably, miracles  have  been  worked  or  prophecies  been  made 
in  confirmation  of  a  doctrine,  that  doctrine  is  thereby  known 
to  be  approved  by  the  Creator  as  His  own  Divine  Revelation. 
The  immediate  inference  from  the  thesis  would  be  that  such 
a  doctrine  must  be  accepted  by  all  men. 

Proof.  A  true  miracle  can  be  wrought  by  God  alone. 
Hence,  it  is  a  Divine  seal,  stamped  as  it  were  upon  the  doc- 
trine, in  express  confirmation  of  which  the  miracle  is  worked. 
The  Divine  origin  of  such  a  doctrine,  therefore,  is  infallibly 
true,  because  it  is  impossible  for  God  to  affix  His  seal  to  a 
falsehood. 

A  prophecy  is  an  accurate  prediction  of  a  future  event 
that  is  not  dependent  upon  necessary  causes.  But  God  alone 
is  the  author  of  such  a  prediction,  for  He  alone  can  possess 
such  knowledge.  Therefore,  prophecies  made  in  confirma- 
tion of  a  doctrine  which  is  published  as  coming  from  God, 
are  infallible  proofs  that  such  a  doctrine  is  a  Divine  Reve- 
lation. 

133.  God  is  at  perfect  liberty  to  choose  the  manner  of  His 
Eevelation.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  He  has  chosen 
to  manifest  it  to  the  vast  majority  of  men,  not  immediately, 
i.  <?.,  by  directly  acting  upon  the  intellect  with  an  overpower- 
ing illumination,  but  mediately,  i.  e.,  through  the  medium  of 
other  men  whom  He  has  commissioned  to  pubhsh  His  re- 
vealed truths.  Thus,  the  evidence  of  Revelation  does  not 
overmaster  the  rational  faculties,  but  leaves  a  man  free  to 
accept  it,  and,  in  this  manner,  to  increase  his  merit.  This 
acceptance  is  an  act  of  the  highest  prudence,  while  the  rejec- 
tion of  Divine  Revelation  would  be  unreasonable  and  a  griev- 
ous wrong.  Indeed,  from  man's  complete  dependence  upon 
God,  and  his  consequent  duty  to  reverence  the  Divine  teach- 


Our  Duties  to  God. 


ings  and  to  accept  them  with  loving  promptness,  it  follows, 
logically,  that  every  one  who  conceives  a  well-grounded  sus- 
picion that  a  Divine  Revelation  has  been  made,  is  obliged  in 
conscience  to  inquire  into  the  matter  with  more  than  ordinary 
dihgence. 

1 34.  Thesis  V.  Indifference  in  the  matter  of  religion  is  a 
grievous  wrong. 

Proof.  This  indifference  may  be  theoretical  or  practical. 
Theoretical  indifference  is  an  opinion  that  all  systems  or 
forms  of  religion,  though  contradictory  to  one  another,  are 
equally  pleasing  to  God  and  useful  to  man.  This  doctrine 
is  false,  and  an  insult  to  God.  It  is  false,  because  all  truth, 
and,  a  fortiori,  revealed  truth,  is  one  and  not  self -contradic- 
tory. It  is  an  insult  to  God,  because  it  represents  Infinite 
Truth  as  pleased  with  error.  Practical  indifference  is  a  re- 
fusal to  give  God  the  homage  which  man  owes  Him  essen- 
tially (Thesis  I.).  As  both  kinds  of  indifference  imply  a  great 
moral  disorder,  they  are  both  grievously  wrong. 

135.  It  is  evident: 

1.  That  God  cannot  make  contradictory  revelations. 
Therefore,  there  can  be  only  one  true  religion  in  the 
world ;  for  all  systems  of  religion  contradict  one  an- 
other on  some  points  of  doctrine. 

2.  That  God  cannot  be  glorified  or  pleased  by  false- 
hood. In  this,  as  in  other  matters.  He  overlooks  mis- 
takes that  are  caused  by  invincible  ignorance.  Never- 
theless, once  a  reasonable  suspicion  concerning  this 
matter  exists  in  the  mind,  a  man  is  obliged  to  do  his 
utmost  in  order  to  discover  the  truth  about  super- 
natural Revelation,  namely,  whether  a  Revelation  has 
been  made  and  where  it  may  be  found. 

3.  That,  if  God  has  made  a  Revelation  to  direct  men  to 


82     The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Individuals. 

their  last  end,  He  must,  in  His  infinite  wisdom,  have 
provided  reliable  means  to  distinguish  it  from  all  false 
systems  usurping  its  place. 

136.  Objections. 

1.  One  does  enough,  if  he  is  an  honest  man.  Answer, 
A  man  who  does  not  practise  religion  is  not  an  hon- 
est man,  for  he  defrauds  God  of  the  worship  which  is 
justly  His  due. 

2.  Among  so  many  jarring  creeds,  it  is  impossible  to 
discover  the  true  rehgion.  Answer.  Still,  one  form 
of  religion  is  divinely  true,  which  alone  can  be  pleas- 
ing to  God.  Now,  God's  providence  and  goodness 
are  doubted  by  thinking  that  the  true  form  of  religion 
is  beyond  the  reach  of  an  earnest  mind  seeking  the 
truth  and  at  the  same  time  humbly  asking  God's  aid 
to  find  it. 

3.  No  one  should  change  his  religion.  Answer.  Cer- 
tainly not,  unless  his  religion  is  false. 

4.  Then  every  man  on  earth  ought  to  set  about  inquir- 
ing into  the  truth  of  his  religion.  Answer.  Only 
those  need  inquire  who  have  good  reason  for  doubt- 
ing the  truth  of  their  religion. 

137.  History  attests  aijd  Theology  confirms  the  facts,  that 
a  Revelation  was  made  to  mankind  in  the  very  beginning ; 
that  this  was  subsequently  amplified  and  developed  by  fur- 
ther revelations ;  that  it  was  finally  perfected  by  the  teach- 
ings of  the  Son  of  God  Himself,  and  that  this  Christian 
Bevelation  has  been  entrusted,  in  its  completeness,  to  an  in- 
fallible Church,  to  be  preserved  and  expounded  until  the  end 
of  time.  These  are  truths  beyond  the  reach  of  Philosophy. 
Nevertheless,  Reason  leads  us  by  the  radiance  of  her  own 
natural  light  Jo  t);ie  portal  of  supem9,tural  religion,  and  is 


Otir  Duties  to  God.  ^i^) 

there  met  by  a  Heavenly  guide,  with  a  brightness  of  illumina- 
tion so  dazzling  that  all  natural  lights  in  its  presence  must 
pale  to  dimness.  In  that  sacred  temple,  across  whose  thresh- 
old she  may  pass  with  man,  Reason  finds  many  truths  above 
her  grasp,  which  she  calls  mysteries,  yet  none  are  opposed  to 
her  own  inherent  principles.  There  she  may  abide  in  peace 
under  the  guidance  of  the  Divine  Spirit,  who  rules  there. 

138.  Was  a  Divine  Revelation  necessary  for  mankind? 
That  form  of  Revelation  which  declares  the  Beatific  Vision  to 
be  man's  supernatural  destiny  and  teaches  him  the  supernatu- 
ral means  to  secure  it  was  not  necessary  for  the  attainment  of 
a  merely  natural  end.  Absolutely  or  intrinsically  considered, 
the  latter  could  be  attained  by  reason  unassisted  supematu- 
rally:  it  would  be  physically  possible;  but,  for  the  over- 
whelming majority,  such  an  event  would  be  morally  impos- 
sible. This,  too,  is  the  lesson  taught  by  History  on  its  every 
page.  The  nations  of  the  earth,  even  the  most  highly  civi- 
lized, had  fallen,  despite  the  teachings  of  primeval  Revelation, 
into  the  grossest  idolatry.  Besides,  how  strangely  and  wildly 
some  of  the  most  rarely  gifted  minds  have  erred  in  matters  of 
the  greatest  importance !  In  oiu:  own  times  also  we  are  made 
painfully  aware  of  the  deplorable  tendency  of  self-sufficient 
souls  to  mistake  the  truth  respecting  man's  duties  to  God. 
False  philosophies, — Pantheism,  Positivism,  Agnosticism,  Ma- 
terialism,— are,  alas  !  too  widespread  and  too  notoriously 
prominent  in  the  world  of  thought  to  leave  us  ground  for 
thinking  that  mankind  could  have  reached  even  a  natural  end 
without  the  assistance  of  a  supernatural  Revelation. 

139.  Although  there  should  exist  many  philosophical  teach- 
ers holding  perfectly  correct  doctrines  on  the  duties  of  man, 
still,  countless  multitudes  could  not,  by  this  natural  means 
alone,  become  truly  enhghtened.    Such  enhghtenment  can  be 


84    The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Individuals. 

accomplished  in  only  two  ways,  by  reasoning  and  by  proclaim- 
ing truths  with  infaUible  authority.  In  neither  way,  however, 
could  the  desired  effect  be  brought  about  for  the  masses.  It 
could  not  be  done  by  reasoning,  since  few,  comparatively, 
would  be  able  to  follow  the  required  processes  of  thought.  Nor 
coiild  authority  be  of  avail,  in  the  h5rpothesis  of  a  purely  natu- 
ral order.  Other  men,  holding  false  doctrines,  might  claim 
equal  authority,  and  then  how  could  the  dispute  be  settled  by 
natural  means  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  people  ?  What  natu- 
ral sign  would  mark  the  authoritative  teachers  of  mankind  and 
distinguish  them  from  the  propagators  of  error? 

Article  III.     The  Love  of  God. 

140.  Love  is  an  act  of  the  will  by  which  we  tend  to  good. 
We  render  to  God  the  due  homage  of  our  will  by  loving  Him 
above  all  things,  just  as  by  valuing  His  word  above  all  other 
testimony  we  offer  Him  the  homage  of  our  understanding. 
Our  love  is  well  ordered  when  it  tends  towards  an  object  ac- 
cording to  the  measure  of  true  good  which  the  intellect  per- 
ceives in  that  object.  Now,  God  is  the  highest  good,  not 
merely  relatively,  but  absolutely  the  highest  good,  for  He  is  the 
Infinite  Good.  Therefore,  if  we  love  God  according  to  the 
measure  of  His  goodness,  we  must  love  Him  as  the  Supreme 
Good,  and  for  His  own  sake,  because  He  deserves  infinite  love. 
This  perfect  love  for  God  is  the  love  of  benevolence  or 
Mendship ;  a  friend  being  one  to  whom  we  wish  well,  not  for 
our  own  satisfaction  only,  but  for  his  sake. 

141.  Yet  we  also  understand  that  God  is  the  source  of  im- 
measurable good  for  us.  This  happens  in  many  ways,  but 
chiefly  because  our  ultimate  happmess  consists  in  possessing 
Him  for  eternity.      To  love  God  for  our  own  sakes  is   a 


Our  Duties  to  God.  85 


love  of  desire  or  hope.  It  is  well  ordered,  however,  since  it 
fulfills  the  requirements  stated  above.  Our  intellect,  indeed, 
perceives  that  God  is  not  only  the  highest  good  in  Himself, 
but  also  the  good  most  conducive  to  our  own  happiness. 
Still,  this  love  is  imperfect;  for,  in  tending  towards  God,  it 
does  not  regard  the  highest  good,  namely,  God's  supreme  ex- 
cellence. Moreover,  to  be  acceptable  to  God,  our  love  for 
Him,  whether  perfect  or  imperfect,  must  always  be  a  love  of 
preference,  that  is,  a  love  which  prefers  God  to  all  things 
else.  We  need  not,  however,  constantly  perform  acts  of 
love  for  God,  this  duty  being  founded  upon  the  positive 
precepts,  which  oblige  us  to  act  only  at  certain  times. 


CHAPTER  III. 

OUR  DUTIES  TO  OURSELVES. 

142.  Strictly  speaking,  we  do  not  owe  duties  to  ourselves, 
since  a  duty  is  a  moral  bond  obliging  us  to  respect  the  rights 
of  others.  In  many  cases  I  can  remit  the  debt  due  me  from 
my  neighbor  and  thus  dispense  him  from  certain  duties 
towards  myself,  but  I  cannot  free  myself  from  one  of  those 
duties  which  I  am  said  to  owe  to  myself.  Such  duties,  how- 
ever, we  do  not  really  owe  to  ourselves  but  to  God,  for  we 
belong  to  him  absolutely  and  entirely ;  hence,  we  are  His  prop- 
erty and  His  servants.  To  Him  we  owe  the  duty  of  taking 
care  of  ourselves  and  of  reasonably  promoting  our  own  good. 
Such,  in  Moral  Philosophy,  is  the  meaning  of  the  expression 
our  duties  to  ourselves. 

143.  What  duties  then  do  we  owe  to  ourselves?  Evi- 
dently in  this  matter  we  are  obliged  to  observe  the  most  gen- 
eral principle  of  the  moral  law,  "  do  that  which  good  order 
requires."  Now,  the  first  requirement  of  good  order  is  that 
we  tend  toward  the  end  for  which  we  have  been  made.  In 
brief,  therefore,  my  duties  to  myself  consist  in  directing  my 
voluntary  acts  in  such  a  manner  as  to  attain  my  last  end.  In 
detail : 

I.  My  last  end  and  the  way  to  reach  it  are  made  known 
to  me  through  my  intellect  j  hence  I  have  a  duty  to 
develop  my  intellect  in  order  to  perceive,  with  in- 
creasing clearness,  the  best  means  for  attaining  my 


Our  Duties  to  Ourselves.  S7 

end,  and,  consequently,  for  understanding  the  law  of 
God  and  its  application  to  myself. 

2.  The  moral  order  regards  free  acts,  or  acts  of  the 
will ;  hence,  I  ought  to  strengthen  the  will  by  train- 
ing it  to  follow  the  guidance  of  reason. 

3.  But  this  implies  that  I  must  control  my  passions, 
which  tend  to  hinder  my  will  from  obeying  such  guid- 
ance. 

4.  To  accomplish  all  this  and  to  fill  the  place  allotted 
to  me  by  Providence,  I  am  bound  in  duty  to  take 
reasonable  care  of  my  life  and  the  health  of  my  body  ; 
besides,  I  must  endeavor  to  acquire  such  temporal 
goods  as  may  help  me  to  lead  a  moral  life. 

5.  For  like  reasons,  I  must,  to  some  extent,  protect  my 
honor  or  reputation. 

144.    Thesis  VI.     Suicide  is  never  allowed. 

Proof.  Suicide  is  the  taking  away  of  one's  own  life.  But 
this  is  a  usurpation  of  God's  supreme  dominion  over  life  and 
death,  and  hence  a  grievous  violation  of  the  moral  order. 
God  has  an  absolute  right  to  every  moment  of  my  existence 
and  to  all  the  honor  I  can  give  Him  by  fulfilling  His  sovereign 
will,  even  by  patiently  enduring  the  ills  which  He  permits  to 
befall  me.  Since,  therefore,  suicide  is  a  great  moral  disorder, 
it  can  never  be  allowed. 

Objections. 

1 .  Courage  is  praiseworthy ;  it  is  exhibited  in  suicide. 
Answer.  The  man  who  commits  suicide,  is  rash,  not 
courageous,  in  attempting  what  he  has  no  right  to  do, 
and,  as  Plato  says  in  his  dialogue  called  Phaedo,  he 
is  a  moral  coward  in  running  away  from  his  post. 

2.  Of  two  evils  we  ought  to  choose  the  less  grievous ; 
but  suicide  is  an  evil  less  grievous  than  a  life  of  sin. 


88    The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Individuals. 

Answer.  There  is  here  no  matter  for  choice ;  we  are 
not  forced  to  sin ;  an  act  is  not  sinful,  unless  it  is  free. 
Besides,  we  are  never  permitted  to  do  evil  that  good 
may  result  therefrom. 

3.  We  must  be  willing  to  sacrifice  our  hves  in  order  to 
possess  God  the  sooner.  Answer.  We  must  be  will- 
ing to  die  when  God  wills  it  and  in  the  manner  that 
pleases  Him,  but  not  in  a  way  that  would  be  a  viola- 
tion of  His  divine  right.  Such  a  violation  would 
deprive  us  forever  of  the  possession  of  God. 

4.  A  criminal  might  be  condemned  to  kill  himself,  as 
was  the  case  with  Socrates.  Answer.  No  authority 
can  oblige  a  person  to  do  what  is,  in  itself,  morally  evil. 

145.  Yet  we  may  at  times  expose  our  lives  to  imminent 
danger,  provided,  as  in  the  case  of  evil  indirectly  willed  (No. 
51),  we  do  not  directly  intend  our  death,  and  the  good  to  be 
thereby  obtained  is  worthy  of  so  great  a  risk.  No  one  has  a 
right  to  expose  life  or  limb  or  health  for  a  trifle,  such  as  vain 
glory  or  the  gratification  of  mere  curiosity.  But  a  sufficient 
reason  might  be  found  in  the  needs  of  our  religion  or  of  our 
country,  the  advancement  of  science,  the  relief  of  persons  in 
distress,  or  in  any  other  truly  noble  cause,  when  important 
results  are  to  be  attained  which  cannot  be  secured  without 
such  a  risk. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Our  Rights  and  Duties  Towards  our  Fellow-Men. 

146.  Man  has  duties  towards  God  and  towards  himself ; 
in  regard  to  his  fellow-men  he  has  both  duties  and  rights. 
We  are  still  speaking  of  man  as  an  individual  and  not  as  a 
member  of  society.  According  to  this  view  we  shall  nexti 
consider  his  duties  to  other  men  and  his  right  to  possess 
property. 

Article  I.     The  Love  we  Owe  our  Fellow-Men. 

147.  Thesis  VII.  We  must  love  our  fellow-men  as  we  love 
ourselves. 

Explanation.  We  do  not  say  as  much  or  as  intensely  as  we 
love  ourselves,  for  this  would  be  impossible,  but  "as  our- 
selves," that  is,  in  a  similar  manner,  by  wishing  them  good 
things  of  the  kind  we  desire  for  ourselves. 

Proof.  Right  order,  which  is  the  foundation  of  all  morality, 
requires  the  creature  to  conform  his  will  to  the  will  of  the 
Creator.  Now,  the  Creator  wills  the  good  of  all  men,  namely, 
that  they  shall,  of  their  own  free  will,  attain  their  last  end, 
and  that  they  shall  have  all  the  necessary  means  to  do  so. 
This  same,  therefore,  we  must  desire  for  our  fellow-men; 
and  this  is  to  love  oiu-  fellow-men  as  we  love  ourselves. 

Right  order  requires  also  that  every  one  shall  make  it  his 
first  duty  to  work  out  his  own  salvation ;  he  is  immediately 
and  directly  responsible  for  this.  Hence,  he  must  seek  pri- 
marily to  procure  with  most  special  care  all  things  tending  to 

89 


90    The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Individuals. 

this  object,  which  is  his  own  greatest  good.     Consequently 
every  man  must  love  himself  more  than  he  loves  other  men. 

My  love  for  other  men  is  based  on  the  fact  of  our  common 
nature.  All  other  men  have  the  same  specific  nature  as  my- 
self, but  not  the  same  identity  or  individuality ;  therefore,  my 
love  for  all  other  men  must  be  the  same  specifically,  or  of  the 
same  kind,  as  my  love  for  myself ;  but  it  need  not,  in  truth  it 
cannot,  be  so  intense,  because  I  cannot  be  so  completely  iden- 
tified with  another  person  as  with  my  individual  self. 

148.  But  according  to  the  foregoing  principle,  does  not 
heroism,  by  which  men  sacrifice  themselves  for  the  good  of 
others,  violate  the  rule  of  well-ordered  love  ?  Even  here 
the  principle  holds  true ;  for,  though  the  hero  may  risk  or  sac- 
rifice his  life  to  save  another  person,  yet  he  thereby  endeavors 
to  gain  for  himself  a  higher  good  than  hfe.  His  heroic  act  of 
charity  merits  a  greater  reward  in  the  next  world  than  a  pro- 
longed life  of  ordinary  virtue.  Hence,  he  really  seeks  his 
own  greater  good,  preferring  a  spiritual  good  to  one  that  is 
temporal. 

149.  From  the  argument  of  the  preceding  thesis,  it  is  ap- 
parent that,  even  in  the  natural  order,  our  love  for  oiu:  fellow- 
men  is  based  for  its  motive  upon  our  love  for  God.  Hence, 
we  perceive  that  all  our  rights  and  duties  are  referred  directly 
or  indirectly  to  our  dependence  upon  God. 

The  dictates  of  this  general  love  may  be  thus  expressed : 
"  Never  do  to  others  what  you  would  not  wish  them  to  do  to 
you,"  and  "  do  unto  others  as  you  would  have  others  do 
unto  you."  The  negative  dictate  of  this  law  obliges  always; 
the  positive  dictate  obliges  us  to  act  on  special  occasions 
only,  when  others  are  in  uncommon  need  of  assistance.  Our 
duty  to  render  such  assistance  becomes  urgent  when  they  are 
in  extreme  necessity. 


Our  Rights  and  Duties  etc.  91 

150.  We  are  obliged  to  love  all  men;  therefore,  we  must 
love  our  enemies.  True,  we  may  take  whatever  precautions 
sound  reason  approves,  in  order  to  protect  our  right  against 
those  who  seek  to  injure  us,  but  our  object  in  so  doing  must 
be  justice  or  the  expediency  of  public  or  private  good,  and  not 
personal  revenge.  It  is  not  lawful  to  hate  our  enemies,  for 
hatred  is  never  a  means  to  redress  the  wrong  we  may  have 
suffered ;  nor  are  we  allowed  to  injure  them,  unless  the  injury 
be  done  in  self-defense  (No.  164),  and  without  violating,  the 
order  of  civil  society.  Nay  even,  we  cannot  rightfully  ex^ 
elude  enemies  from  that  general  internal  love  which  we  owe 
to  all  men.  They  may,  it  is  true,  have  done  nothing  to 
deserve  such  favor ;  yet,  in  common  with  ourselves,  they  are 
members  of  the  human  family,  and  made  in  a  special  man- 
ner to  the  image  and  likeness  of  God. 

151.  Whom  are  we  to  love  most  ?  Evidently,  we  ought 
to  love  those  most  who  are  most  closely  united  to  us  by  ties 
of  nature,  religion  or  civil  society.  Community  of  nature  be- 
ing the  bond  of  love  between  man  and  his  fellows,  the  more 
two  parties  have  naturally  in  common,  or  the  nearer  they  ap- 
proach to  identity  by  relationship  of  any  kind,  the  greater 
ought  to  be  their  love  for  each  other.  Special  effects  of 
this  love  ought  to  be  determined  by  the  particular  kind  of  re- 
lationship :  to  blood  relations,  we  owe,  especially,  natural 
goods;  to  oiu:  brethren  in  the  household  of  the  Faith,  spiritual 
goods;  to  our  fellow-citizens,  civil  protection. 

Article  II.     Our  Duties   Regarding  the  Minds 
AND  Wills  of  Others. 

152.  Duties  to  others  founded  on  the  mutual  relationship 
of  our  minds  are  violated  by  all  falsehood  and,  particularly, 


92     The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Individuals. 

by  the  propagation  of  false  principles.  Duties  arising  from 
the  relationship  of  our  wills  are  violated  by  bad  example  or 
scandal,  which  tends  to  deprave  the  wills  of  others. 

153.  A  falsehood,  or  lie,  is  speech  contrary  to  one's  mind. 
By  a  falsehood,  a  contradiction  is  willfully  established  between 
a  person's  thoughts  and  the  received  expression  of  those 
thoughts.  For  this  reason,  a  falsehood  contains  a  moral  dis- 
order and  is  essentially  wrong. 

Lying  must  be  distinguished  from  equivocation  and  mental 
reservation. 

154.  Equivocation  consists  in  using  an  expression  readily 
susceptible  of  two  meanings,  one  false,  the  other  true,  which 
the  listener  or  reader  can,  and  often  will,  understand  wrongly. 
Thus  we  read  (Gen.  xii.  13),  that,  on  entering  Egypt, 
Abraham  instructed  Sarai  to  call  herself  his  sister,  the  Hebrew 
word  for  sister  being  often  used  to  denote  a  near  female  rela- 
tive. He  did  this  because  his  life  would  not  have  been  safe 
if  she  were  known  to  be  his  wife.  In  the  matter  of  liceity, 
equivocation  is  generally  classed  with  mental  reservation 
which  is  not  purely  mental. 

155.  "  Mental  reservation  is  the  unexpressed  qualification 
of  a  statement  affecting  or  entirely  altering  its  meaning  as  un- 
derstood by  the  person  addressed,  generally  so  that  the  uttered 
statement  is  untrue,  though  with  the  qualification  it  is  true." 
(Standard  Dictionary,  1894.) 

It  consists,  therefore,  in  withholding  a  circimistance  by 
which  a  statement  is  qualified  in  such  a  manner  that  the  state- 
ment is  false  as  it  stands,  although,  it  is  true  if  joined  to  the 
qualifying  circumstance.  When  it  is  strictly  mental,  i.  <?., 
when  there  is  nothing  either  in  the  words  or  in  the  circum- 
stances that  can  prevent  the  hearer  from  being  deceived,  it  is 
equivalent  to  a  lie  and  therefore  essentially  wrong.     But  when 


Our  Rights  and  Duties  etc.  93 

the  reservation  is  not  strictly  mental,  it  may  be  allowed  at 
times ;  yet  not  without  weighty  reasons,  else  speech  would  be- 
come unreliable  and  social  confidence  would  be  impaired.  If, 
however,  reservation  were  never  lawful,  the  common  good  or 
great  private  good  would  often  have  to  be  sacrificed  without 
sufficient  reason,  for  it  may  often  happen  that  important 
secrets  cannot  be  protected  without  mental  reservation.  One 
example  will  suffice :  a  man  to  whom  an  official  secret  has 
been  intrusted  may  answer,  if  interrogated  on  the  subject, 
that  he  does  not  know,  meaning  thereby  that  he  does  not 
know  the  matter  in  such  a  way  as  to  be  able  to  communi- 
cate it. 

The  objection  may  be  raised  that  mental  reservation  is 
always  wrong  because  it  leads  others  into  error,  and,  con- 
sequently, inflicts  an  injury  upon  them.  We  answer  that  he 
who  uses  a  mental  reservation,  as  an  unavoidable  means,  in- 
tends directly  to  save  a  private  person  or  the  public  from 
injury;  and  that,  in  so  doing,  he  is  not  the  cause  but  the  justi- 
fiable occasion  of  error  in  the  mind  of  the  rash  questioner. 

156.    Thesis  VIII.     A  lie  is  intri?isically  evil. 

Proof  I.  It  is  intrinsically  evil  to  use  a  thing  contrary  to 
its  natural  end.  But  the  natural  end  of  speech  is  to  com- 
municate our  thoughts  to  our  fellow-men,  and  a  lie  is  the  con- 
trary of  the  thoughts  of  him  who  utters  it.  Therefore,  a  lie  is 
contrary  to  the  natural  end  of  speech  and  is  intrinsically  evil. 

Proof  2.  The  universal  shame  attached  to  lying  is  an  evi- 
dent sign  that,  by  the  common  consent  of  mankind,  it  is  held 
to  be  wrong  in  itself.  This  is  made  clearer  by  the  applica- 
tion of  the  simple  text,  "  Do  not  da  unto  others,  etc."  Does 
any  person  wish  to  be  deceived  ?  Lying,  then,  is  an  evil  to 
the  in  ellect  which  no  one  wishes  to  suffer,  for  no  one  wishes 
to  be  deceived. 


94    The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Individuals. 

Jh'oof  2i-  Man  is  by  nature  a  social  being;  hence  it  is  the 
will  of  the  Author  of  Nature  that  he  shall  live  in  society. 
Therefore,  whatever  tends  to  subvert  human  society  is  intrin- 
sically wrong.  But  lying  tends  to  do  this,  because  it  weakens 
mutual  confidence,  which  is  essential  for  human  society. 

157.  Objections. 

1.  That  cannot  be  wrong  which  all  civilized  nations 
allow  in  their  courts  of  justice;  but  they  allow  the 
guilty  to  plead  "not  guilty."  Answer.  "  Not  guilty," 
pleaded  in  a  criminal  court,  is  an  accepted  technicality 
meaning  "not  proved  guilty." 

2.  That  is  not  wrong  which  is  related  by  Holy  Scrip- 
ture concerning  virtuous  men ;  but  it  is  there  related 
that  Jacob  said,  "  I  am  Esau,  thy  first-bom  (Gen. 
xxvii.  19).  Answer.  Jacob  regarded  himself,  after 
purchasing  Esau's  right  of  primogeniture,  as  legally 
Esau  the  first-bom.  Besides,  Holy  Scripture  does  not 
approve  all  the  deeds  which  it  chronicles  of  good  men. 

3.  Our  Blessed  Saviour  Himself  declared  that  He  was 
not  going  up  to  Jerusalem,  and  yet  eventually  He 
went  thither  (John  vii.  8).  Answer.  Ovs  Lord  did 
not  go  up  to  Jerusalem  on  that  particular  festival  day 
of  which  He  was  speaking  at  the  time,  but  He  went 
up  on  the  third  or  fourth  day  afterwards. 

4.  But  He  denied  that  He  knew  when  the  end  of  the 
world  should  come  (Mark  xiii.  32).  Answer.  Our 
Lord  spoke  mystically  as  man  and  not  as  God ;  so 
He  was  understood  by  His  disciples,  as  in  other  hke 
passages,  e.  g.,  "  My  doctrine  is  not  mine,  but  His 
that  sent  me." 

158.  Thesis  IX.  We  are  obliged  to  refrain  from  giving 
^SfUfidal, 


Our  Rights  and  Duties  etc.  95 

Explanation.  Our  duty  towards  the  will  of  our  fellow-man 
amounts  to  this :  that,  in  charity,  we  ought  to  aid  him  in  the 
attainment  of  his  highest  good,  and,  in  justice  as  well  as  in 
charity,  we  must  never  deter  him  therefrom.  We  may  so 
deter  him,  and  thus  become  accessory  to  another's  wrong- 
doing, in  various  ways,  and  especially  by  bad  example,  all  of 
which  we  include  under  the  general  term,  scandal.  For  scan- 
dal may  be  given  by  any  word  or  deed  not  entirely  right, 
which  is  an  occasion  of  wrongdoing  on  the  part  of  others. 

Proof.  We  are  obliged  to  will  that  others  should  attain 
their  last  end  (Thesis  VII.),  But  to  give  scandal  is  to  will 
the  contrary,  because  it  tends  to  lead  men  away  from  their 
last  end.  Therefore,  we  are  obliged  to  refrain  from  giving 
scandal. 

Article  III.    Duties  Regarding  the  Lives  of  Others. 

159.  Taking  away  another  man's  life  is  homicide.  This, 
we  shall  see  further  on,  may  in  special  cases  be  justifiable, 
namely,  in  a  just  war  (No.  263),  in  the  infliction  of  the  death 
penalty  by  the  civil  authority  (No.  249),  and  in  self-defense 
(No.  164).  When  homicide  is  not  justifiable  yet  has  extenu- 
ating circumstances,  it  is  known  as  manslaughter;  when 
committed  with  malice  and  full  deliberation,  it  is  called  mur- 
der. In  the  law,  murder  is  defined  as  "  the  killing  of  a  man 
with  malice  prepense  or  aforethought." 

1 60.  The  material  world  has  been  created  for  mankind ; 
not  for  this  or  that  individual  man,  not  for  any  special  class 
of  men,  but  for  every  man  and  for  all  men.  Each  and  every 
man  is  created  for  God  and  for  his  own  final  happiness,  which 
is  to  be  found  in  the  everlasting  possession  of  God.  Con- 
sidered in  this  light,  /.  e,,  according  to  their  nature,  all  meij 


96     The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Individuals. 

are  equal  and  independent  of  one  another.  It  is  not  with 
man  as  with  the  brute  creation.  All  other  things  have  been 
made  for  him ;  he  can,  therefore,  dispose  of  them  for  his  own 
advantage,  and  he  has  the  right  of  life  and  death  over  irra- 
tional animals.  But  man  has  been  made  for  God  alone; 
consequently,  to  God  alone  belongs  the  right  of  life  and  death 
over  man.  Besides,  since  man  is  bound  to  tend  towards  his 
last  end,  he  has  a  natural  right  to  the  means  necessary  for 
this  purpose.  Now,  life  is  such  a  means;  it  is  the  founda- 
tion or  the  indispensable  condition  of  all  other  means.  There- 
fore, every  man  has  a  right  to  life,  which  all  other  men  are 
bound  to  respect. 

161.  Thesis  X.     Murder  is  a  great  wrong. 

Proof.  The  violation  of  most  important  rights  is  a  great 
wrong.  But  murder  is  such  a  violation:  it  is  therefore  a 
great  wrong.  Miurder  is  a  violation :  i.  Of  God's  right  over 
human  life.  2.  Of  the  murdered  man's  right  to  his  own  life, 
the  foundation  of  his  other  rights  and  duties,  and  the  means 
necessary  to  attain  or  increase  his  final  beatitude.  3.  Of  the 
rights  of  society  to  one  of  its  members,  and  to  public  peace 
and  order.  4.  Of  the  rights  that  bereaved  relatives  and 
friends  have  to  the  love  and  society  of  the  murdered  man. 
Though  some  of  the  latter  evils  may  not  exist  in  special  cases, 
nevertheless  the  chief  disorders  are  present  in  every  murder. 

162.  Objections. 

1.  An  act  is  good  when  its  object,  end,  and  circum- 
stances are  good ;  but  such  would  be  the  case  in,  say, 
the  murder  of  a  persecutor  of  the  Church,  Answer. 
The  object  of  the  act,  or  the  thing  done  (No.  47)  is 
wrong,  for  it  is  a  usurpation  of  God's  absolute  right 
over  the  life  and  death  of  man. 

2.  How  then  can  it  be  right  to  kill  a  man  in  war  ? 


Our  Rights  and  Duties  etc.  97 

Answer.  The  thesis  treats  of  murder,  but  not  of 
justifiable  homicide.  We  shall  see  (No.  263)  that 
God  confers  upon  the  State  the  right  of  waging  a  just 
war. 

3.  David  killed  the  young  man  who  had  slain  Saul. 
Answer.  David  acted  in  this  case  as  a  sovereign  pun- 
ishing crime. 

4.  Moses  by  his  private  authority  slew  an  Egyptian, 
Answer.  Moses  was  the  divinely  appointed  deliverer 
of  the  chosen  people.  God,  the  master  of  life  and 
death,  inspired  him  to  begin  his  task  in  this  manner. 

5.  Inspiration  cannot  be  claimed  for  Mathathias,  who 
put  an  apostate  to  death  by  his  own  authority  (Mach. 
ii.  24).  Answer.  Mathathias  was  high-priest  and 
judge,  and,  as  such,  the  executive  of  the  Jewish  law, 
which  ordained  death  without  trial  to  the  introducer 
of  idolatry. 

163.  Thesis  XI.  Under  certain  conditions  it  is  lawful^  in 
self -defense ,  to  kill  an  unjust  aggressor. 

Explanation.  The  conditions  are:  i.  Real  danger  of  los- 
ing life,  or  of  suffering  great  bodily  injury,  or  of  losing  im- 
portant possessions,  the  latter  often  being  as  necessary  as 
life  or  limb.  According  to  the  general  opinion,  a  woman 
may  kill  an  assailant  when  his  death  is  necessary  in  defense 
of  her  chastity.  2.  No  other  way  of  escape.  3.  No  direct 
intention  of  killing  the  aggressor,  but  only  of  defending  one's 
self.  4.  That  no  greater  injury  be  intentionally  inflicted  than 
necessity  requires.  5.  That  violence  be  used  only  when  the 
danger  is  imminent. 

Proofs.  Our  right  to  live  involves  a  right  to  use  the 
means  necessary  for  life,  provided  such  means  do  not  violate 
the  rights  of  others.     But,  in  the  case  of  unjust  aggression, 


gS     The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Individuals. 

the  death  of  the  aggressor  may  be  the  only  means  for  saving 
one's  hfe;  nor  are  the  rights  of  others  thereby  violated. 
Between  the  assailant  and  defendant  arises  a  conflict  of 
claims  to  life,  in  which,  evidently,  the  right  of  the  defendant 
prevails,  while  that  of  the  assailant  is  suspended  for  the  time 
being.  The  precedence  of  right  belongs  to  the  defendant, 
who  has  not  willingly  exposed  himself  to  the  danger,  and  is 
merely  repelling  an  attack;  but  it  cannot  belong  to  the 
assailant,  who  is  not  acting  from  a  motive  of  self-defense, 
and  can  cease  from  the  attack  or  could  have  abstained  from 
beginning  it. 

Proof  2.  The  thesis  is  a  dictate  of  common  sense,  as 
Cicero  declares  in  his  plea  for  Milo. 

164.   Objections. 

1.  The  end  never  justifies  the  means.  Answer.  The 
means  employed  in  self-defense  are  not  evil;  the  de- 
fendant intends  by  his  physical  act,  which  is  not  in 
itself  evil,  not  the  death  of  his  aggressor,  but  his  own 
defense,  and  he  violates  no  rights. 

2.  God's  right  as  master  of  life  and  death  is  violated. 
Answer.  It  is  violated  by  the  aggressor,  who  forces 
the  defendant  to  strike  the  deadly  blow. 

3.  We  must  love  our  enemies.  Answer.  Well  ordered 
charity  does  not  require  us  to  love  our  enemies  more 
than  we  love  ourselves,  nor  even  to  love  them  with 
equal  intensity. 

4.  But,  if  this  last  principle  is  true,  we  should  be  bound 
in  duty  to  kill  the  aggressor ;  yet  this  doctrine  is  re- 
pugnant to  charity.  Atiswer.  We  are  obliged  to  em- 
ploy only  ordinary  means  for  the  preservation  of  hfe. 
As  homicide  is  certainly  an  extraordinary  means,  we 
are  not  obliged  to  make  use  of  it,  although  we  have  a 


Our  Rights  and  Ditties  etc.  99 

right  to  do  so.  A  man  may  waive  this  right,  unless 
held  back  by  imperative  duties  to  others,  and  prefer, 
by  a  heroic  act  of  charity,  to  lose  his  life  rather  than 
cut  off  his  assailant  while  the  latter  has  all  his  sins 
upon  his  head. 

5.  The  foregoing  does  not  apply,  if  the  aggressor  is  an 
insane  person.  Answer.  Though  not  an  unjust  ag- 
gressor formally,  yet  he  is  such  materially.  Hence 
the  common  opinion  is  that,  in  most  cases,  the  killing, 
in  self-defense,  of  an  insane  person  is  not  against  the 
natural  law. 

6.  Then  infanticide  is  not  wrong,  if  it  is  necessary  to 
save  the  mother's  life.  Answer.  The  unborn  child  is 
not  an  unjust  aggressor,  either  formally  or  materially. 
Hence,  the  right  of  the  mother  who  has  caused,  in 
some  sense,  the  conflict  of  claims  to  life,  must  yield 
to  the  right  of  the  child. 

Article  IV.     Duties  Relating  to  the  Honor  of 
Others. 

165.  Honor  is  the  esteem  in  which  a  man  is  held  by 
his  fellow-men.  Considered  radically,  or  in  its  cause,  it  is  a 
man's  real  excellence.  Since  all  men  have  naturally,  as  beings 
endowed  with  rational  faculties  and  destined  for  an  exalted 
end,  a  certain  high  excellence,  all  men  are  naturally  entitled 
to  a  certain  honor.  Still,  as  all  men  are  not  gifted  with  equal 
excellence,  they  are  not  all  entitled  to  equal  honor.  A  per- 
son may  lose  some  of  his  claims  to  be  honored  or  respected 
by  others.  It  may  be  necessary  for  the  common  good,  or 
even  for  some  considerable  private  good,  that  the  vices  of  an 
individual  be  exposed  and  his  honor  thus  lessened. 


lOO    The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Individuals. 

Honor  is  unjustly  impaired  by:  i.  Insult,  or  contumely, 
consisting  in  open,  deliberate  expressions  of  contempt;  2. 
Calumny,  or  false  accusation ;  3.  Detraction,  or  the  disclosure 
of  another's  secret  faults  to  any  one  who  has  not  a  right  to 
know  them.  The  last  two  faults  are  still  further  specified  as 
offenses  against  another's  good  na?ne. 

166.  Thesis  XII.  //  is  unlawful  to  impair  another's 
honor,  and  necessary  to  make  amends  for  its  violation. 

Proof.  We  are  obliged  to  love  others  as  we  love  ourselves; 
but  to  lessen  another's  honor  is  not  to  love  him  as  we  love 
ourselves,  for  we  would  not  have  others  do  this  unto  us.  We 
wish  our  honor  to  be  respected,  (a)  as  something  valuable  for 
its  own  sake  and  prized  as  such  by  noble  minds ;  (b)  as  a 
protection  of  our  rights,  for  a  man  in  bad  repute  is  more  apt 
to  suffer  wrong  and  has  little  if  any  influence  towards  con- 
ciliating favor. 

A  man  is  obliged  to  make  good  the  damage  or  loss  which 
he  has  caused  to  another's  honor  or  good  name.  Since  justice 
demands  that  every  one  shall  have  his  due,  the  honor  unjustly 
taken  away  is  due  to  him  from  whom  it  has  been  taken  and 
must,  as  far  as  is  possible,  be  restored. 

167.  Duelling,  a  practice  handed  down  from  the  pagan- 
ism of  northern  Europe,  was  once  extensively  used  as  a 
means  for  protecting  or  recovering  personal  honor.  Happily, 
it  has  fallen  into  contempt  and  consequent  disuse. 

168.  Thesis  XIV.     Duelling  is  opposed  to  the  natural  law. 

Proof.  A  duel  is  a  fight  between  two  parties  with  murder- 
ous weapons,  undertaken  by  private  authority  and  according 
to  previous  appointment.  Now,  such  an  act  is  intrinsically 
wrong,  and  therefore  opposed  to  the  natural  law.  The  act  is 
intrinsically  wrong,  because  it  has  the  malice  both  of  suicide 
and  of  murder,     i.  A  principal  in  a  duel  exposes  his  life 


Ozir  Rights  and  Duties  etc.  loi 

without  a  just  and  reasonable  cause,  and  he  does  this  deliber- 
ately and  by  pre-arrangement.     2.   He  deliberately  seeks  the 
life  of  a  fellow-man  on  his  own  private  authority  and  with- 
out being  forced  by  necessary  self-defense. 
169.    Objections. 

1.  David  is  praised  for  his  duel  with  Goliath.  Answer. 
A  single  combat,  authorized  by  the  civil  power  as  a 
means  of  warfare,  is  not  a  duel  in  the  sense  here  at- 
tached to  the  word. 

2.  A  duel  may  be  necessary  to  avoid  the  imputation  of 
cowardice.  Answer.  It  would  be  moral  cowardice  to 
do  a  wrong  action  through  human  respect. 

3.  It  is  lawful  to  slay  the  unjust  assailant  of  a  man's 
honor,  since  many  value  honor  more  highly  than 
life.  Answer.  Life  can  sometimes  be  defended 
only  by  striking  down  the  unjust  aggressor;  but  this 
is  not  true  of  a  man's  honor  or  good  name.  More- 
over, the  esteem  in  which  one  man  is  held  by  others 
is  not  more  precious  than  life,  though  this  is  true  of 
honor  considered  radically  or  in  its  cause,  /.  e.,  per- 
sonal excellence  and  virtue. 

4.  According  to  the  general  opinion,  a  woman  may  kill 
the  assailant  of  her  honor,  or  virtue,  if  there  be  no 
other  means  of  escape.  Answer.  Honor  in  this  case 
means  more  than  a  good  name ;  it  means  bodily  chas- 
tity, which  its  owner  has  a  right  to  defend  as  a  price- 
less possession  (No.  163,  i). 


CHAPTER  V. 

RIGHTS   OF   OWNERSHIP   IN    MATERIAL 
PROPERTY. 

170.  Ownership  is  the  right  to  dispose  of  property  at 
will,  and  to  exclude  others  from  its  use.  By  property,  we 
mean  the  external  material  goods  of  the  earth,  which  men 
can  divide  amongst  themselves. 

Article  I.     Validity  of  Titles  to  Ownership. 

171.  Thesis  XV".    We  have  a  right  to  own  property. 
Explanation.     The  ownership  here  spoken  of  is  not  abso- 
lute:  it  is  dependent  on  God. 

Proof.  We  have  a  right  to  live,  indeed  we  are  bound  by 
duty  to  our  Creator  to  preserve  our  lives ;  hence  we  have  a 
natural  right  to  the  means  necessary  to  preserve  life.  But  the 
ownership  of  property,  /.  e.,  the  holding,  using,  and  disposing 
at  will  of  material  goods  to  the  exclusion  of  other  men,  is  a 
necessary  means  for  the  preservation  of  life.  Therefore,  we 
have  a  right  to  own  property. 

172.  Thesis  XVI.  We  have  the  right  to  increase  or  lay 
up  property. 

Proof  \.  Our  right  to  life  not  only  exists  for  the  present 
hour  or  day,  but  it  also  extends  into  the  future;  hence  we 
have  the  right  to  the  ordinary  means  for  prolonging  our  lives 
by  providing  betimes  for  future  wants,  such  as  sickness,  old 


Ownership  in  Material  Property.        103 

age,  or  the  dependence  upon  us  of  other  persons.  Now,  this 
implies  a  right  to  increase  our  property  beyond  present  needs. 
Therefore,  we  have  a  right  to  increase  or  lay  up  property. 

Proof  2.  All  men,  considered  specifically,  or  according  to 
their  common  nature,  are  equal ;  therefore,  no  one  is  bound 
either  to  labor  for  another  or  to  surrender  the  results  of  his 
labor  without  just  compensation.  Yet  this  a  man  would  be 
forced  to  do,  unless  rights  to  property  were  lasting ;  because, 
if  a  claim  to  property  had  been  estabhshed,  and  that  claim 
could  not  continue,  the  labor  which  the  claimant  had  ex- 
pended in  obtaining  or  developing  the  property  would  pass 
without  compensation  to  another  man. 

173.  The  principles  explained  in  the  preceding  paragraphs 
apply  to  landed  property  just  as  well  as  to  other  material 
goods  of  a  less  stable  character.  Yet  the  right  of  private  in- 
dividuals to  own  land  has  been,  of  late  years  especially,  vigor- 
ously denied,  as  unjust  and  opposed  to  the  natural  law.  This 
doctrine,  or  land  theory,  has  had  for  its  most  prominent 
champion  in  our  own  country  Mr.  Henry  George,  who  de- 
clares (Progress  and  Poverty,  B.  VI.,  C.  II.)  that  private 
ownership  in  land  is  the  chief  sotuce  "  of  the  unjust  and  un- 
equal distribution  of  wealth  apparent  in  modem  civilization." 
He  finds  only  one  remedy:  "We  must  make  land  common 
property."  His  reasonings  are  as  ingenious  as  his  claim  is 
bold  and  his  language  forcible ;  but  they  are  full  of  sophistry. 
He  begins  by  granting  that  if  the  remedy  is  a  true  one  it 
must  be  consistent  with  justice.  But  he  fails  in  his  earnest 
attempt  to  prove  this  for  his  land  theory.  In  striving  to 
estabHsh  the  justice  of  his  claim,  he  does  not  hold  the  teach- 
ing of  the  Communists  that  any  kind  of  private  property  is 
unlawful.  On  the  contrary,  he  refutes  this  teaching  with 
much  ability   and  force.     "What  constitutes,"  he  asks  (B. 


I04    The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Individuals. 

VII.,  C.  I.),  "the  rightful  basis  of  property?  What  is  it 
that  enables  a  man  to  justly  say  of  a  thing,  *  It  is  mine '  ? 
From  what  springs  the  sentiment  which  acknowledges  his  ex- 
clusive right  as  against  all  the  world  ?  Is  it  not  primarily 
the  right  of  a  man  to  himself,  to  the  use  of  his  own  powers, 
to  the  enjoyment  of  the  fruits  of  his  own  exertions  ?  Is  it 
not  this  individual  right  which  springs  from  and  is  testified 
to  by  the  natural  facts  of  individual  organization — the  fact 
that  each  particular  pair  of  hands  obey  a  particular  brain  and 
are  related  to  a  particular  stomach ;  the  fact  that  each  man 
is  a  definite,  coherent,  and  independent  whole — which  alone 
justifies  individual  ownership  ?  As  a  man  belongs  to  him- 
self, so  his  labor  when  put  in  concrete  form  belongs  to  him. 

"And  for  this  reason,  that  which  a  man  makes  or  pro- 
duces is  his  own,  as  against  the  world — to  enjoy  or  to  de- 
stroy, to  use,  to  exchange,  or  to  give.  No  one  else  can 
rightfully  claim  it,  and  his  exclusive  right  to  it  involves  no 
wrong  to  anyone  else.  Thus  there  is  to  everything  produced 
by  human  exertion  a  clear  and  indisputable  title  to  exclusive 
possession  and  enjoyment,  which  is  perfectly  consistent  with 
justice,  as  it  descended  from  the  original  producer  in  whom  it 
vested  by  natural  law.  The  pen  with  which  I  am  writing  is 
justly  mine.  No  other  human  being  can  rightfully  lay  claim 
to  it,  for  in  me  is  the  title  of  the  producer  who  made  it.  It 
has  become  mine  because  transferred  to  me  by  the  stationer, 
to  whom  it  was  transferred  by  the  importer,  who  obtained 
the  exclusive  right  to  it  by  transfer  from  the  manufacturer,  in 
whom  by  the  same  process  of  purchase  vested  the  rights  of 
those  who  dug  the  material  from  the  ground  and  shaped  it 
into  a  pen.  Thus  my  exclusive  right  of  ownership  in  the  pen 
springs  from  the  natural  right  of  the  individual  to  the  use  of 
his  own  faculties." 


Ownership  in  Material  Pi^operty.        105 

The  theory,  however,  proves  too  much.  If  the  principle 
were  true  that  right  to  ownership  can  be  estabhshed  only  by 
transforming  labor,  man  could  own  nothing,  for  he  can  pro- 
duce nothing  without  material  to  work  upon.  The  iron  or 
gold  of  which  the  pen  is  made  is  not  produced  by  man; 
hence,  in  the  very  first  instance,  appropriation  by  occupation 
must  be  admitted  as  a  true  title  to  the  raw  material.  Mr. 
George  is,  therefore,  entirely  mistaken  when  he  goes  on  to 
say :  "  There  can  be  to  the  ownership  of  anything  no  right- 
ful title  which  is  not  derived  from  the  title  of  the  producer." 
In  his  elaborate  development  of  this  false  proposition,  on 
which  his  theory  of  the  injustice  of  private  ownership  in  land 
chiefly  rests,  the  same  fallacy  is  ever  recurring,  namely,  the 
confusion  oi  production  with  any  exercise  of  the  human  facul- 
ties. The  explorer  does  not  produce  the  desert  land  which 
he  discovers ;  and  yet  he  acquires  a  clear  title  to  it  on  Mr. 
George's  own  principle  that  he  exerts  his  faculties  in  its  ac- 
quisition. Mr.  George's  theory  is,  therefore,  unsound;  he 
totally  fails  to  prove  the  injustice  of  private  ownership  in 
land.  His  attacks  on  land  owners  are  not  justified,  and 
are  consequently  unwise.  For,  as  he  himself  says :  "  That 
alone  is  wise  which  is  just,  that  alone  is  enduring  which  is 
right." 

1 74.  Thesis  XVIII.  Mere  first  ocaepancy  is  by  itself  a 
valid  title  to  ownership. 

Explanatio7i.  Occupation  consists  in  taking  possession  of 
something  that  does  not  belong  to  another  person,  and  that 
can  be  an  object  of  ownership.  This  means  of  acquiring 
ownership  can  be  employed  at  present  to  only  a  very 
Hmited  extent,  since  land  and  nearly  all  movable  property 
belong  to  individuals,  or  companies,  or  governments. 

Proof.     The  principle  that  a  man  is  entitled  to  possess 


io6    The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Individuals. 

what  he  first  occupies,  provided  it  be  the  property  of  no 
other  person,  is  universally  admitted  as  a  dictate  of  common 
sense.  The  only  thing  opposed  to  it  is  the  doctrine  of  Com- 
munism, that  all  goods  are  by  nature  positively  common  to 
all  men.  But  this  doctrine  is  absurd,  for  a  man  would  be 
thereby  made  slavishly  dependent  upon  all  other  men,  with- 
out whose  permission  he  could  not  justly  appropriate  any- 
thing for  his  personal  use.  The  child  or  the  man,  savage  or 
civilized,  that  catches  a  wild  fowl  or  fish,  that  finds  a  valua- 
ble stone  belonging  to  no  one,  that  gathers  wild  fruit,  will 
justly  claim  ownership  as  a  right  by  priority  of  possession. 
There  is  no  reason  why  this  principle  should  apply  to  mov- 
able goods  only  and  not  to  land  as  well,  provided  he  who 
finds  a  piece  of  land  ownerless  marks  it  by  some  external 
sign  as  his  property,  thus  indicating  his  intention  of  keeping 
it  and  of  excluding  all  others  from  the  possession  of  it. 

175.  In  modern  times  occupancy  of  a  new  land  is  effected 
by  some  state  or  government,  which  thus  becomes  the  first 
owner.  Next,  individuals  acquire  possession  by  complying 
with  certain  conditions  determined  by  the  civil  power.  In 
this  country,  lands  are  held  in  virtue  of  original  grants  made 
either  by  the  United  States  directly,  or  by  other  governments 
that  controlled  tracts  which  afterward  came  under  the  juris- 
diction of  the  United  States.  These  latter  grants  were  con- 
firmed later  on  by  the  present  government.  Once  the  con- 
ditions placed  by  the  civil  power  are  complied  with  by  the 
occupants,  their  rights  are  fixed,  and  both  justice  and  the 
common  good  demand  that  they  be  kept  inviolable.  The  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  provides  that  no  private  prop- 
erty shall  be  taken  for  public  uses  without  just  compensation. 
In  this,  the  Constitution  only  enunciates  the  natural  right  of 
private  owners ;  and  therefore  no  amendment  of  the  Consti- 


Ownership  in  Material  Property.        107 

tution  could  ever  confer  upon  the  government  the  right  freely 
to  confiscate  the  land. 

176.  Yet  a  state  might  hold  landed  property  in  common, 
as  was  done  to  some  extent  among  the  Irish  clans,  and  later 
on  in  the  French  Colony  of  Louisiana.  But,  as  a  rule,  it  is 
far  more  expedient  to  encourage  private  industry  by  allotting 
portions  of  the  land  to  private  persons,  or  permitting  them  to 
take  possession  according  to  certain  formalities  that  the  State 
will  determine  for  the  common  good.  Nearly  all  nations 
have,  ii'x  their  early  history,  acted  on  these  principles;  and 
thus  the  division  of  land  by  occupancy,  yet  with  pubhc  sanc- 
tion and  according  to  public  regulations,  is  said  to  have 
been  made  jure  gentium.  This  term  does  not  mean  inter- 
7iational  law,  but  the  law  of  the  natio7is  in  this  sense,  that  it 
is  the  prevalent  legislation  of  all  nations  in  accordance  with 
the  exigencies  of  natural  rights. 

177.  The  state  retains  two  restrictions  on  private  owner- 
ship, founded  on  the  requirements  of  the  common  good:  i. 
The  right  of  taxation,  that  is,  the  imposition  of  a  burden 
proportionate  to  the  protection  bestowed,  and  not  any  tax  at 
will ;  for  justice  requires  a  proportion  between  what  is  given 
and  what  is  received.  2.  The  right  of  eminent  domain,  i.  e., 
the  right  of  taking  private  property  for  public  uses  when 
necessary,  with  compensation  made  to  the  owners. 

178.  Thesis  XIX.  A  grant  of  unoccupied  land,  made  by 
civil  society  to  private  parties,  on  proper  conditions,  founds  a 
just  claim  to  ownership. 

Proof  1 .  Society  can  make  such  laws  as  promote  its  end — 
the  general  welfare  of  the  community — provided  it  does  not 
violate  any  prior  rights.  But  such  assignments,  or  grants, 
made  on  proper  conditions,  contribute  to  the  general  welfare 
and  violate  no  prior  rights.     For  such  a  measure  promotes 


1 08    The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Individuals. 

enterprise,  industry,  and  public  spirit,  without  which  a  high 
degree  of  civihzation  would  be  difficult,  if  not  impossible. 

Proof  2.  A  State  can  dispose  of  its  property  for  the  com- 
mon good.  This  it  does  by  allotting  lands  as  a  reward  to 
soldiers  who  have  fought  for  their  country,  or  for  the  pur- 
pose of  encouraging  settlers  to  clear  and  improve  the  ground, 
or  as  an  inducement  to  corporations  to  make  roads,  build 
bridges  and  other  public  works,  and  thus  open  up  the  coun- 
try to  trade  and  travel. 

179.  Thesis  XX.  Communism  and  Socialism  are  unjust 
and  injurious. 

Explanation.  Communism  denies  the  right  of  private  own- 
ership and  declares  that  all  property  is  by  nature  positively 
common.  Socialism  demands  that  all  productive  property 
shall  be  given  over  to  the  State,  which  would  thus  become 
sole  proprietor  of  land,  manufactories,  railroads,  etc.,  and  sole 
distributor  of  the  compensation  due  to  every  individual  mem- 
ber of  the  commonwealth  for  his  labor.  Now  we  maintain 
that  Communism  and  Socialism,  if  introduced  as  general  sys- 
tems in  the  present  order  of  things,  would  be  unjust  and  in- 
jurious. 

Proof.  The  fundamental  principle  of  Communism  is  false, 
namely,  that  by  nature  all  goods  were  intended  for  mankind 
to  hQ positively  common,  so  that  no  one  could  justly  appro- 
priate to  himself  anything  beyond  immediate  pressing  wants, 
without  the  consent  of  the  other  members  of  the  community. 
The  absurdity  of  this  view  is  manifest  from  the  unnatural 
dependence  in  which  man  would  be  thereby  placed.  Another 
false  principle  made  use  of  by  both  systems  is  the  absolute 
and  entire  equality  of  all  men.  In  the  abstract  and  before 
the  law,  all  men  are  said  to  be  equal ;  but  in  the  concrete,  no 
two  men  are  exactly  equal.     No  two  men  have  equal  powers 


Ownership  in  Material  Property.        109 

of  body  and  mind,  equal  abilities  for  government  or  trade, 
the  same  tastes  and  dispositions,  even  the  same  rational 
wants. 

Both  systems  would  begin  by  depriving  men  of  the  fruit  of 
past  labors ;  both  would  confiscate  the  earnings  of  one  man 
for  the  benefit  of  others  without  compensation,  thus  violating 
a  great  natural  right.  Moreover,  it  is  impossible  for  either 
system,  judged  on  economic  grounds,  to  last,  or  to  attain 
even  a  fraction  of  the  fanciful  plenty  so  freely  promised  by 
its  advocates.  The  latter  seem  to  base  their  calculations  on 
the  Utopian  dream,  that,  in  the  new  Communistic  or  Socialistic 
Republic,  men  shall  lose  their  selfishness  and  be  free  from 
their  passions,  and  will  freely  practise  heroic  self-denial  and 
self-forgetfulness ;  that,  in  other  words,  men  shall  be  trans- 
formed into  angels.  Yet  these  same  leaders  generally  ignore 
or  repudiate  religion,  the  wellspring  of  self-sacrifice,  and  aim 
at  sweeping  away  the  rights  of  Chiu^ch  and  family. 

Article   II.     Violations   of   Ownership. 

180.  The  violation  of  the  right  of  ownership,  if  committed 
secretly,  is  called  theft ;  it  is  called  robbery,  if  the  act  is  done 
openly  and  with  physical  force.  Such  violations  distiurb  the 
balance  of  equality  which  justice  demands  for  all  the  mem- 
bers of  the  community.  The  balance  cannot  be  properly  re- 
stored except  by  the  restitution  of  the  property  unjustly 
acquired.  What  was  stolen  continues  to  belong  to  the  one 
from  whom  it  was  taken,  and  must  be  given  back  to  him. 
Res  clamat  ad  dommum,  "  property  calls  for  its  owner,"  is  an 
important  axiom  of  jurisprudence.  Even  if  the  owner  cannot 
be  found,  it  is  not  fair  that  the  thief  should  retain  what  he 
has   stolen :  fraus  sua   nemini  patrocinari  debet,  "  no   one 


I  lo    The  Rights  a7id  Duties  of  Individuals. 

should  reap  any  benefit  from  his  fraud."  He  must  part  with 
his  ill-gotten  goods,  disposing  of  them  as  he  may  presume  the 
owner  would  direct,  if  he  could  be  consulted ;  for  instance, 
by  giving  them  or  their  value  to  the  poor. 

i8i.  If  damage  has  been  done  willfully  to  the  property  of 
another,  reparation  of  the  damage  must  be  made  before 
equality  can  be  restored.  This  duty  rests,  in  the  first  place, 
upon  the  chief  perpetrator  of  the  damage ;  and,  secondarily, 
upon  those  who  have  voluntarily  aided  him,  physically  or 
morally,  to  inflict  the  injury.  Such  aid  or  co-operation  may 
be  given  in  various  ways,  viz. :  by  taking  part  in  the  material 
action ;  by  command,  advice,  consent ;  by  sheltering  or  con- 
cealing; by  sharing  in  ill-gotten  gains;  and  even  by  not 
warning,  not  preventing,  or  not  making  the  guilty  known 
when  one  is,  in  justice,  bound  to  do  so. 

Article   III.     Various   Modes   of  Acquiring 
Property. 

182.  The  chief  modes  of  acquiring  property  are  the  fol- 
lowing : 

1.  First  occupancy:  that  is,  taking  possession  of  any 
material  object  that  is  really  without  an  owner. 
(No.  174.)  Domestic  animals,  even  when  they  have 
strayed  far  from  their  owner,  remain  his  property ;  but 
wild  animals,  though  captured  and  tamed,  if  once 
they  have  regained  their  native  liberty,  are  considered 
as  belonging  to  no  one  till  captured  again,  when  they 
become  the  property  of  their  new  captor. 

2.  The  finding  of  lost  articles.  These  have  an  owner 
to  whom  they  must  be  returned,  if  he  can  be  dis- 
covered with  reasonable  effort.    If,  however,  the  owner 


Ownership  in  Material  Property.        1 1 1 

cannot  be  discovered,  the  articles  become  the  property 
of  the  finder.  When  hidden  treasures  of  great  value 
are  found  in  civilized  lands,  their  ownership  or  ap- 
portionment is  settled  according  to  existing  laws  that 
have  been  enacted  for  such  cases.  The  goods  of  those 
who  die  intestate,  and  without  natural  heirs,  are  to  be 
disposed  of  as  the  laws  direct. 

3.  Accession  is  a  title  to  new  property  that  is  added 
to  my  former  possessions,  either  naturally,  e.  g.,  by 
birth,  as  with  the  young  of  cattle,  or  by  alluvion,  as 
by  deposits  of  soil  on  a  river  bank ;  or  accidentally, 
or  even  designedly,  as  when  another  plants  or  builds 
on  my  grounds,  or  in  other  ways  improves  my  prop- 
erty. In  these  instances,  disputed  claims  may  arise 
which  the  civil  law  is  to  decide. 

4.  Prescription  is  a  title  to  ownership  of  property 
based  on  the  fact  that  it  has  been  held  in  quiet  and 
bona  fide  possession  for  the  space  of  time  appointed 
by  the  law.  This  supposes:  i.  That  the  property  is 
such  as  can  be  lawfully  acquired  by  a  private  person. 
2.  That  the  person  in  possession  has  honestly  con- 
sidered it  all  along  as  his  property.  3.  That  he  has 
remained  in  undisputed  and  uninterrupted  possession 
during  the  required  time. 

The  common  good  demands  that  claims  to  property 
reaching  back  beyond  a  reasonable  period  should  be 
disregarded,  in  order  that  ownership  may  be  settled 
on  a  soHd  basis. 


112    The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Individuals. 


Article  IV.     The  Transfer  of  Property  by  Contract. 

183.  Ownership  has  been  defined  (No.  170)  to  be  the 
right  to  dispose  at  will  of  material,  external  goods.  Now, 
the  right  to  dispose  of  an  object  at  will  involves  the  right  to 
transfer  it  to  another  person.  This  act  of  transfer  begins 
in  the  owner's  will,  is  continued  in  the  expression  to  the 
other  party  of  this  act  of  his  will,  and  is  completed  by  the 
latter's  acceptance  of  the  offer.  This  consent,  externally 
manifested,  of  the  two  parties  concerned,  agreeing  to  the 
transfer  of  rights,  is  called  a  contract. 

184.  A  contract  is  gratuitous,  or  one-sided,  if  only  one 
party  gives  up  a  right  to  ownership,  the  other  party  accept- 
ing the  proffered  benefit  without  any  cost  to  himself.  This 
is  the  case  in  free  gifts  amongst  the  living  or  in  the  behests 
of  the  dying.  In  either  instance,  the  equality  implied  in 
natural  justice  requires  the  person  benefited  to  make  the 
compensation  of  gratitude  to  the  donor. 

185.  A  man  has  a  right,  derived  not  from  civil  legislation 
but  from  the  natural  law,  to  dispose  of  his  property  by  his 
last  will.  Yet  he  cannot  do  it  in  such  a  manner  as  to  vio- 
late the  rights  and  just  claims  of  others.  Hence,  the  father 
of  a  family  has  no  right  to  alienate  his  entire  property  in 
favor  of  extems,  if  in  so  doing  he  should  leave  his  wife 
and  children  destitute.  If  he  dies  without  making  a  will, 
they  have  a  right,  founded  on  the  natural  law,  to  inherit  his 
property.  The  share  that  each  member  of  the  family  shall 
receive  is  usually  determined  by  existing  civil  laws. 

186.  Inviolability  is  due  to  last  wills,  not  only  by  reason 
of  the  right  which  the  testator  has  to  dispose  of  his  prop- 
erty, but  also  on  account  of  the  common  good  of  society. 
Few  men  would  care  to  exert  themselves  beyond  the  efforts 


Ownership  in  Material  Property.        113 

necessary  for  present  needs,  if  they  could  not  dispose  of 
the  property  acquired  by  their  toil  for  the  benefit,  after  their 
death,  of  those  who  are  nearest  and  dearest  to  them,  or  of 
objects  and  institutions  the  success  and  continuity  of  which 
they  had  greatly  at  heart  during  life. 

187.  All  contracts  in  which  both  parties  assume  an  obliga- 
tion, or  in  which  both  yield  some  right  for  the  benefit  re- 
ceived, are  called  onerous.  The  rights  thus  exchanged  or 
transferred  need  not  be  those  of  ownership ;  yet,  of  whatever 
kind  they  may  be,  the  principle  of  equality  between  what  is 
given  and  what  is  received  determines  the  justice  of  the 
transaction.  This  principle,  however,  is  not  to  be  too  strictly 
interpreted.  If,  for  example,  I  take  a  fancy  to  an  article  of 
little  intrinsic  value  in  the  possession  of  another  and  induce 
him  to  let  me  have  it  at  a  high  price,  the  bargain  is  just. 
Though  materially  no  equality  exists  between  the  price  and 
the  thing  purchased,  still  there  may  be  an  equality /^r/^za/Zv 
between  what  I  pay  and  the  value  that,  of  my  own  free 
choice,  I  set  on  the  article.  But  this  supposes  that  the  excess 
of  the  price  is  assented  to  freely  on  my  part.  If  another 
takes  advantage  of  my  special  need  and  forces  me  to  pay 
more  than  the  commodity  is  worth,  he  does  me  an  injustice, 
and  the  contract  is  unjust. 

188.  To  be  valid  or  binding,  every  contract,  whether  it  be 
gratuitous  or  onerous,  must  be  attended  with  the  following 
conditions: 

1 .  The  contracting  parties  must  be  competent  persons — 
/.  e.,  in  the  full  possession  of  reason  ;  hence,  infants, 
insane  and  intoxicated  persons  are  not  competent; 
minors  are  legally  incompetent — i.  e.,  their  contracts 
are  usually  not  recognized  as  valid  before  the  law. 

2.  The  matter  of  the  contract  must  be  appropriate — 


1 1 4    The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Individuals. 

i.  e.,  the  rights  transferred  must  be  really  capable  of 
transference,  and  must  belong  to  those  who  exchange 
them.  Hence,  no  one  can  validly  bargain  to  do  a 
thing  that  he  has  no  right  to  do. 
3.  Proper  form  must  be  observed.  Both  civil  and 
ecclesiastical  authority  may,  each  in  its  own  province, 
appoint  certain  forms,  the  non-observance  of  which 
renders  some  contracts  null  and  void.  The  natural 
form  essential  to  every  contract  is  the  true,  full  and 
mutual  consent  of  the  contracting  parties.  This 
supposes  that  both  have  a  sufficient  knowledge  of 
what  they  are  agreeing  to.  Hence,  if  one  of  the 
parties  seriously  misunderstands  the  contract,  he  is 
not  bound  to  stand  by  it.  Contracts  made  by  minors 
can  frequently  be  rescinded  or  annulled  by  their 
parents  or  guardians,  because  minors  are  supposed  to 
act  with  insufficient  knowledge. 

Article  V.     The  Wages  of  Laborers. 

189.  The  relations  between  laborers  and  their  employers 
ought  to  be  such  as  to  conduce  to  the  benefit  of  both  parties. 
This  cannot  be  the  case  unless  full  justice  be  done  on  each 
side.  It  is  therefore  of  great  importance  to  understand  in 
this  matter  the  golden  mean  between  the  exactions  of  grind- 
ing capitalists  and  the  unreasonable  demands  of  Com- 
munists and  Sociahsts. 

By  wages,  we  understand  the  compensation  agreed  upon 
by  the  workman  and  his  employer  for  the  former's  ser- 
vices to  the  latter.  We  shall  first  consider  such  an  agree- 
ment merely  as  an  onerous  contract,  money  or  its  equiva- 
lent being  exchanged  for  work.     Each  party  has  a  right  to 


Ownership  in  Material  P^^operty.        115 

that  which  he  gives  in  exchange;  and  if  the  compensation 
is  proportionate  to  the  services  rendered,  the  contract  is  just. 
The  services  thus  contracted  for  cannot  be  of  use  to  the 
employer,  as  productive  property,  except  in  their  results. 
Accordingly,  whatever  profit  he  can  derive  by  the  combina- 
tion and  direction  of  such  labor  above  that  which  the  wage- 
earners  themselves  could  have  won  by  their  individual  exer- 
tions is  his  gain ;  whatever  he  loses  thereby  is  his  loss. 
They  have  no  part  in  the  management ;  consequently,  it 
would  be  unreasonable  for  the  laborers  to  claim,  in  addition 
to  the  stipulated  compensation,  the  right  to  divide  with 
their  employer  the  profits  of  his  management. 

Their  mutual  relations — we  are  not  speaking  of  co-operative 
associations — are  not  those  of  partnership  ;  else  the  losses,  as 
well  as  the  profits,  would  have  to  be  shared  in  common. 

190.  How  shall  we  determine  the  proper  amount  of  wages 
to  be  paid  to  each  laborer  ?  The  answer  to  this  question  is 
not  easy,  especially  for  particular  cases.  The  following  prin- 
ciples, however,  are  of  general  application : 

1 .  To  preserve  the  balance  of  equality,  which  ought  to 
exist  in  every  onerous  contract,  between  what  is  given 
and  what  is  received  in  return,  a  laborer  who,  by 
superior  skill  or  industry^  renders  more  valuable  service 
than  others,  is  entitled  to  higher  wages. 

2.  The  laborer  who  is  called  upon  to  expend  unusual 
exertion^  by  performing  more  painful  or  more  pro- 
tracted toil,  by  exposing  life  or  limb  or  health  to  more 
than  ordinary  danger,  by  devoting  an  uncommonly 
long  time  to  the  task  of  preparing  and  qualifying  him- 
self for  his  position,  is  entitled  to  a  compensation  ex- 
ceeding the  ordinary  wages. 

3.  The   chief   difficulty  is   encountered   in   fixing  the 


1 1 6    The  Rights  and  Duties  of  hidividuals. 

amount  of  wages  for  ordinary  service.  This  must  be 
the  standard  or  basis  of  wages.  For  other  kinds  of 
service  there  ought  to  be  higher  pay ;  but  what  shall 
we  give  for  ordinary  service?  Labor,  many  answer, 
is  like  merchandise,  and  its  owner,  the  laborer,  is  en- 
titled to  that  only  which  his  labor  will  bring  in  the 
market;  and  hence,  whatever  he  agrees  to  accept, 
even  though  forced  by  stress  of  need  or  competition 
to  sell  his  toil  for  a  pittance,  that  is  the  proper 
amount.  Now,  this  view  is  erroneous  and  unjust. 
Labor  is  not  common  merchandise ;  it  is  the  wear 
and  tear  of  life  in  rational  beings,  every  one  of  whom 
has  an  inalienable  right  to  his  life — not  the  life  of  a 
beast  of  burden,  but  the  life  of  a  man.  Hence,  he 
has  the  right  to  all  that  is  necessary  to  maintain 
human  Hfe,  not  only  in  his  own  person,  but  also  in 
those  who  are  naturally  dependent  upon  him  for  the 
means  of  subsistence.  The  wages,  therefore,  which 
an  employer  is  bound  in  justice  to  pay  to  the  man 
that  labors  for  his  interest  as  faithfully  as  a  human 
being  can  be  fairly  expected  to  labor,  ought  to  be  suf- 
ficient to  support  the  workman  and  his  wife  and  chil- 
dren with  decency  and  reasonable  comfort.  This  is 
the  mmimum  quantity  of  wages.* 

*  "  The  labor  of  the  working-man  is  not  only  his  personal  attribute,  but  it  is 
necessary ;  and  this  makes  all  the  difference :  the  preservation  of  life  is  the 
bounden  duty  of  each  and  all,  and  to  fail  therein  is  a  crime.  It  follows  that 
each  has  a  right  to  procure  what  is  required  in  order  to  live  ;  and  the  poor  can 
procure  it  in  no  other  way  than  by  work  and  wages.  Let  it  be  granted,  then, 
that,  as  a  rule,  workmen  and  employer  should  make  free  agreements,  and,  in 
particular,  should  freely  agree  as  to  wages  ;  nevertheless,  there  is  a  dictate  of 
nature  more  imperious  and  more  ancient  than  any  bargain  between  man  and 
man,  viz.,  that  the  remuueratiou  must  be  enough  to  support  the  wage-earner  in 
reasonable  and  frugal  comfort  If,  through  necessity  or  fear  of  a  worse  evil,  the 
workman  accepts  harder  conditions  because  an  employer  or  a  contractor  will 
give  him  no  better,  he  is  the  victim  of  forge  and  injustice." — Pope  LeoXIJI., 
Encyclical  on  I,abor,  1891. 


Ownership  in  Material  Property.        1 1 7 

191.  Can  wage-earners  justly  form  organizations  to  pro- 
tect themselves  against  exacting  capitalists  ? — in  other  words, 
are  labor  unions  lawful?  A  right  to  an  end  implies  a 
right  to  the  means  necessary  to  attain  that  end,  if  such  means 
do  not  violate  the  rights  of  others.  Now,  laborers  have  a 
right  to  fair  wages ;  therefore,  they  have  a  right  to  the  just 
means  necessary  to  obtain  fair  wages.  But  organized  asso- 
ciation on  the  part  of  workingmen  is  often  necessary ;  it  is 
often  the  only  means  of  securing  fair  wages  from  overreach- 
ing employers  Such  association  does  injustice  to  no  one. 
Therefore,  workingmen  can,  with  justice,  have  recourse  to 
labor  unions  as  a  means  of  self-protection. 

Are  strikes  illicit  ?  Men  have  a  right  to  refuse  working 
for  unfair  wages.  Their  places  may  be  taken  by  others,  and 
the  latter  cannot  justly  be  prevented  from  doing  so,  except 
by  moral  suasion.  Of  course,  employers  also  have  a  right 
to  form  unions,  in  order  to  protect  themselves  against  un- 
reasonable demands  of  their  employees. 

192,  If  the  common  good  is  injured  by  the  general  stoppage 
of  work  attendant  on  strikes  and  lock-outs,  the  most  proper 
remedy  is  to  be  sought  in  the  intercession  and  arbitration  of 
fair-minded  and  disinterested  persons.  On  general  principles, 
it  is  not  desirable  that  the  government  should  meddle  with 
peaceful  disputes  of  citizens,  as  long  as  private  means  are  at 
hand  for  bringing  about  a  good  understanding.  Boards  of 
arbitration  are  usually  the  best  agency  for  restoring  health 
and  vigor  to  the  whole  industrial  system.* 

*  "  In  these  and  similar  questions,  however,  such  as,  for  example,  the  hours  of 
labor  in  different  trades,  the  sanitary  precautions  to  be  observed  in  factories, 
workshops,  etc.,  in  order  to  supersede  undue  interference  on  the  part  of  the  state, 
especially  as  circumstances,  times  and  localities  differ  so  widely,  it  is  advisable 
that  recourse  be  had  to  societies  or  boards,  ...  or  to  some  other  method  of 
safeguarding  the  intere.sts  of  wage-earners,  the  state  to  be  asked  for  approval 
and  protection."— Leo  XIII.,  Encyclical  on  Labor. 


1 18    The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Individuals. 

Yet  no  general  or  lasting  cure  can  be  effected,  except  by- 
animating  the  members  of  both  classes  with  the  spirit  of 
justice  and  mutual  love.  Now,  this  cannot  be  secured  with- 
out a  sound  education,  which  itself  implies  the  doctrines  of 
the  true  religion. 


BOOK  III. 


SOCIAL  RIGHTS  AND  DUTIES. 


CHAPTER    I. 

SOCIETY  IN    GENERAL. 

193.  Men,  we  know  from  observation,  are  not  by  nature 
isolated  individuals.  They  are  associated  in  many  ways : 
as  members  of  families,  as  belonging  to  a  tribe,  as  dwelling 
close  to  one  another  in  hamlets  and  towns,  as  fellow-citizens 
of  a  political  State.  This  relation  of  men  to  one  another 
gives  rise  to  a  most  important  class  of  rights  and  duties, 
which  we  shall  study  in  the  present  book. 

A  society  is  the  uriion  of  several  or  many  persons  for  the 
purpose  of  obtaining  a  common  end  by  the  use  of  common  meajis. 
Sociality,  in  the  strict  meaning  of  the  term,  is  distinctive  of 
man,  since  only  rational  beings  can  direct  means  to  an  end. 
Brutes  can  never  be  social,  though  they  may  sometimes  be 
gregarious;  some  species  may  simulate  society  by  instinc- 
tively acting  in  concert  for  a  common  good. 

194.  The  nature  of  each  society  is  specified  by  the  end 
for  which  it  was  established.  Religious  society,  the  noblest 
of  societies,  because  its  end  is  noblest,  promotes  the  wor- 
ship of  God;  domestic  society  was  instituted  for    the    sake 

119 


I20  Social  Rights  and  Duties. 

of  family  life ;  the  end  of  civil  society  is  the  welfare  of  the 
nation ;  international  society  forwards  the  prosperity  of  many 
nations  bound  together  for  the  protection  of  their  com- 
mon interests.  Besides,  there  are  innumerable  societies  of 
less  importance  than  the  far-reaching  associations  mentioned 
above,  such  as  benevolent,  commercial,  literary  and  scientific 
societies.  It  need  hardly  be  mentioned  that  no  society  is 
lawful  that  is  detrimental  to  the  common  good,  or  to  the 
welfare  of  a  higher  society. 

195,  We  may  ascertain  the  rights  of  any  society  in  par- 
ticular by  examining  the  end  for  which  it  exists.  If  the  end 
is  lawful,  the  means  to  that  end  are  lawful,  provided  such 
means  violate  no  prior  right.  Hence,  an  obvious  right  of  a 
society  is  to  direct  its  members  in  the  use  of  the  proper 
means.  Moreover,  since  the  society  is  either  necessary  for 
the  members  or  is  entered  of  their  own  free  will,  it  has  the 
right  to  enforce  upon  its  members  the  use  of  the  common 
means. 

196,  Thesis  L     Authority  is   necessary  to  society. 

Proof.  Authority  is  the  moral  power  of  directing  men^s  con- 
duct and  of  enforcing  such  direction.  Now,  such  a  power  is 
necessary  for  the  end  of  society.  For  the  members  must  often 
be  informed  regarding  the  nature  of  their  duties  and  the  man- 
ner of  performing  them ;  men  are  free  and  are  naturally  in- 
clined to  seek  their  own  individual  advantage,  often  to  the 
detriment  of  the  common  good  ;  they  may  sometimes  find  it 
advances  their  own  selfish  interests  to  hinder  others  from 
performing  their  duty.  Hence,  unless  a  society  has  the 
power  to  direct  its  members  and  to  enforce  such  direction,  it 
cannot  attain  its  end. 

197,  From  these  explanations  it  is  clear  that  authority 
is  to  be  exercised  only  for  the  good  of  the  society.      The 


Society  hi  General.  121 

office  of  a  person  in  authority  is  a  public  trust,  and  not 
merely  a  personal  privilege  ;  it  demands,  therefore,  prudence 
and  fidelity.  The  extent  of  his  authority  depends  upon  the 
nature  of  his  trust,  and  the  importance  of  the  end  and  of 
the  several  means  required  to  attain  the  end.  The  applica- 
tion of  compulsion  beyond  just  limits  is  called  tyranny. 

198.  All  mankind  constitute  a  universal  society,  of  which 
God  Himself  is  the  founder,  ruler,  law-giver,  and  judge. 
This  universal  association  fills  all  the  requirements  of  a  so- 
ciety (No.  193):  it  is  (a)  a  union  of  rational  beings  placed 
here  upon  earth,  (b)  for  the  common  purpose  of  rendering 
glory  to  God  and  securing  their  own  eternal  happiness,  {c) 
which  purpose  is  to  be  accomplished  by  the  observance  of 
the  same  natiual  law  under  the  authority  of  the  one  Supreme 
Law-giver. 

199.  Thesis  II.  Society  is  natural  to  man,  and  therefore 
the  institution  of  God. 

Proof  I.  The  constant  and  universal  fact  of  human  society 
must  have  a  proportionate  cause,  which  can  be  no  other  than 
the  human  nature  which  God  has  given  to  each  and  every 
man.  Moreover,  the  need  which  all  men  have  of  assistance 
from  other  persons  in  order  to  attain  the  end  of  their  exist- 
ence is  an  unmistakable  sign  that  this  need  or  exigency  of  hu- 
man society  is  natural  to  all  men,  and  consequently  has  been 
implanted  in  human  nature  by  the  Sovereign  Author  of 
nature. 

1.  The  infant  needs  its  parents  for  its  very  existence 
and  for  the  preservation  of  its  life. 

2.  The   child   must  be    sustained    and    educated   by 
others. 

3.  The  youth  requires  the  guidance  and  control  of  ma- 
turer  minds. 


1 2  2  Social  Rights  and  Duties. 

4.  The  full-grown  man  and  woman  generally  need  each 
other's  assistance  to  lead  a  life  of  intelligence  and 
comfort,  of  mutual  love  and  abiding  happiness. 

5.  Old  age  would  be  miserable  indeed  without  the  sup- 
port and  love  of  a  younger  generation. 

Proof  2.  Man's  higher  powers,  his  splendid  faculties  of 
intellect  and  will,  were  surely  not  bestowed  upon  him  to  lie 
dormant  and  neglected,  but  to  be  developed  and  put  to  use. 
Now,  even  if  man  could,  unassisted  by  his  fellows,  preserve 
his  life  against  wild  beasts  and  the  elements,  yet  without  the 
society  of  other  men  he  could  rise  only  a  little  above  idiocy. 
Long  and  intimate  association  with  polished  minds  is  indis- 
pensable for  advance  in  the  sciences  and  arts.  Besides,  in 
the  normal  state  of  things,  man's  wonderful  powers  of  speech 
and  hearing  make  society  a  necessary  element  of  human  hap- 
piness. 

Proof  3.  Some  of  man's  noblest  tendencies,  which  were 
certainly  given  to  him  for  a  purpose,  find  no  exercise  except 
in  human  society ;  such  are  benevolence,  pity  for  the  vmfor- 
tunate,  admiration  of  virtue  and  of  heroism,  self-devotion  to 
the  common  good,  and  similar  dispositions,  which  are  called 
the  social  virtues.  Nor  will  the  general  society  of  human 
kind  afford  proper  play  for  these  tendencies ;  a  closer  asso- 
ciation in  particular  societies  is  evidently  required,  in  which 
mutual  example  and  encouragement  incite  to  generous  deeds 
of  self-sacrifice  and  of  devotion  to  a  great  cause. 


CHAPTER  11. 

DOMESTIC   SOCIETY. 

Article   I.     The    Nature   and    Purpose   of   Domestic 
Society. 

200.  The  form  of  society  most  ancient  and  most  necessary 
for  the  human  race  is  the  family  or  domestic  society.  It 
originates  in  marriage,  which  is  defined  to  be :  The  union  of 
a  man  and  a  woman,  involving  their  living  together  in  undi- 
vided intercourse.  Marriage  is  the  institution  of  the  Creator 
Himself.  He  made  woman  to  be  man's  companion,  not  his 
slave — "A  help  like  unto  himself"  (Gen.  ii.  18).  The  quali- 
ties of  the  two  sexes  were  not  to  be  identical,  but  to  be  simi- 
lar and  supplementary;  wisdom,  strength,  and  firmness  pre- 
dominating on  the  one  side,  deference  and  tenderness  on  the 
other;  while  mutual  love  and  fidelity  were  to  join  both  parties 
in  the  one  indissoluble  union  of  wedlock :  "  Wherefore  a  man 
shall  leave  his  father  and  mother  and  shall  cleave  to  his  wife, 
and  they  shall  be  two  in  one  flesh  "  (Gen.  ii.  24). 

201.  The  primary  ends  of  marriage  are  the  generation 
and  education  of  children,  whereby  the  human  race  is  per- 
petuated and  elevated  to  a  becoming  standard  of  intellec- 
tual and  moral  excellence. 

I.   This  perpetuation  of  the  race  is  evidently  intended 
by  the  Creator,  who  not  only  bade  our  first  parents 
"  increase  and  multiply  and  fill  the  earth "  (Gen.  i. 
133 


124  Social  Rights  and  Duties. 

28),  but  He  also  implanted  in  the  natures  of  men  and 
women  such  inclinations  and  needs  that  this  design 
can  never  be  frustrated. 

2.  Yet  it  is  not  necessary  for  this  purpose  that  every 
one  shall  enter  the  state  of  marriage ;  but  exceptions 
in  this  matter  may  be  expedient,  even  apart  from 
supernatural  considerations. 
The  intellectual  and  moral  elevation  of  mankind  is  far 
more  important  than  its  numerical  increase.  This  principle 
has  been  acted  upon  by  countless  heroes  of  all  times,  who 
have  sacrificed  their  lives  in  youth  or  vigorous  manhood  for 
the  advance  of  truth  and  science,  for  the  honor  and  liberty 
of  their  country,  or  for  the  spread  of  civilization.  An  army 
is  highly  benefited  by  the  presence  of  magnanimous  leaders; 
mankind  likewise  is  elevated  by  the  example  of  intrepid  souls, 
and  particularly  of  those  who  sacrifice  for  a  great  religious 
motive  the  pleasures  and  comforts  of  marriage  and  lead  a  life 
of  perpetual  continency.  In  this  career,  the  most  perfect 
among  the  sons  of  men  has  set  Himself  as  the  pattern,  and 
millions  have  followed  His  example.  However  much  the 
low-minded  and  sensual  may  sneer  at  such  a  practice  or  deny 
the  possibility  of  its  long  continuance,  the  experience  of 
God's  saints  and  innumerable  chosen  souls  makes  it  manifest 
that  such  a  life  is  possible,  and,  with  special  supernatural 
graces,  comparatively  easy. 

202.  The  secondary  end  of  marriage  is  the  direct  good  of 
the  contracting  parties,  their  peace,  mutual  love,  and  union 
of  mind  and  heart.  This  condition  of  things  results  partly 
from  similarity  of  tastes  and  dispositions;  but  it  depends 
chiefly  upon  the  practice  of  the  social  virtues,  especially  of 
an  enduring  conjugal  love,  by  which  each  party  is  prompted 
to  further  the  happiness  of  the  other.     Yet  in  its  primary  and 


Domestic  Society.  125 

secondary  ends,  marriage  is  subordinate  to  the  last  end  of 
man,  his  everlasting  beatitude. 

Article  II.     The  Unity  and  Indissolubility  of 
Marriage. 

203.  The  two  chief  properties  of  marriage  are  unity  and 
indissolubility.  One  man  and  one  woman  are  joined  in 
wedlock,  promising,  as  the  old  formula  correctly  expresses  it, 
to  take  each  other  as  husband  and  wife,  "  for  better,  for 
worse,  for  richer,  for  poorer,  in  sickness  and  health,  till  death 
do  us  part."  To  the  unity  of  marriage  are  o^^^^o%^^i  polyandry, 
or  plurality  of  husbands,  and  polygamy,  or  the  plurality  of 
wives.     To  indissolubility  is  opposed  divorce. 

204.  Polyandry  is  destructive  of  the  very  idea  of  order  in 
domestic  society,  because,  if  man  is  to  retain  his  natural 
headship  of  the  family,  it  would  give  several  heads  to  the  same 
family.  Besides,  polyandry  defeats  both  the  primary  and  the 
secondary  ends  of  marriage.  Even  if  in  this  condition  of 
affairs  children  were  born,  it  would  be  very  difficult,  if  not 
impossible,  to  tell  who  was  the  father  of  each  particular  child, 
so  that  the  education  of  such  practically  fatherless  offspring 
would  be  incomplete  and  neglected.  And  can  we  imagine 
that  domestic  peace  and  love  could  find  place  in  such  a 
household  ?  Consequently,  polyandry  is  entirely  opposed  to 
the  natural  law. 

205.  Polygamy,  though  it  does  not  make  the  generation 
and  education  of  the  children  impossible,  is  directly  opposed 
to  the  secondary  end  of  marriage,  for  it  is  the  unfailing  cause 
of  jealousy,  strife  and  domestic  unhappiness;  it  degrades 
woman  from  her  true  rank  to  the  condition  of  slavery. 
Hence,  polygamy  is  a  violation  of  the  natural  law,  though 


126  Social  Rights  and  Duties. 

not  to  so  great  an  extent  as  polyandry.  History  shows  that 
polygamous  nations  have  advanced  very  slowly,  if  at  all,  in 
civilization,  and  that  amongst  them  the  increase  of  popula- 
tion has  not  equaled  that  of  monogamous  nations. 

To  the  objection  that  God  permitted  polygamy  to  the  patri- 
archs of  old,  we  answer  that  God  never  approved  the  prac- 
tice. He  tolerated  it  for  a  period,  until,  in  the  fullness  of 
time,  His  holy  will  was  more  luminously  declared,  and  the 
original  unity  of  marriage  was  re-established.  Even  if  God 
did  allow  plurality  of  wives  in  past  ages,  it  does  not  follow 
that  the  practice  may  be  adopted  without  His  special  dis- 
pensation. He  alone  controls  the  rights  of  all  parties,  and 
He  alone  could  prevent  the  evils  that  must  result  naturally 
from  a  polygamous  union. 

206.  Indissolubility  is  the  second  property  of  marriage, 
that  is,  the  marriage  contract  is  of  such  a  nature,  that,  once 
entered  upon,  it  continues  in  force  until  the  death  of  one  of 
the  contracting  parties.  A  lasting  union  it  was  meant  to  be 
from  the  beginning  :  *'  Wherefore  a  man  shall  leave  his  father 
and  mother  and  shall  cleave  to  his  wife"  (Gen.  ii.  24). 
This  property  is  violated  by  divorce,  which  consists  in  an- 
nulling or  breaking  the  marriage  contract,  so  that  each  of  the 
contracting  parties  may  marry  again  during  the  lifetime  of 
the  other. 

Divorce  is  opposed  to  one  of  the  primary  objects  of  mar- 
riage, namely,  the  proper  education  of  the  children.  The 
latter  have  a  natural  right  to  the  support,  the  supervision,  the 
good  example,  the  abiding  love  of  both  their  parents,  to 
whom,  in  return,  they  owe  lasting  reverence,  love,  and  gratitude. 
Yet  these  duties,  which  are  established  by  the  natural  law, 
divorce  makes  impossible  of  fulfillment.  It  turns  the  mutual 
love  of  husband  and  wife  into  mutual  hatred ;  the  children 


Domestic  Society.  127 

cannot  cling  to  both  parents,  and  thence   results   a   house 
divided  against  itself,  a  byword  of  disgrace. 

Moreover,  if  divorce  were  foreseen  as  possible,  how  easily 
would  mutual  distrust  be  aroused,  to  be  followed  by  domestic 
discord.  "  If,"  says  the  Rev.  Joseph  Rickaby,  S.  J.  (Moral 
Philosophy,  p.  276),  "  a  divorce  a  vinculo  were  a  visible  object 
on  the  matrimonial  horizon,  the  parties  would  be  strongly  en- 
couraged thereby  to  form  illicit  connections,  in  their  expecta- 
tion of  having  any  one  of  them  ratified  and  sanctified  by 
marriage.  Marriage  would  be  entered  upon  lightly,  as  a 
thing  easily  to  be  done  and  readily  undone,  a  state  of  things 
not  very  far  in  advance  of  promiscuity." 

207.  It  is  sometimes  objected  that  the  unnatural  conduct 
of  one  of  the  contracting  parties  may  make  the  continuation 
of  family  life  a  moral  impossibility,  and  that  in  this  case 
divorce  is  the  less  of  two  evils.  Such  a  state  of  affairs  may 
indeed  render  it  impossible  for  the  parties  in  question  to  live 
together;  nevertheless  divorce  is  not  therefore  admissible. 
An  escape  from  the  difficulty  may  be  had,  without  violation 
of  law  or  of  right,  by  a  temporary  separation,  a  toro,  "  from 
bed  and  board,"  as  the  arrangement  is  termed,  which  may  be 
indefinitely  prolonged  according  to  need.  Yet  this  measure 
differs  from  a  separation  a  vinciclo,  or  the  annulment  of  the 
marriage  contract.  Among  baptized  Christians,  for  whom 
marriage  is  a  sacrament  figuring  the  spotless  and  irrevocable 
espousals  of  the  Son  of  God  with  His  Church,  every  valid 
marriage  that  has  been  consummated  is  absolutely  incapable 
of  annulment :  "  What  God  has  joined  together,  let  no  man 
put  asunder"  (Matt.  xix.  6). 

208.  Marriage  is,  therefore,  by  its  nature,  a  bond  that  can 
be  loosened  only  by  death.  It  may  be  asked  whether  divorce 
is  essentially  wrong,  /.  ^.,  whether  it  is  so  opposed  to  the 


128  Social  Rights  and  Duties. 

natural  law  as  to  be  inadmissible  under  any  conditions.  We 
know  that  in  the  time  of  the  Old  Testament,  God  allowed  or 
tolerated  it  for  some  special  cases  in  the  midst  of  general  cor- 
ruption. But  toleration  of  a  measure  is  immensely  different 
from  approval  of  the  same.  Besides,  it  is  one  thing  for  God, 
the  Sovereign  Master  and  Guardian  of  rights,  to  dispense 
from  a  law,  and  quite  another  thing  for  the  civil  authorities 
to  grant  a  similar  dispensation  in  a  matter  that  does  not 
come  within  their  jurisdiction.  The  civil  powers  do  not 
create  the  family,  nor  can  they  without  injustice  bring  about 
its  destruction. 

209.  Thesis  III.  The  rights  of  domestic  society  are  not  de- 
rived from  civil  society. 

Explanation.  To  Catholics  it  is  evident  that  civil  society 
cannot  without  sacrilege  usurp  control  over  matrimony, 
which  is  a  sacrament  instituted  by  Christ.  But  we  are  here 
considering  the  subject  in  the  light  of  natural  reason,  pre- 
scinding from  the  special  dignity  to  which  we  know  by 
Revelation  the  marriage  contract  has  been  elevated. 

Proof  I.  The  individuals  composing  a  State  must  have 
existence  before  the  State  can  exist,  and  these  individuals 
have,  by  their  nature,  the  right  to  form  domestic  society. 
Add  to  this,  the  institution  of  marriage  and  the  entire  consti- 
tution of  the  family  are  antecedent,  historically,  to  the  forma- 
tion of  civil  society.  Consequently,  the  rights  of  the  family 
cannot  be  derived  from  civil  society ;  and  therefore  the  latter 
can  advance  no  title  to  control  or  modify  rights  which  it  did 
not  originate. 

Proof  2.  Every  rightly  constituted  society  can  justly  claim 
only  such  powers  as  are  necessary  for  the  attainment  of  its 
own  distinctive  end,  and  it  can  claim  no  powers  that  infringe 
upon  prior  rights.     But  to  attain  its  ends — the  pubhc  peace 


Domestic  Society.  129 

and  the  protection  of  personal  rights — the  State  has  no  need 
of  jurisdiction  over  marriage,  the  education  of  children,  or 
other  matters  pertaining  naturally  to  the  family  or  the  indi- 
vidual, and  this,  too,  by  a  right  prior  to  the  rights  of  the 
State.  On  the  contrary,  by  depriving  individuals  or  families 
of  their  natural  rights,  which  it  is  bound  to  protect,  civil  so- 
ciety contradicts  its  own  end. 

Proof  T^.  A  nobler  society  cannot  be  subject  in  the  matter 
of  its  inherent  and  distinctive  rights  to  a  society  that  is  less 
noble.  But  domestic  society  is  nobler  in  its  ends  and  object 
than  civil  society,  and  therefore  cannot  be  subject  to  the 
latter  in  the  matter  of  its  essential  rights.  The  end  of  do- 
mestic society  is  the  propagation,  and,  especially,  the  educa- 
tion of  the  human  race  for  time  and  eternity,  whilst  the  end 
of  civil  society  is  happiness  in  this  world ;  hence,  the  advan- 
tages it  secures  are  less  intimately  connected  with  the  true 
happiness  of  men  than  those  aimed  at  by  domestic  society. 

210.  The  State  has  a  right  as  the  guardian  of  public  de- 
cency to  forbid  such  marriages  as  are  opposed  to  the  natural 
law.  Though  it  can  have  no  jurisdiction  over  the  substantial 
features  of  marriage,  it  may  assert  control  in  the  matter  of 
certain  external  forms  or  accessories,  in  order  to  insure  the 
protection  of  individual  rights,  such  as  the  settlement  of 
property  and  the  rightful  succession  to  titles  and  privileges. 
Hence  the  State  may  demand  a  record  of  valid  marriages, 
and  for  this  purpose  may  require  compliance  with  legal 
formalities,  e.  g.,  of  registration,  provided  the  burdens  thus 
imposed  be  reasonable  and  for  the  common  good.  Should  it 
be  objected  that  the  State  has  a  right  to  regulate  contracts, 
and,  therefore,  the  marriage  contract,  we  reply  that  the  State 
has  no  right  over  contracts  that  are  in  their  natiu-e  prior  to 
its  existence.     In  so  far  as  civil  consequences  are  involved  in 


130  Social  Rights  and  Duties. 


family  matters,  the  State  is  bound  to  protect  natural  rights, 
but  it  cannot  create  or  control  them.  Except  in  cases  of 
gross  violation  of  strict  rights  among  members  of  a  family, 
the  presumption  is  against  State  interference  in  the  concerns 
of  domestic  society. 

Article  III.     Parental  Authority.     Education. 

211.  The  temporal  and  eternal  happiness  of  men,  as  well 
as  the  prosperity  of  civil  society,  depends  chiefly,  in  the 
natural  order,  on  the  perfection  of  domestic  society.  Now 
an  essential  condition  for  the  welfare  of  every  society  is 
a  proper  exercise  of  its  authority;  since  in  this  manner  the 
necessary  means  are  directed  to  the  end  for  which  the  society 
exists.  Hence,  in  discussing  principles  of  domestic  society, 
we  must  first  decide  in  whom  the  authority  of  the  family 
resides. 

Thesis  IV.    The  husband  is  naturally  the  head  of  the  family . 

Proof  1.  The  universal  practice  of  all  races  of  men  shows 
that  this  is  a  dictate  of  common  sense. 

Proof  2.  He  to  whom  the  other  members  of  the  family 
look  naturally  for  protection,  support  and  direction,  is  in- 
tended by  the  Author  of  nature  to  possess  authority  in  the 
family,  or  to  be  its  head.  Now,  such  a  one,  in  the  normal 
state  of  affairs,  allowance  being  made  for  occasional  and  par- 
tial exceptions,  is  the  husband,  the  father  of  the  family.  For 
{a)  the  husband  is  properly  the  founder  of  the  family,  the  pri- 
mary cause  of  its  existence ;  woman  was  created  to  be  a  help 
and  companion  to  man.  [b)  It  is  he  who,  as  a  rule,  is  expected 
to  provide  for  the  family  its  means  of  support,  {c)  On  ac- 
count of  his  superior  strength  of  mind  and  body,  all  look  to 
him  for  direction  in  doubt,  and  for  defense  in  danger,    {d)  He 


Domestic  Society.  131 

is  to  represent  the  interests  of  the  family  abroad,  the  wife 
being  detained  at  home  habitually  by  duties  which  she  can 
best  perform,  {c)  Nature's  gifts  have  been  so  divided  be- 
tween husband  and  wife  that  reason,  which  is  the  faculty  for 
ruling,  is  more  dominant  in  the  former,  love  and  sympathy  in 
the  latter.  He  is  the  head,  and  she  the  heart ;  but  the  head 
should  direct  the  heart. 

212.  The  wife  and  mother,  who  is  not  a  menial,  but  the 
helpmate  and  companion  of  her  husband,  shares  his  parental 
dignity,  and  is  likewise  entitled  to  a  share  in  his  authority 
over  the  family.  She  is  naturally  the  centre  of  domestic 
affection,  the  dispenser  of  the  comforts  provided  by  the 
father,  the  mistress  of  the  home,  subject  indeed  to  his  pru- 
dent direction  when  important  occasions  make  such  direction 
necessary,  yet  possessing  the  right  to  manage  her  own  do- 
main. From  her  lips  the  children  will  receive  direction  and 
warning,  and  her  loving  hand  will  correct  their  faults.  The 
father  will,  if  need  be,  firmly  support  her  authority,  and  by 
word  and  example  teach  the  children  to  venerate  their 
mother. 

213.  Education  is  the  most  important  duty  of  parents 
towards  their  offspring.  It  consists  in  the  well-proportioned 
development  of  the  child's  faculties  to  prepare  him  to  make 
efforts  for  himself  in  order  to  secure  happiness  in  this  world 
and  the  next.  Bodily  development  is  first  in  the  order  of 
time;  moral  and  religious  education  is  first  in  the  order  of  im- 
portance ;  for  religion  and  morality  lead  to  the  highest  and 
most  lasting  happiness.  Cultivation  of  the  intellect  in  some 
degree  is  necessary  for  all  men,  though  there  can  be  no  uni- 
versal standard  in  this  matter ;  the  extent  of  the  mental  train- 
ing to  be  given  to  the  child  must  depend  largely  on  the 
position  in  life  which  he  may  be  reasonably  expected  to  hold 


132  Social  Rights  and  Duties. 

in  after  years.  Book-learning  is  not  the  measure  of  personal 
happiness  or  of  public  usefulness ;  but  attainments  in  the 
moral  order,  whether  they  be  accompanied  with  scholarship 
or  not,  are  an  unfailing  source  of  happiness  to  their  possessor 
and  of  valuable  service  to  other  men  and  to  the  State. 

214.  Eeligion  is  the  most  important  element  of  education. 
The  child  has  the  right  to  be  prepared  for  all  the  most  im- 
portant duties  of  Ufe.  Now,  among  these  latter,  the  worship 
of  God  takes  precedence  of  all  others,  and  is  to  be  most 
soUcitously  provided  for.  Nor  can  the  principles  of  morality 
be  inculcated  without  dogmatic  religious  teaching ;  for  men 
will  not  observe  the  natural  law  unless  they  know  that  it  has 
a  proportionate  sanction.  But  to  teach  the  existence  of  such 
a  sanction  is  to  teach  rehgion.  All  parents  of  sound  judg- 
ment are  constantly  teaching  their  children  principles  of 
natural  reHgion,  and  no  one  who  possesses  a  sufficient  un- 
derstanding of  this  important  subject,  can  honestly  disagree 
with  Washington's  declaration :  "  Howsoever  great  the  in- 
fluence of  a  polite  education  is  said  to  be  on  certain  minds, 
reason  and  experience  by  no  means  allow  us  to  expect  that 
morality  shall  prevail  in  a  nation  if  rehgious  principles  be 
excluded." 

When,  moreover,  parents  are  blessed  with  supernatural 
truth  and  grace,  they  would  be  exceedingly  cruel  to  their 
child  if  they  denied  him  what  they  themselves  consider  to 
be  the  most  precious  and  necessary  possession  on  earth — the 
knowledge  of  God's  revealed  religion.  Hence,  the  Christian 
education  of  their  children  is  the  most  sacred  duty  of 
Christian  parents. 

215.  Enemies  of  revealed  religion  have,  especially  in  re- 
cent times,  advocated  an  unreasonable  system  of  education, 
which  recalls  the  harsh  and   unnatural  training  in  vogue 


Domestic  Society.  13; 


amongst  the  ancient  Spartans — namely,  State  control  of 
education.  They  maintain  that  the  State  should  assume 
the  office  of  educating  the  young  without  regard  for  the  nat- 
ural rights  of  parents.  By  this  means,  the  youth  of  the  land 
could  be  imbued  with  the  poHtical  principles  of  the  ruling 
power  or  party,  and,  especially,  they  could  be  indoctrinated 
with  irreligion  and  be  induced  to  look  with  complete  indif- 
ference, if  not  with  abhorrence,  upon  the  Faith  of  their  an- 
cestors. This  system  finds  favor  with  certain  political  writers 
and  leaders  who  aim  at  extending  and  centralizing  the  civil 
power ;  with  self-seeking  demagogues  who  scheme  for  a 
control  of  patronage  in  the  system  of  State  education ;  with 
Socialists  who  would  destroy  individual  liberty  and  make 
the  State  all-powerful ;  and  with  many  well-meaning,  though 
deluded  men  who,  not  perceiving  the  wrong  and  the  danger 
of  such  a  course,  prefer  State  control  of  education  as  a 
cheaper  and  less  troublesome  method,  and  even  as  a  safe- 
guard against  what  they  fancy  to  be  the  subversion  by  the 
Catholic  Church  of  the  liberties  of  the  land. 

216.  Thesis  V.  The  education  of  children  belongs  by  right 
to  their  parents. 

Explanation.  This  right  belongs  to  parents  primarily  and 
per  se  ;  per  se — i.  <?.,  by  the  very  fact  that  they  are  parents, 
though  per  accidens  it  may  pass  to  others,  as,  e.  g.,  when  the 
parents  are  dead,  or  if  they  are  wholly  unfit  to  exercise 
this  right;  primarily — /.  <?.,  they  possess  this  right  before  all 
others,  and  are  responsible  for  the  education  of  their  chil- 
dren, even  when  they  delegate  part  of  their  right  to  others 
who  thus  acquire  a  secondary  right. 

Proof  I .  They  who  have  a  natural  and  indispensable  duty 
to  educate  the  young  have  the  natural  right  to  fulfill  that 
duty.     But  parents  have  such  a  duty ;  therefore,  they  have 


134  Social  Rights  and  Duties. 

the  natural  right  to  educate  their  children.  That  parents 
have  such  a  duty  is  evident  from  the  primary  object 
of  matrimony,  which  is  not  merely  the  generation  of  chil- 
dren, but  especially  the  education  of  new  members  of 
the  human  family  in  a  manner  worthy  of  their  rational 
nature. 

Proof  2.  The  child  has  on  his  part  an  inalienable  right  to 
the  means  necessary  for  attaining  his  last  end.  Since  educa- 
tion of  some  kind  is  such  a  means,  he  has  a  right  to  educa- 
tion. Now,  surely  this  is  not  a  vague,  abstract  right,  but  it  is 
something  determinate,  and  connotes  determinate  persons  who 
are  under  positive  obligation  to  care  for  that  right.  Such 
persons  nature  clearly  points  out ;  the  parents  are  naturally 
the  most  closely  related  to  the  child  ;  in  them  nature  has  im- 
planted the  enduring,  patient  love  required  for  such  a  work ; 
the  child  is  naturally  disposed  to  revere  and  love  his  parents 
and  to  receive  their  instructions  and  corrections  with  ready 
docility. 

Proof  2,-  If  education  belonged  by  right  to  the  State  rather 
than  to  the  parent,  the  former  would  have  to  perform  all  the 
functions  of  education,  the  feeding,  clothing,  and  housing  of 
the  children  no  less  than  the  office  of  instructing  them  in  let- 
ters, morality,  and  religion.  But  such  functions  do  not  come 
within  the  range  of  the  State's  duties ;  attempts  to  assume 
them  would  be  justly  denounced  as  usurpations  of  personal 
rights.  In  particular :  (a)  Who  does  not  feel  that  the  State  in 
its  agents  has  no  right  to  invade  the  home  circle  and  there 
assume  control,  setting  aside  the  wishes  of  parents  and  chil- 
dren ?  (/;)  The  State  is  utterly  incompetent,  especially  in  a 
population  of  mixed  creeds,  to  teach  dogmatic  religion ;  and 
yet  without  dogmatic  religious  teaching,  morality  is  apt  to  be 
little  more  than  a  name. 


Domestic  Society.  135 

217.   Objections. 

1.  The  State  must  control  whatever  bears  on  the 
public  good  ;  but  such  is  the  education  of  children. 
Answer.  This  principle,  if  followed  out,  would  make 
us  a  nation  of  slaves ;  for  it  would  destroy  every  per- 
sonal right.  Almost  every  act  bears  immediately  or 
remotely  on  the  public  good;  thus  the  State  could 
regulate  all  details  of  food,  clothing,  and  lodging,  the 
choice  of  trade  or  profession,  the  selection  of  husband 
or  wife;  these  matters,  inasmuch  as  they  affect  the 
well-being  of  the  citizens,  are  related  to  the  common 
good.  Accordingly,  we  reply  to  the  objection  :  The 
State  must  control  whatever  bears  on  the  public  good 
— provided  it  does  not  go  beyond  its  own  province 
and  usurp  inalienable  private  rights,  for  the  protection 
of  which  the  State  has  been  instituted. 

2.  The  State  is  bound  to  secure  what  is  so  necessary 
for  the  public  good  as  education.  Answer.  The 
State  has  no  right  to  meddle  in  private  matters  that 
are  well  enough  provided  for.  Its  duty  in  such  cases 
is  to  come  forward  and  lend  further  assistance  when 
private  efforts  are  inadequate  to  avoid  a  great  public 
evil  or  to  prociu-e  a  great  public  good.  Now,  educa- 
tion— especially  that  which  is  called  elementary  edu- 
cation— can  be  well  enough  imparted  by  parents  and 
those  whom  they  choose  as  aids  in  this  work.  The 
State  may  laudably  encourage  and  assist  private 
efforts :  to  be  a  patron  of  education  is  an  honor ;  to 
usurp  its  functions  is  injustice. 

3.  But  the  State  needs  intelligent  voters.  Answer. 
The  man  in  ovu"  times  who  cannot  read  and  write  is 
surely  at  a  disadvantage ;  nevertheless,  it  is  possible 


136  Social  Rights  and  Duties. 

for  one  to  be  very  intelligent  without  book-learning. 
The  State  needs  honest,  conscientious  voters ;  to  ob- 
tain these,  it  must  encourage  sound  religious  instruc- 
tion, but  it   need   not   control   any  form  of   educa- 
tion. 
4.    But  the  State  should  defend  the  rights  of  children ; 
hence,  it  has  a  right  to  pass  compulsory  school  laws. 
Answer,    i.  The  duty  of  defending  children's  rights 
could,  at  best,  only  entitle  the  State  to  compel  parents 
to  educate  their  children.    2.  The  education  to  which 
children   have   a   strict  right,  is   that   which   will  fit 
them  to  attain  their  happiness  in  this  world  and  the 
next.     Now,  this   does   not   require   a   certain   fixed 
amount  of  book-learning.   Therefore,  if  parents  choose 
to  teach  their  child  a  trade,  the  latter  has  no  further 
right  to  education  that  the  State  may  defend. 
218.   The  duties  of  children  toward  their  parents  are  those 
of  love,  gratitude,  honor,  and  obedience.     Flowing   directly 
irom  the  mutual  relations  of  parents  and  children,  the  first 
three  of  these  duties  remain  always  in  full  vigor.     In  regard 
to   the  duty  of  obedience,  three  periods  of  life  are  to  be 
distinguished : 

1.  During  the  years  of  imperfect  judgment,  while  the 
child  constantly  needs  support  and  wise  direction,  he 
must  allow  himself  to  be  trained  by  his  parents  with 
perfect  docility.  Hence,  at  this  period,  he  owes  them 
obedience  in  all  things  that  are  not  opposed  to  the  law 
of  God.  He  must  submit  to  his  parents'  correction 
and  chastisement,  in  the  infliction  of  which  love  ought 
to  rule,  accompanied  by  prudence,  moderation,  and 
firmness. 

2.  When  the  judgment  is  matured,  yet  the  son  or 


Domestic  Society.  137 

daughter  remains  under  the  parental  roof,  the  parents 
are  to  be  obeyed  in  all  things  pertaining  to  the  man- 
agement of  the  home  and  the  general  good  of  the 
family.  They  must  continue  to  watch  over  the  morals 
of  their  children,  to  warn  and  reprove  them  whenever 
necessary,  and  even  to  enforce  compliance  with  the 
laws  of  good  behavior.  They  ought  to  assist  their 
children  to  make  a  wise  and  prudent  choice  of  a  state 
of  life,  though  they  have  no  right  to  prescribe  or  dictate 
the  state  of  hfe  to  be  chosen,  or  the  partner  to  be 
selected  in  marriage ;  nor  can  parents  object  to  the 
adoption  of  a  holier  career  in  the  religious  or  eccle- 
siastical state,  unless  they  be  in  pressing  need  of  their 
children's  support.  Man's  first  and  highest  allegiance 
is  due  not  to  his  parents,  but  to  God,  and  he  has 
a  perfect  right  to  obey  the  Divine  call  to  a  holier 
manner  of  life.  "  He  that  loveth  father  or  mother 
more  than  Me,  is  not  worthy  of  Me."  (Matt,  x.,  37.) 
Hence,  it  is  apparent,  also,  that  parents  cannot  right- 
fully prevent  their  children  from  embracing  the  true 
Faith. 
3.  When  the  grown-up  son  or  daughter  withdraws 
from  the  parental  home,  the  duty  of  obedience  ceases, 
but  not  the  duties  of  love  and  reverence  for  parents, 
and  of  respect  for  their  wisdom  and  advice.  More- 
over, all  must  assist  their  parents  in  case  of  need,  and 
ever  be  to  them  a  source  of  honor  and  consolation. 
219.  A  complete  family  usually  includes  servants,  who 
differ  from  other  wage-earners  by  being  permanently  em- 
ployed in  domestic  occupations.  As  such,  they  become 
inmates  of  the  house,  and,  in  a  certain  sense,  members  of  the 
family.     From  this  fact  special  rights  and  duties   arise   in 


138  Social  Rights  and  Duties. 

their  regard  with  respect  to  the  other  members  of  the  house- 
hold ;  ^.^.,  they  may  be  entrusted  with  delegated  authority 
over  the  children  of  their  employers.  It  is  their  duty  to  have 
the  good  of  the  family  sincerely  at  heart :  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  they  are  entitled  not  only  to  their  salary,  but  also  to 
special  love  and  care,  particularly  in  times  of  illness.  Every 
one  is  bound  by  the  natural  law  to  see  to  the  moral  and 
physical  welfare  of  those  belonging  to  his  own  household. 
220.  We  know  from  history  that  at  the  dawn  of  Chris- 
tianity nearly  half  the  human  race  was  in  a  state  of  slavery. 
In  the  mildest  meaning  of  the  term,  a  slave  is  a  human  being 
bound  for  life  to  work  for  his  master  without  other  remu- 
neration than  his  support,  possessing  no  rights  except  those 
that  are  inalienable.  Inalienable  rights  are  such  as  are  in- 
timately connected  with  the  attainment  of  our  last  end. 
They  are  the  rights  to  life,  limbs,  health,  surroundings  favor- 
able to  morality,  and  in  general  all  those  aids  to  eternal  hap- 
piness of  which  a  man  cannot  justly  deprive  himself,  since 
by  so  doing  he  would  infringe  God's  rights  to  his  service. 
Slavery  thus  limited  may,  perhaps,  in  certain  special  circum- 
stances, contain  no  violation  of  strict  right,  and,  therefore, 
no  injustice ;  yet,  it  ever  has  been  an  evil,  usually  far  greater 
than  squalid  poverty ;  and  it  has  occasioned  countless 
abuses  of  the  most  deplorable  kind.  Hence,  the  Church  has 
always  labored — and  with  unfailing  success — to  mitigate  and 
finally  to  suppress  it.  To  the  general  satisfaction,  slavery  has 
disappeared  from  all  Christian  lands.  There  is  no  reason, 
therefore,  for  treating  the  subject  further. 


CHAPTER     III. 

CIVIL  SOCIETY. 

2  21.  Civil  society  may  be  defined  as  a  union  of  many  such 
persons  as  are  their  own  masters,  siii  juris,  joined  together 
for  the  purpose  of  protecting  their  rights  and  securing  their 
temporal  happiness.  In  the  present  chapter  we  shall  con- 
sider the  nature  and  the  origin  of  civil  society,  and  the 
exercise  of  civil  functions. 

Article  1.     The    Nature    and    the   Origin   of    Civil 

Society. 

2  2  2.  The  nature  of  civil  society  can  be  best  understood 
from  a  detailed  examination  into  its  constituent  notes,  namely: 
I.  Its  end  or  purpose,  2.  The  units  composing  it,  3.  The 
authority  governing  it,  4.  The  means  employed  to  obtain 
its  end. 

§  I ,    The  End  of  Civil  Society. 

223.  I.  We  have  seen  in  a  preceding  chapter  (No.  199) 
that  society,  or  association  of  some  kind,  is  natural  to  man, 
and,  consequently,  that  it  is  an  institution  of  God.  The 
society  first  in  the  order  of  nature  is  the  family,  or  domestic 
society,  and  next  in  order  comes  civil  society,  or  the  State. 

The  necessity  of  civil  society  is  obvious :  when  many 
families  live  in  proximity,  they  are  forced  to  have  intercourse 
of  some  sort  with  one  another.  In  the  course  of  time  it  will 
come  to  pass,  as  each  family  has  chiefly  its  own  interests  at 

139 


140  Social  Rights  and  Duties. 


heart,  that  many  of  these  famiHes  will  not  be  moderate  in 
their  aspirations,  their  claims,  and  their  efforts  at  aggran- 
dizement. Hence,  unless  they  be  united  for  the  purpose  of 
securmg  public  peace  and  the  protection  of  personal  rights, 
they  will  be  frequently  at  variance,  and  even  in  deadly  strife 
with  one  another. 

224.  The  preservation  of  peace  among  its  members  is  the 
primary  end  of  civil  society.  United  by  a  common  bond, 
men  can  render  great  assistance  to  one  another  in  securing, 
with  comparative  ease,  the  comfort  and  happiness  of  all; 
and  opportunities  for  the  development  and  exercise  of  the 
human  faculties  are  thus  afforded  which  would  be  impossible 
without  such  an  association.  The  complex  end  of  civil  so- 
ciety is  clearly  stated  in  the  preamble  to  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  which  reads  thus:  "We,  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  in  order  to  form  a  more  perfect  union,  estab- 
lish justice,  ensure  domestic  tranquillity,  provide  for  the  com- 
mon defense,  promote  the  general  welfare,  and  secure  the 
blessings  of  liberty  to  ourselves  and  oiu"  posterity,  do  ordain 
and  estabhsh  this  Constitution  for  the  United  States  of 
America." 

225.  Civil  society,  we  repeat,  is  natural  to  man,  and, 
consequently,  owes  its  institution  to  the  Creator.  It  is  natu- 
ral, because  it  is  the  outcome  of  man's  natural  tendencies  and 
is  necessary  for  the  development  and  application  of  his  high- 
est powers.  Without  civil  society,  men  could  not  lead  lives 
worthy  of  their  rational  nature  and  their  ultimate  destiny. 
The  theory  of  Hobbes  and  of  Rousseau,  that  man  is  natu- 
rally a  savage,  perpetually  at  war  with  his  fellow-men,  and 
that  society  is  an  afterthought,  something  artificial  super- 
added to  his  nature,  is  as  opposed  to  histoncal  facts  as  it  is 
degradmg  to  the  human  race. 


Civil  Society.  141 

§  2.    The  units  of  which  civil  society  is  composed. 

226.  When  certain  families  have  entered  into  association 
for  mutual  aid  and  protection,  the  domestic  relations  in  each 
family  are  manifestly  not  altered  thereby :  the  family  con- 
tinues to  be  a  natural  society;  each  family  is  a  moral  person, 
the  father  acting  for  all  the  members.  Hence  the  units  com- 
posing civil  society  are  not  individual  men,  women,  and 
children,  but  the  families,  or  the  heads  of  families.  The 
wives  and  children  are  indeed  members  of  the  State,  though 
not  directly ;  they  are  members  of  the  families  that  make  up 
the  State,  and  they  are  represented  in  the  State  by  the  heads 
of  the  families  to  which  they  severally  belong.  It  is  neither 
necessary  nor  desirable  for  the  common  good  that  the  State 
should  deal  directly  with  them,  ignoring  the  natural  organiza- 
tion of  the  domestic  society.  Unmarried  men,  who  are  prop- 
erly qualified  by  age  and  civil  condition,  /.  <?.,  who  have  at- 
tained their  majority  and  are  their  own  masters,  sui  Juris, 
share  with  heads  of  families  in  the  enjoyment  of  civil 
rights. 

§  3.      Civil  Authority. 

227.  That  the  common  good  may  be  attained,  the  mem- 
bers of  which  civil  society  is  made  up  often  stand  in  need  of 
direction,  and  sometimes  of  compulsion.  The  power  thus  to 
direct  and  compel  is  called  civil  authority ;  it  is,  as  it  were, 
the  soul  or  animating  principle  of  the  body  politic.  What 
rights  should  belong  to  this  authority  must  be  inferred  from 
its  purpose,  which  is  the  attainment  of  the  end  of  civil 
society.  Civil  authority,  therefore,  is  to  possess  all  those 
rights  which  are  necessary  to  direct,  and  even  compel,  the 
citizens  to  tend  towards  the  end  of  the  State,  /.  e.,  public 
peace,  the  protection  of  rights,  the  more  perfect  attainment 


142  Social  Rights  and  Duties. 

of  happiness  for  all,  provided  the  means  employed  be  con- 
sistent with  individual  rights. 

228.  But  may  not  the  common  good  require  the  sacrifice 
of  individual  or  private  rights  ?  As  the  common  good  con- 
sists principally  in  the  defense  of  the  private  rights  of  indi- 
viduals and  famihes,  it  cannot  require  such  a  sacrifice. 
Exceptions  in  this  matter  are  more  apparent  than  real.  Yet, 
aside  from  the  forfeiture  of  personal  rights  or  privileges  for 
certain  misdeeds,  cases  may  arise  in  which  individuals  or 
families  have  to  forego  private  advantages  in  order  to  serve 
the  common  good :  as  when  a  citizen  is  called  upon  to  ex- 
pose his  life  for  the  defense  of  his  country.  In  this  case  his 
right  is  not  violated;  the  State  does  not  take  away  his  life, 
but  it  obliges  him  to  expose  himself  to  danger  for  a  greater 
good,  in  accordance  with  the  demands  of  duty. 

229.  In  levying  taxes,  the  State  distributes  the  common 
burden  of  expenses  incurred  for  the  pubhc  good.  The  right 
of  eminent  domain  (No.  177)  suspends  a  private  right  ac- 
cording to  the  principles  explained  in  a  preceding  book 
(No.  121).  The  tendency  of  certain  agitators  in  politics  and 
political  economy  is  to  extend  the  powers  of  the  State  beyond 
all  just  limits,  to  the  prejudice  of  private  rights.  This  ten- 
dency, whether  it  is  manifested  in  the  advocacy  of  unjust 
taxation,  in  special  class  legislation,  or  in  meddling  with 
parental  rights  of  education,  is  directly  at  variance  with  the 
purposes  of  civil  government,  and  opposed  to  the  spirit  of  our 
Constitution.  Civil  government  exists  for  the  welfare  of  the 
people  and  the  protection  of  private  rights.  When,  therefore, 
the  government  usurps  the  rights  of  individuals,  it  becomes  a 
form  of  tyranny,  quiet  submission  to  which  is  not  patriotism, 
but  slavery. 

230.  "Whence  comes  the  authority  of  the  State  ?    The 


Civil  Society.  143 

question  may  refer  to  civil  authority  in  the  abstract  or  in  the 
concrete.  Civil  authority  in  the  concrete  regards  the  partic- 
ular form  of  government  which  a  particular  State  or  nation 
has  come  to  assume.  It  is  evidently  a  matter  of  historical 
fact:  certain  events  have  brought  about  the  assumption  of 
that  manner  of  government. 

Supposing  now  that  a  State  or  government  exists,  we  may 
inquire  whence  it  derives  authority;  /.  e.,  the  right  to  govern 
its  subjects.  This  latter  is  a  consideration  of  authority  in  the 
abstract,  and  is  an  ethical  question. 

231.  Thesis  VI.  Civil  authority  is  derived  from  God,  and 
can  impose  conscientious  obligations. 

Proof.  As  in  every  society  (No.  196),  so  in  civil  society, 
authority  is  necessary ;  it  is  the  very  form  or  animating  prin- 
ciple of  civil  society  (No.  227).  Now,  God  is  the  founder 
of  civil  society,  since  it  is  natural  to  man ;  and  God  neces- 
sarily wills  that  everything  He  makes  shall  possess  all  powers 
necessary  for  the  purposes  for  which  He  made  it.  But  au- 
thority is  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  civil  society ;  therefore, 
it  possesses  this  authority  from  God. 

From  this  principle,  it  follows  that  civil  government  can 
impose  obligations  in  conscience.  Authority  means  the 
moral  right  to  govern.  Now,  such  a  right  implies  on  the 
part  of  the  governed  the  moral  obligation  to  obey.  Never- 
theless, the  authority  thus  bestowed  is  limited  to  those  pur- 
poses for  which  it  was  intrusted  to  the  State — namely,  to 
procure  the  end  of  civil  government  by  just  means.  Hence, 
an  unlawful  use  of  authority  imposes  no  moral  obligation. 

232.  It  has  been  much  debated  whether  civil  authority 
comes  immediately  from  God  to  the  ruler,  or  through  the 
medium  of  the  people,  by  whom  it  is  intrusted  to  the  rulers. 
Certainly,  it  can  hardly  be  said  that  such  authority  resides 


144  Social  Rights  and  Duties. 

with  an  unorganized  multitude ;  yet,  as  soon  as  the  commu- 
nity has  become  an  organized  body,  it  has  the  moral  power 
of  civil  government.  It  may  intrust  this  power  to  one  or 
more  persons,  and  it  may  place  restrictions  upon  these  both 
with  regard  to  the  time  and  the  manner  of  exercising  the 
authority  thus  bestowed. 

233.  One  thing  is  certain — namely,  that  civil  authority 
is  not  a  mere  collection  of  private  rights  intrusted  by  all 
the  individuals  of  a  community  to  the  management  of  one 
or  more  chosen  members.  The  civil  power  has  the  right  to 
inflict  the  death  penalty  (No.  249)  in  punishment  of  enormous 
crimes.  But  such  a  right  could  not  belong  to  a  merely 
volimtary  association  of  individuals,  since  they  cannot  give 
to  any  person  or  persons  a  right  which  they  do  not  possess. 
Therefore,  civil  authority  is  not  a  mere  collection  of  private 
rights.  This  principle  is  further  explained  in  the  following 
thesis : 

234.  Thesis  VII.  The  doctrine  of  the  social  contract  tnaiti' 
tained  by  Rousseau  is  illogical. 

Explanation.  According  to  the  fanciful  theory  of  the  "so- 
cial contract"  devised  by  Jean  Jacques  Rousseau,  the  citi- 
zens, when  they  obey  the  authority  of  the  State,  obey  them- 
selves or  fulfill  their  own  commands ;  for  civil  authority  he 
declared  to  be  nothing  else  than  the  free  union  of  individual 
wills.  He  supposed  that  the  members  of  a  community  have 
agreed  to  intrust  the  exercise  of  their  individual  rights  to  one 
or  more  men,  who  thus  become  their  agents  for  the  adminis- 
tration of  these  associated  rights,  just  like  the  agents  of  a 
business  firm,  and  who  may  be,  like  such  agents,  dismissed 
at  the  pleasure  of  their  employers.  As  forms  of  government 
have  existed  from  time  immemorial,  the  supposed  contract 
must  have  been  entered  into  by  our  remote  ancestors. 


Civil  Society.  145 

Proof  I.  Either  the  citizens  are  bound  by  the  agreement 
of  their  ancestors  to  a  civil  compact  or  they  are  not  so  bound. 
If  such  an  obhgation  exists,  they  do  not  render  obedience  to 
themselves,  as  Rousseau  would  have  it,  but  to  their  ances- 
tors; hence,  they  would  be  bound  by  a  will  not  their  own. 
If,  however,  no  such  obhgation  exists,  then  there  is  no  civil 
authority  at  all ;  for  that  is  no  authority  which  every  one  is 
free  at  any  moment  to  set  aside.  There  can  be  no  true  right 
to  command  where  there  is  no  corresponding  duty  to  obey. 

Proof  2.  This  theory  could  never  explain  the  right,  ad- 
mitted by  all  nations,  of  inflicting  capital  punishment ;  for  no 
one  can  give  to  another  what  he  does  not  himself  possess — 
the  right  to  take  away  his  life. 

§  4.    The  Means  Employed  by  Civil  Authority. 

235.  The  means  employed  to  obtain  the  end  of  civil  gov- 
ernment are  of  three  kinds: 

1.  Acts  commanded  as  necessary  for  this  end,  such  as 
the  payment  of  taxes,  or  the  raising  and  equipment  of 
armies  in  time  of  war. 

2.  Acts  forbidden  as  injurious  to  private  rights  or  to 
the  common  good.  On  both  these  points  there  is  need 
of  great  care  that,  by  the  promotion  of  certain  lawful 
objects  or  the  protection  of  certain  rights,  other  rights 
be  not  violated,  especially  those  of  a  more  sacred  char- 
acter; this  would  defeat  the  very  purpose  for  which 
civil  government  exists. 

3.  The  organization  of  the  government,  or  the  civil 
polity  which  is  to  direct  the  means  to  the  end. 

236.  There  are  various  forms  of  organization: 

I .    The  monarchical,  in  which  all  civil  power  is  vested 


146  Social  Rights  and  Duties. 

in  one  man,  whether  he  be  called  king  or  emperor  or 
by  any  other  title. 

2.  The  aristocratic,  in  which  power  is  vested  in  a  few 
individuals  or  families. 

3.  The  democratic,  in  which  the  people  hold  the  power; 
it  is  then  usually  administered  by  representatives 
whom  the  people  have  chosen.  These  are  the  simple 
forms  of  government  organization.  Mixed  forms  are 
those  in  which  the  simple  forms  are  variously  com- 
bined. In  the  British  Government,  for  instance,  the 
supreme  power  is  vested  in  the  crown — king  or  queen 
— and  in  Parliament,  which  consists  of  the  House  of 
Lords,  as  the  aristocratic  element,  and  the  House  of 
Commons,  as  the  democratic  element,  the  members 
of  the  latter  House  being  elected  by  the  people. 

237.  Practically,  that  form  of  government  is  the  best  for 
any  people  which  is  best  adapted  to  obtain  for  them  the  end 
or  purpose  of  civil  power;  that  form,  namely,  which,  account 
being  taken  of  the  character,  traditions,  and  various  circum- 
stances of  the  people,  is  best  suited  for  the  defense  of  their 
private  rights,  for  the  maintenance  of  peace  at  home  and 
abroad,  and  for  the  development  of  the  country's  resources ; 
which  will  thus  contribute  to  the  common  happiness  on  earth, 
and  enable  every  member  of  the  community  to  attain  his  last 
end. 

Article  II.     The  Functions  of  Civil  Government. 

238.  To  fulfill  its  purposes,  civil  government  must  exercise 
three  functions,  namely :  the  legislative,  in  the  making  of 
laws;  ih^ judiciary,  in  the  application  of  the  laws  to  particular 
cases;  the  executive,  in  carrying  laws  and  judgments  into  effect. 


Civil  Society.  147 

All  three  functions  may  be  exercised  by  one  person  or  body 
of  men ;  but  in  this  country  they  are  intrusted  to  three  dis- 
tinct departments :  the  legislative  to  Congress,  the  judiciary 
to  the  law  courts,  the  executive  to  the  President. 

§  I.    Legislation. 

239.  Since  the  State  derives  its  authority  from  the  moral 
law,  it  can,  as  we  have  shown,  bind  its  subjects  in  conscience 
to  observe  its  enactments  (No.  231).  In  order  to  possess 
this  binding  force,  such  enactments  must  be  just  (ibid.); 
therefore,  they  must  fulfill  all  the  conditions  required  for  just 
laws  (No.  81).  Hence,  one  readily  perceives  how  false, 
when  applied  to  legislative  acts,  the  common  saying  may  be, 
"  The  voice  of  the  people  is  the  voice  of  God."  An  unjust 
law  enacted,  even  with  perfect  unanimity,  by  an  entire  nation 
would  have  in  itself  no  binding  force ;  a  fortiori,  it  has  no 
such  power  if  passed  by  a  mere  majority.  In  fact,  a  majority 
may  be  just  as  tyrannical  as  a  despotic  monarch.  Since  laws 
are,  by  their  nature,  directions  for  future  acts,  they  cannot 
justly  brand  an  action  as  guilty  which  before  the  passage  of 
such  laws  was  considered  innocent ;  nor  can  they  justly  in- 
crease the  punishment  for  an  act  already  committed.  Hence, 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  forbids  the  enactment 
by  Congress  of  ex  post  facto  laws. 

240.  Though  the  civil  authority  has  power  to  bind  the 
conscience,  yet  not  every  purely  civil  law  imposes  such  obliga- 
tion. For  laws  have  no  greater  binding  effect  than  their 
authors  intend  to  impose ;  nor  can  the  obligation  exceed  the 
requirements  of  the  common  good.  Some  laws  accomplish 
all  the  purposes  for  which  they  were  enacted,  if  the  trans- 
gressor is  obliged  to  pay  the  appointed  penalty  when  caught 


148  Social  Rights  and  Duties. 

in  the  forbidden  act ;  and  the  legislator  is  often  content  with 
this  kind  of  sanction  without  being  willing  to  lay  a  moral  ob- 
ligation on  the  conscience.  Such  laws  are  styled  merely 
penal  laws.  In  practice,  it  is  often  not  easy  to  determine 
which  laws  are  merely  penal.  Evidently,  however,  those 
laws  oblige  in  conscience  the  violation  of  which  would  be 
positively  injurious  to  the  common  good. 

241.  The  office  of  legislation  is  to  direct  the  acts  of  the 
citizens  to  the  attainment  of  the  end  proper  to  civil  society. 
That  end  includes  public  order,  defense  of  private  rights,  and 
development  of  material  and  mental  resources  for  the  com- 
mon good.     Hence,  legislation  must  take  care — 

1.  To  ward  off  physical  evils  from  the  country,  e.g., 
contagious  diseases.  Therefore  it  has  power  to  use 
the  means  necessary  for  such  purpose,  e.  g.,  the  enact- 
ment of  sanitary  regulations,  the  establishment  of 
quarantine,  etc. 

2.  To  ward  off  moral  evils,  such  as  the  dissemination 
of  false  doctrines  that  weaken  morality,  undermine 
society,  and  attack  natural  religion.  Hence,  too,  the 
State  has  a  clear  right  to  put  just  restrictions  on 
license  of  speech  and  of  the  press.  The  public  prof- 
anation of  Sunday,  indecent  theatricals,  houses  of 
debauch  tend  to  degrade  the  standard  of  pubhc  and 
private  morality,  and,  consequently,  are  subject  to 
legislative  action.  On  the  other  hand,  religion,  the 
chief  safeguard  of  morals,  ought  to  be  at  all  times 
countenanced  and  actively  protected. 

3.  To  protect  individual  rights,  such  as  the  rights  of 
minors,  of  orphans,  of  those  concerned  in  contracts, 
in  last  wills,  etc. 

4.  To  forward  material  improvements,  such  as  high- 


Civil  Society.  149 

ways,  bridges,  watercourses,  harbors,  and  all  such 
works  generally  as  are  useful  to  the  country  at  large 
and  too  vast  for  private  enterprise. 
5.  To  promote  mental  develop^nent.,  by  encouraging 
education  and  assisting  educational  institutions,  espe- 
cially those  devoted  to  the  teaching  of  the  highest 
branches;  for  education  contributes  largely  to  the 
common  good,  and  higher  studies  in  particular,  though 
pursued  by  the  few,  redound  to  the  welfare  of  the 
people  generally. 

242.  In  many  undertakings  the  State  ought  to  aid  but 
not  to  supplant  private  enterprise,  assuming  the  lead  when 
individuals  and  corporations  can  advance  no  further,  subsi- 
dizing important  works  that  affect  the  general  welfare,  with- 
out exercising  a  monopoly  or  competing  with  private  efforts. 
The  tendency  of  Socialism  is  to  substitute  State  control  for 
private  enterprise  in  many  departments  of  business,  without 
any  benefit  to  the  common  good.  Thus,  instead  of  being  a 
protector,  the  State  would  become  a  usurper  of  private  rights, 
and  in  this  way  defeat  the  purpose  of  its  existence. 

§  2.    The  Judiciary. 

243.  The  task  of  the  judiciary  is  twofold: 

1.  To  settle  disputes  between  rival  claimants:  this  is 
done  in  the  civil  courts. 

2.  To  prosecute,  in  criminal  courts,  persons  charged 
with  violating  the  law,  and,  in  case  of  their  conviction, 
to  award  the  penalty  appointed  for  the  transgression. 
The  settlement  of  civil  disputes  is  often  submitted  by 
the  disputing  parties  to  arbiters  chosen  by  themselves. 
An  arbiter  differs  from  a  judge  in  this,  that  the  latter 


150  Social  Rights  and  Duties. 

acts  in  virtue  of  the  sovereign  power  of  the  State,  and, 
therefore,  possesses  authority  over  the  parties  con- 
cerned, while  an  arbiter  has  no  rights  in  the  matter 
under  dispute  except  such  as  are  conceded  to  him  by 
the  htigants.  From  the  decision  of  the  lower  courts 
appeal  may  be  made  in  important  cases  to  higher 
courts.  But  there  must  be,  in  the  nature  of  things,  a 
supreme  court,  from  whose  decision  there  can  be  no 
appeal.  Though  even  this  higher  tribunal  may  err, 
nevertheless  the  public  good  requires  that  its  decisions 
shall  be  final. 

244.  The  courts  are  guided  by  existing  laws,  the  expe- 
diency of  which  is  no  matter  for  their  consideration ;  their 
work  is  the  interpretation  and  application  of  existing  laws  to 
special  cases.  Yet  certain  courts  are  sometimes  called  upon 
to  decide  whether  a  given  enactment  is  truly  a  law,  whether 
it  has  all  the  requirements  of  a  just  law  (No.  81).  If  an 
enactment  is  evidently  unjust  or  is  openly  at  variance  with 
the  Constitution  of  the  country,  it  is  not  a  law,  and  judges 
cannot  justly  enforce  it. 

245,  The  preservation  of  public  order,  one  of  the  primary 
functions  of  civil  society,  necessitates  the  punishment  of 
social  crimes.  Now,  a  social  crime  is  an  outward  disturb- 
ance of  civil  society  by  the  violation  of  a  strict  right  of  our 
fellow-men.  Evil  acts  in  which  injury  is  done  to  those  per- 
sons only  who  freely  take  part  in  them,  do  not  violate  a  strict 
right  of  any  man,  and  are,  therefore,  not  subject  to  the  pun- 
ishments of  civil  authority. 

It  is  for  the  legislative  power  to  appoint  the  punish- 
ment of  crimes,  for  the  judiciary  to  award  the  punishment 
in  individual  cases,  for  the  executive  to  inflict  it,  or,  in 
exceptional  circumstances,  at  the   discretion  of   the  official 


Civil  Society.  151 

holding  the  necessary  authority,  to   remit  or   commute  the 
penalty. 

246.  Thesis  VIII.  Civil  society  has  the  right  to  punish 
social  crifnes. 

Proof.  Every  natural  society  has  a  right  to  those  means 
which,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  events,  are  necessary  for  it 
to  obtain  its  ends ;  but  the  punishment  of  social  crimes  is 
such  a  means  for  civil  society.  Therefore  civil  society  has 
the  right  to  punish  social  crimes. 

247.  Let  us  consider  how  and  why  such  punishment  is 
necessary  in  order  that  civil  society  may  attain  its  end. 

1.  That  end  is  the  maintenance  of  social  order.  To 
secure  this,  it  is  necessary  that  advantage  and  pleasure 
be  consequent  on  the  observance  of  order.  But  the 
criminal  disturbs  the  order  of  things  by  seeking  to 
make  advantage  and  pleasure  consequent  upon  dis- 
order. Accordingly,  justice  requires,  for  the  restora- 
tion of  right  order  which  he  has  disturbed,  that  he 
shall  lose  advantages  or  feel  pain.  For  this  purpose, 
then,  various  kinds  and  degrees  of  punishment  are 
needed  to  match  the  various  kinds  of  evil  doings  and 
the  various  grades  of  guilt.  Hence,  one  purpose  of 
legal  punishment  is  expiation. 

2.  The  end  of  civil  society  is  likewise  to  guard  rights 
from  violation ;  but  this  cannot  be  done  unless  offend- 
ers be  punished  in  a  manner  to  deter  others  from  fol- 
lowing their  evil  example ;  the  penalty  should,  for  this 
purpose,  be  proportioned  to  the  crime. 

3.  The  criminal  himself  needs  correction,  /.  <?.,  by  the 
bitter  medicine  of  pain  he  is  to  be  induced  to  give  up 
his  vicious  practices,  and  kept  from  disturbing  the 
social  order  in  the  future. 


152  Social  Rights  and  Duties. 

248.  Thus  a  threefold  reason  exists  for  the  infliction  of 
legal  punishment;  it  is  expiatoij,  deterrent,  and  medicinal.  In 
domestic  society,  punishment  is  primarily  medicinal  for  the 
correction  of  the  offender,  yet  at  times  it  may  be  deterrent 
for  others.  In  civil  society,  punishment  is  chiefly  expiatory 
and  deterrent,  and  it  need  not  be  medicinal. 

249.  Thesis  IX.  Civil  society  has  the  right  to  inflict  the 
death  penalty  for  enormous  crimes. 

Explanation.  We  know  from  Revelation  that  God  has 
bestowed  this  right  upon  civil  authority;  we  maintain  here 
that  it  belongs  to  civil  society  by  the  principles  of  natural 
reason. 

Proof.  The  means  employed  by  civil  society  must  be  suffi- 
cient to  attain  its  end.  Now,  in  many  cases,  nothing  less  than 
capital  punishment  is  sufficient  to  attain  that  end.  For,  {a) 
There  are  criminals  so  depraved  and  so  indifferent  to  other 
forms  of  punishment  that  the  death  penalty  alone  can  deter 
them  from  committing  enormous  crimes,  [b)  Some  crimes, 
such  as  deliberate  murder,  treason,  or  parricide,  disturb  social 
order  to  such  an  extent  that  capital  punishment  alone  ap- 
proaches a  proportionate  atonement. 

250.  Objections: 

1.  Man  is  too  noble  a  being  to  be  slaughtered  as  a 
warning  to  others.  Answer.  Such  certainly  he  is  if 
he  has  done  no  wrong;  not,  however,  if  he  has  degraded 
himself  by  a  monstrous  crime. 

2.  The  present  doctrine  would  justify  "  Lynch  law," 
and  mob  violence,  which  are  evident  evils.  Answer. 
A  mob  has  no  authority  to  inflict  death :  civil  society 
receives  such  authority  from  God,  its  founder. 

3.  Everyman  has  an  inalienable  right  to  his  life;  there- 
fore the  State  cannot  condemn  him  to  death.  Answer. 


Civil  Society.  153 

When  we  say  that  a  right  is  inahenable,  we  mean  that 
no  one  can  take  it  away  except  God  and  one  dele- 
gated by  Him  for  that  purpose ;  now  the  State  has  a 
commission  from  God  to  inflict  the  death  penalty  for 
enormous  crimes. 

4.  In  some  States  the  death  penalty  has  been  abolished; 
therefore  it  is  not  necessary.  Answer.  That  conse- 
quent does  not  follow  from  the  antecedent.  It  is  not 
clear  that  the  purposes  of  civil  government  are  suffi- 
ciently attained  vci  those  States.  If  they  are,  it  is 
owing  to  special  circumstances,  and  constitutes  an  ex- 
ception to  a  general  rule. 

5.  Desperate  men  are  not  restrained  by  fear  of  the 
death  penalty.  Afiswer.  Nevertheless  it  is  the  most 
potent  restraint  that  the  State  can  use ;  besides,  such 
men  are  prevented  by  the  prompt  infliction  of  the 
penalty  from  multiplying  their  enormities.  Moreover, 
few  criminals  have  been  found  so  hardened  as  not 
eagerly  to  desire  a  commutation  of  capital  punishment 
to  imprisonment  for  life. 

§  3.     The  Executive. 

251.  In  addition  to  the  legislative  and  judicial  depart- 
ments, a  country  requires  for  its  government  executive  officers, 
an  armed  force,  and  a  treasury  for  the  remuneration  of  public 
services.  Those  officials  whose  duty  it  is  to  carry  the  laws 
into  effect  form  the  executive  department,  which  is  in  some 
respects  dependent  upon  the  two  other  departments.  The 
President  of  the  United  States  is  the  chief  executive  officer  of 
the  nation ;  at  the  same  time  he  is  at  the  head  of  the  legisla- 
tive department,  holding  the  power  of  veto  and  giving  vahdity 


154  Social  Rights  and  Duties. 

to  the  enactments  of  Congress  by  affixing  his  signature 
thereto.  The  President  is  also  the  official  embodiment  of 
the  majesty  and  authority  of  the  nation. 

252.  The  public  ofGlcers  ought  to  be  chosen  or  appointed 
from  those  who,  by  their  knowledge,  ability,  fidelity,  and 
integrity,  are  well  qualified  to  procure  the  common  good. 
The  practice  of  distributing  offices  as  the  spoils  of  party 
victory  among  the  unworthy  and  incompetent,  is  a  gross 
violation  of  distributive  justice  and  a  serious  injury  to  the 
State. 

253.  The  treasury  is  supplied  either  by  direct  taxation^ 
i.  e.,  by  taxes  imposed  on  the  property  of  the  individual  citi- 
zens, or  by  indirect  taxation,  i.  e.,  revenues  and  duties  paid 
for  manufactured  and  imported  goods.  The  right  of  taxation 
is  based  upon  the  need  of  the  government  to  defray  public 
expenses  incurred  for  the  common  good ;  hence,  the  taxes 
levied  should  not  exceed  these  expenses.  The  assessment 
of  taxes  for  each  class  of  the  citizens  ought,  as  far  as  is  prac- 
ticable, to  be  proportioned  to  the  benefits  received  therefrom. 
Thus,  each  citizen  receives  from  the  State  an  equivalent  for 
the  taxes  he  pays,  and  no  one  is  forced  to  labor  for  another 
without  just  compensation.  This  rule  does  not  prevent  the 
taxation  of  the  rich  to  supply  assistance  to  the  needy  poor. 
The  honest  poor  have  a  right,  as  human  beings,  to  live  in 
decent  comfort,  and,  if  they  cannot  succeed  in  doing  so  by 
their  own  exertions,  they  must  be  aided  by  the  wealthy  mem- 
bers of  the  community.  It  is  even  necessary  for  the  common 
good  that  no  class  of  the  people  should  be  driven  by  want  to 
discontent  and  desperation. 

254.  The  armed  force  required  by  civil  society  consists 
usually  of: 

I.   lYie police,  a  body  of  men  who  exercise  a  constant 


Civil  Society.  155 

guardianship  over  public  tranquillity  and  the  rights  of 
individuals. 

2.  The  militia,  or  civic  troops,  intended  chiefly  for  the 
protection  of  the  State  against  the  insubordination  of 
its  own  subjects. 

3.  The  regular  army,  whose  main  purpose  is  defense 
against  foreign  foes. 

As  personal  danger  naturally  accompanies  the  work  of 
armed  men,  these  are  bound,  when  the  occasion  requies  it, 
to  expose  themselves  even  to  death  in  the  performance  of 
their  duty.  In  the  use  of  armed  force,  nations  approach  near- 
est to  ideal  perfection  when  this  use  is  brought  within  the 
narrowest  limits,  while  at  the  same  time  the  public  peace  is 
vigorously  maintained.  Accordingly,  the  people  of  the  United 
States  have  reason  to  congratulate  themselves  that  public 
order  reigns  so  extensively,  though  the  army  is  comparatively 
diminutive,  the  militia  seldom  needed,  and  the  police  rarely 
compelled  to  make  use  of  deadly  weapons. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
INTERNATIONAL   LAW. 

255.  All  the  members  of  mankind  naturally  constitute  one 
universal  society  (No.  198),  of  which  God  Himself  is  the 
founder,  ruler,  lawgiver,  and  judge.  In  this  universal  society 
a  great  variety  of  rights  and  duties  has  place.  Thus  far  we 
have  considered  those  of  individuals  (Book  II.),  those  of  do- 
mestic society  (Book  III.,  C.  II.),  and  those  which  arise  in 
civil  society  (C.  III.).  Lastly,  we  are  to  examine  the  rights 
and  duties  which  issue  from  the  relations  of  independent 
civil  societies  to  one  another.  These  rights  and  duties  are 
regulated  by  international  law. 

256.  International  law  is  defined  by  James  Madison, 
fourth  President  of  the  United  States,  as  "  Consisting  of  those 
rules  which  reason  deduces  as  consonant  to  justice,  from  the 
nature  of  the  society  existing  among  independent  nations; 
with  such  definitions  and  modifications  as  may  be  established 
by  general  consent "  (Wheaton's  Elements  of  International 
Law,  C.  I.).  As  a  distinct  code,  it  is  of  modern  origin;  for 
within  recent  times  intercourse,  chiefly  commercial,  between 
the  nations  of  the  earth  has  attained  such  proportions  and  is 
become  so  intricate  that  regulations  governing  it  have  as- 
sumed vast  importance. 

Formerly  international  law  constituted  in  Philosophy  a 
branch  of  what  was  called  jus  gentium,  the  law  of  nations, 
defined  by  Suarez  as  "  That  which  is  laid  down  by  reason 
among  all  mankind  and  is  observed  by  nearly  all  nations :  " 
it  treated  of  both  civil  and  international  right. 

I.S6 


International  Law.  157 

257.  As  now  understood,  international  law  comprises  two 
parts,  indicated  in  Madison's  definition,  namely  : 

1.  What  reason  requires,  i.  <?.,  the  natural  rights,  and 

2.  Such  definitions  and  modifications  of  this  as  may  be 
established  by  general  consent,  /.  e.,  acquired  or  con- 
ventional rights.  The  latter  may  be  determined  ex- 
plicitly, by  contracts  among  the  nations,  or  ijnplicitly, 
by  custom  so  well  established  as  to  be  considered 
binding  on  all  civilized  countries. 

258.  By  a  nation  we  here  mean  an  independent  civil 
government ;  the  several  States  of  the  Union,  though  sover- 
eign States — possessed  of  the  right  of  the  sword  and  other 
attributes  of  sovereignty — are,  nevertheless,  not  so  many 
nations,  because  not  independent  in  many  respects ;  but  all 
together  constitute  one  nation,  represented  by  our  central 
national  government.  Evidently  a  nation  here  does  not  mean 
a  race,  as  it  does  when  we  speak  of  the  Celtic  nation.  Nor 
does  it  mean  a  geographical  division;  for  this  may  contain 
various  nations,  e.  g.,  Spain  and  Portugal.  Again,  one  nation 
may  be  made  up  of  diverse  races,  as  is  the  case  in  Austria  or 
Great  Britain ;  and  one  race  may  be  divided  among  various 
nations  or  governments,  as  is  exemplified  in  the  Teutonic 
race. 

259.  The  principles  underlying  all  international  law 
are  the  following : 

1.  That  every  man  must  love  all  other  men  (Nos.  149, 
198). 

2.  That  every  independent  civil  society  is  a  moral  per- 
son, and,  as  such,  possessed  of  definite  rights,  which 
must  be  respected  by  all  other  persons,  physical  and 
moral.  For  a  person  is  properly  a  complete  substance 
endowed  with  intellect  (Mental  Philosophy,  No.  55), 


158  Social  Rights  and  Duties. 

a  being,  therefore,  capable  of  having  rights  and  duties. 
Civil  society,  inasmuch  as  it  is  complete  and  indepen- 
dent in  its  own  line,  and  is  a  collection  of  intellectual 
units,  is  called  a  moral  person ;  as  such  it  is  the  em- 
bodiment of  all  the  private  rights  pertaining  to  its 
members.  Besides,  since  civil  society  is  natural  to 
man,  it  has  a  natural  right  to  exist  and  to  use 
whatever  just  means  are  necessary  for  attaining  its 
end. 

260.  Since  the  rights  of  a  nation  flow  from  its  essence  as  a 
complete  civil  society,  all  nations  stand  on  an  equal  footing 
with  regard  to  natural  rights.  Hence,  the  greater  powers 
have  no  more  natural  right  to  lord  it  over  less  potent  nations 
than  strong  men  have  a  right  to  neglect  and  abuse  the  rights 
of  infants.     In  particular  : 

1.  No  nation  may  enter  the  territory  of  another  nation 
without  the  consent  of  the  latter. 

2.  One  nation  has  no  right  to  interfere  with  the  inter- 
nal workings  of  another  government.  Hence,  foreign 
powers  have  no  right  to  encourage  or  assist  subjects 
rebelling  against  legitimate  authority. 

3.  Yet  one  nation  has  a  right  to  assist  another  nation 
if  the  latter  asks  such  assistance.  The  principle  of 
non-intervention,  in  the  sense  that  one  nation  is  not 
allowed  to  render  the  aid  requested  by  another  nation 
in  distress,  is  unjust.  In  effect,  this  principle  allows 
a  robber  nation  to  despoil  its  victim,  and  helps  rebel 
subjects  to  oppose  lawfully  established  authority. 

261.  The  natural  rights  of  a  nation,  which  all  are  obliged 
to  respect,  are  chiefly  as  follows : 

I.  The  right  of  preserving  its  existence  as  a  nation. 
Such  existence  implies  four  conditions :  union  among 


International  Law.  159 

the  citizens,  legitimate  authority,  independence,  the 
dignity  of  a  moral  person  invested  with  sovereignty. 

2.  The  right  to  maintain  civil  order  among  its  mem- 
bers. This  implies :  the  dependence  of  the  subjects 
on  their  rulers,  a  just  administration  of  the  common- 
wealth, concord  among  the  citizens. 

3.  The  right  to  acquire  new  territory,  whether  by  treaty 
or  by  first  occupancy,  etc.,  provided  no  prior  rights 
be  violated. 

4.  The  right  of  dominion  over  its  water-courses,  which 
include  such  an  extent  of  the  adjacent  seas  as  is  neces- 
sary for  the  security  and  prosperity  of  its  citizens. 
Conflicting  claims  must  be  settled  by  treaties,  cus- 
toms, etc. 

5.  The  right  to  honorable  recognition  by  other  nations 
and  by  men  generally.  This  implies  the  sacredness 
of  embassies,  etc.,  a  right  which  has  always  been  ac- 
knowledged by  all  civilized  nations. 

6.  The  right  to  develop  its  resources,  material  and  in- 
tellectual, and  generally  the  right  to  promote  all  that 
tends  to  public  and  private  prosperity  without  preju- 
dice to  private  rights. 

7.  Lastly,  the  right  to  manage  its  own  affairs ;  hence, 
to  determine  changes  in  its  manner  of  administration, 
and  to  settle  difficulties  with  its  own  subjects  without 
interference  or  contradiction  on  the  part  of  other 
States. 

262.  Nature  has  established  no  human  authority  superior 
to  that  of  national  governments;  hence,  there  is  no  higher 
human  power  to  enforce  the  observance  of  the  moral  law  by 
nations  and  to  decide  conflicting  international  claims.  A 
universal  arbiter  to  decide  contests  between   nations  were 


i6o  Social  Rights  and  Duties. 

indeed  desirable.  Such  the  Supreme  Pontiff  was  among 
Christian  nations  in  the  ages  of  Faith.  In  special  cases, 
he  has  lately  been  called  upon  to  act  in  a  similar  capac- 
ity, to  the  great  advantage  of  justice,  peace,  and  civiliza- 
tion. 

263.  When  arbitration  cannot  be  agreed  upon  by  contest- 
ing nations,  recourse  is  had  to  war,  to  which,  as  a  last  resort, 
they  have  an  undoubted  right.  That  a  war  may  be  justifia- 
ble, these  conditions  are  required : 

1.  That  a  nation's  claims  are  just,  important,  moderate, 
and  certain. 

2.  That  every  reasonable  effort  has  been  made  in  vain 
to  settle  the  dispute  by  peaceable  means. 

3.  That  war  offers  a  fair  prospect  of  success ;  for  no 
one  is  justified  in  choosing  the  greater  of  two  evils; 
least  of  all  can  those  in  authority  do  so,  for  they  are 
the  guardians  of  their  subjects'  rights. 

4.  That  war  be  undertaken,  as  Cicero  says,  only  as  a 
means  to  bring  about  a  just  peace. 

264.  The  manner  of  waging  war  should  be  conformable 
to  the  approved  usages  of  civilized  nations.  To  be  effective, 
it  necessitates  destruction  of  life  and  property,  confiscations, 
sieges,  blockades,  battles,  bombardments,  and  all  the  horrors 
unavoidably  connected  with  such  measures.  But  it  does  not 
justify; 

1.  Any  useless  or  wanton  violence  or  destruction  by 
which  the  final  settlement  is  not  furthered;  for  in- 
stance, the  direct  kiUing  or  ill-treating  of  non-combat- 
ants, such  as  women  and  children. 

2.  The  kilhng  of  prisoners  or  wounded  soldiers  who 
have  no  more  power  to  injure. 

3.  The  use  of  means  universally  execrated  as  unneces- 


International  Law.  i6i 

sarily  cruel,  such  as  envenomed  weapons,  poisoned 
wells,  etc. 

4.  The  use  of  means  that  are  in  themselves  unjust, 
such  as  lying,  perjury,  and  soHcitations  to  treason. 

5.  The  continuation  of  hostiUties  when  a  settlement 
has  been  made  possible. 

265.  The  victorious  nation  has  the  right: 

1.  To  possess  the  object  for  which  the  war  was  waged, 
and  to  which  it  had  all  along  a  just  claim. 

2.  To  exact  compensation  for  the  damages  sustained 
in  the  war. 

3.  To  provide  for  its  future  security  against  a  danger- 
ous foe.  This  may  even  necessitate  the  permanent 
subjection  of  the  defeated  nation.  Moderation,  jus- 
tice, and  humanity  must  ever  prevail. 

266.  It  is  the  tendency  of  Christian  civilization  to  culti- 
vate universal  good-will  and  forbearance,  not  only  among 
Christian  nations,  but  towards  all  mankind.  It  has  gradually 
removed  the  most  revolting  usages  of  warfare — the  useless 
slaughter  of  the  vanquished,  the  enslaving  of  the  conquered, 
with  their  wives  and  children,  the  wanton  destruction  of 
property,  the  lawless  plundering  and  sacking  of  cities,  the 
inhuman  treatment  of  the  weak,  the  aged  and  the  young. 
Thus  it  has  limited,  as  far  as  is  possible,  the  horrors  of  war 
to  those  actually  in  arms.  This  same  tendency  has  intro- 
duced tender  care  of  the  wounded,  respectful  burial  of  the 
dead,  a  chivalrous  treatment  of  all  parties  in  the  midst  of  hos- 
tilities, and  has  lessened  ill-feeling  after  the  re-establishment 
of  peace.  Its  greatest  triumph  has  been  the  prevention  of 
active  hostilities ;  so  that  war  is  now  an  exceptional  occur- 
rence, whereas  it  used  to  be  the  common  occupation  of  na- 
tions.    We  may   hope   that  the   still  wider  prevalence  of 


*; 


1 62  Social  Rights  and  Duties, 

Christian  principles  and  of  correct  views  on  the  purposes  and 
duties  of  civil  society  will  gradually  enable  the  nations  to 
dispense  with  war  altogether,  by  deferring  all  international 
contests  to  the  arbitration  of  the  most  worthy  personage  on 
earth,  the  Vicar  of  the  Prince  of  Peace. 


THE  END. 


ALPHABETICAL  INDEX. 


The  numbers  refer  to  the  paragraphs. 


Abraham,  89,  154. 

Abrogation  of  laws,  87. 

Accession,  182. 

Accountability ,54  to  60 ;  hinderances 

to,  61  to  67. 
Acquired  rights,  119. 
Acquisition  of  property,  170  to  182. 
Action,  external,  52. 
Adoration,  124  to  126. 
Agnostics,  38,  138. 
Alienable  rights,  119. 
Anger,  69. 

Arbiter,  243,  262,  266. 
Aristocracy,  236. 
Armed  force,  254. 
Authority,  139,   196;   parental,  211; 

civil,  827  to  229  ;  its  origin,  230  to 

234 ;  means,  235. 
Aversion,  69. 

Beatific  vision,  33. 
Beatitude,  26  to  35. 
Benevolence,  love  of,  140. 
Binding  the  will,  54,  56,  117,  240. 
Blasphemy,  127. 
Brave,  79. 

Capital  punishment,  233,  249,  250. 
Cardinal  virtues,  74. 
Caution,  76. 
Celibacy,  201. 


Circumstances,  49. 

Civil  Society,  221;  notes  of,  22a; 
end,  223,  224;  necessity,  225; 
units,  226 ;  authority,  227  to  234. 

Civilized  warfaie,  266. 

Clear-sightedness,  76. 

Communism,  179. 

Concupiscence,  65,  78. 

Conflict  of  rights,  120,  121,  228. 

Congress,  238. 

Connatural  rights,  119. 

Conscience,  80,  95  to  106,  240. 

Constitution  of  U.  S.,  175,  224,  239. 

Contract,  183 ;  gratuitous,  184 ;  oner- 
ous, 187;  conditions  of,  188; 
social,  234 ;  protection  of,  241. 

Courage,  69,  79,  144. 

Courts  of  law,  239,  243,  244. 

Cowardice,  79. 

Craftiness,  76. 

Crime,  245. 

Damage  repaired,  181. 

Danger,  145. 

David,  162. 

Death  penalty,  233,  249,  250. 

Democracy,  236. 

Derogation,  87. 

Desire,  69,  141. 

Despondency,  69. 

Determinants  of  morality,  46  1052. 


163 


164 


Alphabetical  Index. 


Dispensation,  87, 

God,  tendency  to,  14 ;  how  ?    15  to 

Divine  law,  82. 

17  ;  man's  last  end,  20  to  24,  32, 

Divorce,  206  to  206. 

41 ;  binds  us,  54,  55  ;  duties  to,  122 

Domestic  society,  200  to  220. 

to  142. 

Doubtful  conscience,  99  to  106. 

Golden  mean,  tj. 

Duel,  167  to  169. 

Good,  true,  8,  18  ;  kinds  of,  19,  40 ; 

Duties,  see  "Rights";  to  ourselves, 

and    bad,   37   to  39,    42 ;    radical 

142, 143  ;  to  fellowmen,  146  to 

149; 

notion  of,  40. 

to  enemies,  150  ;  of  children, 

218. 

Goods  of  earth,  35. 

Government,  civil,  235  to  237 ;  func- 

Education, 213  to  220,  241, 

tions,  238  to  254. 

Eminent  domain,  177,  229. 

Grant  of  land,  177. 

Emotions,  68. 

Gratitude,  75. 

Employer,  189  to  192. 

End,  6  to  8  ;  kinds  of,  9  to  12  ; 

last. 

Habit,  72. 

13;    mediate,    17,   20;    attainable. 

Happiness,  25  to  35. 

27,  28  ;  subjective,  objective, 

ma- 

Hate,  60. 

terial,  formal,  24 ;  of  act,  48 ; 

and 

Heroism,  148. 

means,  48,  164. 

Hinderances  to  accountability,  6i  to 

Equivocation,  154. 

67. 

Eternal,  law,  83;  punishment,  109  to 

Hobbes,  44,  225. 

112. 

Homicide,  159. 

Evil,  37  to  39,  45. 

Honor,  143,  165,  166,  169. 

Example,  158. 

Hope,  6g,  141. 

Excuse  from  moral  law,  85. 

Human,  acts,  2,  5,  7,36,  45;  law,  82; 

Executive,  238,  251  to  254. 

binding,  93,  94. 

Expiation,  248. 

Husband,  211. 

Exposing  life,  145. 

Huxley's  theory  of  morals,  38. 

Ex  post  facto  law,  239. 

External  action,  52. 

Idolatry,  127. 
Ignorance,  62  to  64. 

Faculties,  higher  and  lower,  18 

.35; 

Immortality,  112. 

tend  to  God,  21 ;  need  society,  199. 

Immutability  of  natural  law,  87  to 

Faith,  124,  129. 

89. 

False  theories  of  morality,  44. 

Impiety,  127. 

Fear,  66,  69. 

Imputable,  53. 

Filial  piety,  75. 

Inalienable  rights,  119,  216,  220,  250. 

Finding  lost  articles,  182. 

Indifference  in  religion,  134  to  136. 

Formula  of  natural  law,  84. 

Indifferent  act,  45. 

Fortitude,  74,  79. 

Indirect  will,  50,  51. 

Friendship,  140. 

Infallibility,  139. 
Infanticide,  164. 

Glory  of  God,  22. 

Instinct,  44. 

Alphabetical  Index. 


165 


Intellect,  143. 

Interest,  87. 

International  law,  176,  255  ;  defined, 

256  ;  parts,   257  ;    principles,   259, 

260. 
Intolerance,  130. 
Israelites,  89. 

Joy,  69. 

Judiciary,  238,  243  to  250. 
yus  gentium,  176,  256. 
Justice,  75. 

Knowledge  of  natural  law,  90  to  92. 

Laborer,  189  to  192. 

Landed  property,  173. 

Last.end,  9,  13  to  16;  will,  185, 186. 

Law,  defined,  80 ;  requisites,  81  ; 
kinds,  82 ;  natural,  83  to  92  ;  hu- 
man, 93,  94  ;  of  nations,  176  ;  just, 
239;  penal,  240;  international,  176, 
255  to  260. 

Laxists,  104. 

Legislation,  238  to  242. 

Leo  XIII.,  quoted,  190,  192. 

Liceity,  104,  105. 

License  of  speech  and  press,  241. 

Lie,  153,  156,  157. 

Life,  right  to,  160. 

Lost  articles,  182. 

Love,  69  ;  of  God,  124,  140,  141 ;  due 
to  others,  146  to  149  ;  due  to  ene- 
mies, 150;  degrees  of,  151. 

Madison,  256. 

Magnanimity,  79. 

Mandeville,  44. 

Manslaughter,  159. 

Marriage,   2co;  ends  of,  201,    202; 

unity,  203  to  205 ;  indissolubility, 

206  to  208. 
Materialists,  38,  138. 


Mathathias,  162. 

Mean,  golden,  77. 

Means,  48,  164. 

Mental  reservation,  155,  157. 

Merit,  57  to  61. 

Minors,  188. 

Miracle,  131,  132. 

Misery,  23. 

Monarchy,  226. 

Moral,  good,  19,  39,  40  ;  sense,  44. 

Moral  Philosophy,  defined,  i ;  found- 
ed on  Mental,  3 ;  divided,  4. 

Morality,  36;  essence  of,  37  to  43; 
false  theories,  44  ;  determinants,  46 
to  52. 

Mortification,  78. 

Moses,  162. 

Murder,  159  to  162 

Mystery,  129,  130. 

Nation,  258. 

Natural  law,  82,  83;  formula  of,  84; 
no  excuse  firom,  85 ;  precepts  of, 
86;  immutable,  eternal,  87  to  89; 
known,  90  to  92. 

Necessity,  extreme,  149. 

Object  of  act,  47. 
Occupancy,  first,  174  to  176,  182. 
Offices,  197,  252. 
Ought,  39. 

Ownership,  170;  titles  to,  171  to  179; 
violations  of,  180. 

Paley,  44. 
Pantheists,  38,  138. 
Parental  authority,  211. 
Passions,  68  to  71,  143. 
Patience,  79. 
Penal  law,  240. 
Perfection,  kinds  of,  35. 
Piety,  filial,  75. 
Plato,  144. 
Pleasure,  19. 


1 66 


Alphabetical  Index. 


Polyandry,  204. 

Rigorists,  104. 

Polygamy,  205. 

Robbery,  180. 

Positive  laws,  82. 

Rousseau,  225,  234. 

Positivists,  38,  138. 

Prayer,  128. 

Sacrifice,  128. 

Precepts,  affirmative  and  negative. 

Sadness,  69. 

86. 

Sanction,  107  to  112. 

'Preference,  love  of,  141. 

Scandal,  158. 

Prescription,  182. 

Self-defense,  163,  164. 

Press,  license  of,  241. 

Self-distrust,  76. 

Prior  rights,  118, 123. 

Sense,  moral,  44. 

Private  enterprise,  242. 

Separation  a  foro,  207. 

Probability,  96,  98,  104. 

Servants,  219. 

Promulgation,  81. 

Simplicity,  76. 

Property,    170    to   174;    modes    of 

Sin,  mortal  and  venial,  43  ;   punish- 

acquiring, 171  to  179 ;  transfer  of. 

ment  of,  112. 

183  to  186. 

Slavery,  220. 

Prophecy,  131,  132. 

Social  contract,  234. 

Punishment,    eternal,    109    to    112; 

Socialism,  179,  242. 

civil,  247,  248  ;  capital,  249,  250. 

Society,  193;  kinds,  194;  authority, 

Pusillanimity,  76. 

19S  to  197 ;  universal,  198  ;  natural 

to   man,   198 ;    domestic,   200    to 

Rashness,  79. 

220 ;  civil,  221  to  254 ;  international. 

Reasoning,  139. 

255. 

Religion,  75,  124;  one  true,  136;  in 

Speech,  license  of,  241. 

education,  214. 

Spencer's  theory  of  morals,  38,  44. 

Repairing  damage,  181. 

State,    control    of    education,    215, 

Reservation,  mental,  155, 157. 

217;  rights  regarding  matrimony. 

Responsibility,  63. 

210. 

Restitution,  180. 

Stoics,  71. 

Resurrection,  29,  30. 

Strikes,  191. 

Revelation,  129  to  131 ;  kinds  of,  137, 

Suicide,  144,  145. 

138. 

Sui  juris,  221,  226. 

Right  and  wrong,  37  to  39. 

Summum  bonum,   109 ;  see   "  Beati- 

Rights, of  God,  55,  123;  of  life  and 

tude." 

death,   160 ;   of  societies,   195 ;  of 

Sunday,  241. 

domestic  society,  209 ;  of  civil  so- 

ciety, 227  to  234 ;  of  nations,  259 

Taxation,  177,  229. 

to  269. 

Temperance,  74,  78. 

Rights  and  duties,  113  to  116;  from 

Theft,  88,180. 

God,  117;  priority  of,  118;  kinds, 

Theories  of  morality,  44. 

119,  122;  in  conflict,  120,  121,  228; 

Timidity,  76. 

of  children,  216,  217. 

Titles  to  ownership,  171  to  179. 

Alphabetical  Index. 


167 


Transfer  of  property,  183  to  186. 
Treasury,  253. 
Tutiorists,  104, 

Unions,  labor,  191. 
United  States,  175,  224,  239. 
Useful,  19,  44. 
Utilitarianism,  44. 

Vices,  72  ;  against  religion,  127. 
Victorious  nation,  165. 
Violation  of  ownership,  180. 
Violence,  67. 


Virtues,  72  to  79. 
Virtus  in  medio,  77. 
Voxpopuli,  44,  239. 

Wages,  189  to  192. 

War,  263  to  266. 

Wife,  200,  205,  212. 

Will,  7, 68, 74  ;  indirect,  50, 51 ;  last, 

185,  186. 
Worship,  125,  126. 
Wrong,  see  "  Right." 

Zeno,  71. 


Z  5 

l?9S 


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